The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It
Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963.

The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.

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The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It
Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963.

The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.

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The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It

The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It

by David M. Toczek
The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It

The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It

by David M. Toczek

Hardcover

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Overview

Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963.

The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780313316753
Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date: 04/30/2001
Series: Contributions in Military Studies , #208
Pages: 224
Product dimensions: 6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.56(d)
Age Range: 1 Year

About the Author

DAVID M. TOCZEK is a serving US Army lieutenant colonel currently assigned to a NATO post in Heidelberg, Germany. A graduate of the United States Military Academy, he received his Master's in history from Texas Tech University and spent three years as a military history instructor and assistant professor in the Department of History, United States Military Academy, teaching at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.

Table of Contents

Foreword
Preface
The Background
The Belligerents
The Fight
The Aftermath
Conclusions
Appendix A: Brief Chronology of Events
Appendix B: Key American Leaders in Vietnam
Appendix C: The Ballad of Ap Bac
Appendix D: Operational Terms
Appendix E: ARVN Weapon Systems Characteristics
Appendix F: U.S. Army/ARVN Vehicle/Aircraft Characteristics
Selected Bibliography
Index

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