A History of the Modern Middle East offers a comprehensive assessment of the region, stretching from the fourteenth century and the founding of the Ottoman and Safavid empires through to the present-day protests and upheavals. The textbook focuses on Turkey, Iran, and the Arab countries of the Middle East, as well as areas often left out of Middle East history—such as the Balkans and the changing roles that Western forces have played in the region for centuries—to discuss the larger contexts and influences on the region's cultural and political development. Enriched by the perspectives of workers and professionals; urban merchants and provincial notables; slaves, students, women, and peasants, as well as political leaders, the book maps the complex social interrelationships and provides a pivotal understanding of the shifting shapes of governance and trajectories of social change in the Middle East.
Extensively illustrated with drawings, photographs, and maps, this text skillfully integrates a diverse range of actors and influences to construct a narrative that is at once sophisticated and lucid. A History of the Modern Middle East highlights the region's complexity and variation, countering easy assumptions about the Middle East, those who governed, and those they governed—the rulers, rebels, and rogues who shaped a region.
A History of the Modern Middle East offers a comprehensive assessment of the region, stretching from the fourteenth century and the founding of the Ottoman and Safavid empires through to the present-day protests and upheavals. The textbook focuses on Turkey, Iran, and the Arab countries of the Middle East, as well as areas often left out of Middle East history—such as the Balkans and the changing roles that Western forces have played in the region for centuries—to discuss the larger contexts and influences on the region's cultural and political development. Enriched by the perspectives of workers and professionals; urban merchants and provincial notables; slaves, students, women, and peasants, as well as political leaders, the book maps the complex social interrelationships and provides a pivotal understanding of the shifting shapes of governance and trajectories of social change in the Middle East.
Extensively illustrated with drawings, photographs, and maps, this text skillfully integrates a diverse range of actors and influences to construct a narrative that is at once sophisticated and lucid. A History of the Modern Middle East highlights the region's complexity and variation, countering easy assumptions about the Middle East, those who governed, and those they governed—the rulers, rebels, and rogues who shaped a region.
A History of the Modern Middle East: Rulers, Rebels, and Rogues
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A History of the Modern Middle East offers a comprehensive assessment of the region, stretching from the fourteenth century and the founding of the Ottoman and Safavid empires through to the present-day protests and upheavals. The textbook focuses on Turkey, Iran, and the Arab countries of the Middle East, as well as areas often left out of Middle East history—such as the Balkans and the changing roles that Western forces have played in the region for centuries—to discuss the larger contexts and influences on the region's cultural and political development. Enriched by the perspectives of workers and professionals; urban merchants and provincial notables; slaves, students, women, and peasants, as well as political leaders, the book maps the complex social interrelationships and provides a pivotal understanding of the shifting shapes of governance and trajectories of social change in the Middle East.
Extensively illustrated with drawings, photographs, and maps, this text skillfully integrates a diverse range of actors and influences to construct a narrative that is at once sophisticated and lucid. A History of the Modern Middle East highlights the region's complexity and variation, countering easy assumptions about the Middle East, those who governed, and those they governed—the rulers, rebels, and rogues who shaped a region.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780804798754 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Stanford University Press |
| Publication date: | 04/20/2016 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 544 |
| File size: | 38 MB |
| Note: | This product may take a few minutes to download. |
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A History of the Modern Middle East
Rulers, Rebels, and Rogues
By Betty S. Anderson
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2016 the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior UniversityAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-9875-4
CHAPTER 1
BIRTH OF EMPIRES
The Ottoman and Safavid Empires through the 18th Century
STARTING AS EARLY AS THE 6TH CENTURY but accelerating thereafter, Turkic and Mongol tribes migrated from the area roughly situated at the crossroads of today's Russia, Mongolia, Northern China, and Kazakhstan. Over the centuries, successive waves marched through present-day Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, establishing a series of Turkic and Mongol dynasties along the way, the last of which was the long-lived Mughal Empire in India (1526–1857). Turkic tribes also traveled southwest, across the Iranian plateau and into Anatolia and the Middle East. In 1055, the Turkic Seljuks conquered the Abbasid capital of Baghdad. Although they became the de facto rulers, calling themselves sultans (derived from the Arabic word for authority), they retained the Abbasid caliphs as titular heads of the empire.
In the face of internal dissension and threats posed by the arrival of new and stronger Turkic confederations, the Seljuks could not maintain cohesion; in 1194 the empire disintegrated, and the Abbasid Empire as a whole fell to the Mongol descendants of Genghis Khan (ca. 1162–1127) in 1258. The region between Anatolia and India came under the control of the empires of the Ilkhanid Mongols (1256–1335) and the Timurids (1370–1507). During the rise and fall of these many empires, the Byzantine Empire continued to rule from Constantinople. Its territories in the Levant and North Africa were lost to the Muslims, and Anatolia became a battleground as Turkic Muslim leaders pushed their way west. The defenses around the capital city slowly weakened.
Birth of the Ottoman Empire
It was in these conditions that the Ottoman Empire arose and came to rule territories from the European Balkans through Anatolia, to the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa between the 14th century and the empire's demise in 1923. Originating from the Oghuz tribe and taking the name from the family's founder, Osman I (r. 1299–1326), the family migrated from Central Asia, worked for a time in service to the Seljuks, and then began to acquire power independent of any other tribe in the region. During the 14th century, the Ottomans became the preeminent Anatolian power and in 1346 captured the first of the wealthy, fertile lands of the European Balkans. In 1453, Sultan Mehmet II (r. 1444–1446; 1451–1481) captured the Byzantine capital of Constantinople at the head of a military force that was arguably the most powerful military in the world. From this base in the renamed Istanbul, the Ottomans established an empire that lasted for centuries.
The Ottoman waves of conquest from the late 13th to the 16th centuries peaked under Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (the Lawgiver, r. 1520–1566), when his army stood at the gates of Vienna in 1529. While his army could not bring down the walls of the Hapsburg imperial capital, the Ottoman army was still strong enough to hold new territories in Greece and the Balkan provinces between Istanbul and Vienna and to extend its conquest to North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula over the following years. Nonetheless, the defeat did signal that the Ottoman advance was slowing; by the end of the 17th century it had stopped completely. The Russians defeated the Ottomans at the northern shore of the Black Sea in 1670, and another attempt to capture Vienna in 1683 failed. In the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz, the Ottomans ceded much of Hungary to the Austrians after yet another defeat. The Ottoman era of military expansion was over although the empire would survive more than two centuries before it came to an end in the aftermath of World War I.
Birth of the Safavid Empire
Shaykh Safi al-Din (1252–1334) established the Safavid Sunni Sufi order in the province of Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran and attracted followers in areas from Egypt to India in the 13th and 14th centuries. In the quest for an empire in the 15th century, the family allied with a confederation of tribes called Qizilbash, named for the distinctive red turbans worn by the warriors, and converted to Shi'ism. In 1501, Shah Isma'il (r. 1501–1524) and the Qizilbash established the Safavid Empire by successfully capturing the Azerbaijani capital of Tabriz and conquering the rest of modern-day Iran and most of Iraq. But attempts to expand farther were thwarted to the west by the superior army of the Ottomans, leading to the Safavid defeat at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 and the eventual loss of Baghdad to Ottoman rule. To the east, the Safavids continued to battle the Uzbeks for land along their shared frontiers and the Mughals for the city of Qandahar.
The height of Safavid power occurred under Shah Abbas I (r. 1588–1629). The shah monopolized revenues collected along the major trade routes that traversed Iran and from his new capital in Isfahan presided over a centralized administrative structure. However, his successors struggled with economic problems and could not maintain an armed force sufficient for fending off invaders. As a result, the Safavids fell under the sway of an Afghan tribe in 1722, and in 1736 all pretense of Safavid rule was eliminated when Nader Shah Afshar (r. 1736–1747) removed the Safavid puppet shah from the throne. Iran remained fragmented geographically and politically until the Qajar dynasty from Azerbaijan chose Tehran as its capital and established its rule across Iran in 1796.
Ottoman and Safavid Differences and Similarities
The Ottoman and Safavid Empires differed in many respects, from the religious institutions they propagated to the relationships they negotiated with power brokers in their regions. The Ottoman sultans represented themselves as the protectors of orthodox Sunni Islam, especially after their conquest of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem in the early 16th century. The Safavid shahs imposed Shi'i Islam on Iran, established a clerical establishment to oversee it, and inextricably connected the religion to the ruling powers.
The Ottomans created a governing structure led by specially trained officials at the imperial center complemented by a host of intermediaries tasked with representing the sultan's interests in the provinces. The system, characterized by complex sets of dependent relationships, largely destroyed the independence of the tribes and princes who had aided the Ottoman conquest and of the Muslim and non-Muslim religious clerics who had held comparable influence before the Ottoman rise.
The Safavids succeeded in building a centralized state structure under Shah Abbas I that weakened the Qizilbash tribesmen as independent players. But the state struggled to counter the independent power of their newly established Shi'i clerical institution and the autonomy of the many tribes in the provinces.
* * *
SUFISM
Simultaneously with the work done to codify the doctrines of the Sunni and Shi'i sects, those who came to be called Sufis (named possibly after the wool of the simple cloaks many early Sufis wore) were studying the Quran to find a mystical connection to God. Some meditated over the 99 names of God (dhikr), others danced (dervishes), and still others brought their breathing down to the lowest possible level, all so they could feel God's love inside them. Once Sufis had perfected their path to God, they passed it on to their followers, who slowly began to create permanent brotherhoods training successive generations of followers. The process paralleled that of scholars focusing on the elements of Islamic law. Recognizable Sufi brotherhoods began to form across the Muslim world in the 11th century. These brotherhoods guided their followers in the proper rituals, and their leaders and prominent families frequently became local influential political players.
* * *
The Ottomans presided over a diverse, wealthy economy that could withstand fluctuations in the world economy, whereas the Safavids stood on a more precarious economic foundation. Extensive irrigation works needed to be maintained for crops to grow on the Iranian plateau, and all revenues from export products had to be monopolized by the state to support the empire's military and administrative structure.
Nevertheless, these two empires had many elements in common, from their Turkic tribal origins to the governmental structures they established and the paths to royal legitimacy they articulated. The Ottomans were a Turkic tribe leading the conquest across Anatolia, and the Safavids required support from the Qizilbash, a confederation of Turkic tribes, in their quest for empire. Both leaderships spoke Turkish yet glorified Persian as the language of arts, architecture, and culture. In both empires, the religious creed associated with the ruling family had been a heterodox, flexible amalgamation of religious ideas during the time of conquest but became an orthodox faith with a hierarchical structure based on shari'a law once the polity had become settled. The Safavid family was perceived as legitimate rulers because of their long-standing leadership over the Safavid Sufi order, as well as the family's many blood ties with renowned Turkic tribes and the Byzantine royal family. In the first years of the empire, the family also came to claim descent from 'Ali and the Shi'i imams, thus adding an element of divinity to their already illustrious family line. The Ottomans had no such lineage, but they spent the first 100 years of their rule writing one into existence so that they could represent themselves as equals of the many eminent dynasties that had preceded them.
None of these elements could have been successful, however, if the early Ottoman and Safavid leaders had not been adept at negotiating the many alliances required to construct an armed force sufficient for achieving their imperial goals. The sultans and shahs had to earn their allies, even in the case of the Safavids, who had a built-in group of supporters for their Sufi order. They did so primarily by winning battles and distributing wealth and influence to those who chose to fight alongside them. Anatolia, Azerbaijan, and the Iranian plateau were filled with tribes and princely rulers with the potential for establishing dynasties under their own names. Through military prowess and strategic alliances both the Ottomans and Safavids succeeded in defeating the strongest of them and incorporating the rest into their military force.
The leaders of the Ottoman and Safavid Empires proved equally skillful at locating the types of allies they needed to govern a settled polity. The Ottomans transitioned the Turkic tribal allies of the conquest phase into provincial government officials; simultaneously, they elevated specially trained officials to their administration and the elite corps of their military. The Safavids worked to undermine the power of the Qizilbash tribal allies by centralizing power within a governmental administration led by Persian administrators. In this process, Persian administrators became the new intermediaries connecting shahs to subjects and resources.
The Ottomans and Safavids were victorious in both conquest and governance because they combined effective narratives of legitimacy with practical negotiating skills that enabled them to secure the services of useful allies. By offering expertise to their sultans and shahs in return for a measure of influence over their respective realms, thousands of military leaders, tribal shaykhs, urban merchants, clerics, officials, and administrators became stakeholders in the systems of Ottoman and Safavid governance. The largesse flowing from the imperial centers, and the skills proffered by these intermediaries in return, kept the complex imperial gears oiled and in motion.
Ottoman Legitimacy
The centuries of Islamic and Turco-Mongol rule throughout Central Asia and the Middle East had established lineage as a key element in any claim to governance. The Abbasids attracted followers because of their descent from the Prophet's family; the Ilkhanids, because of their descent from Genghis Khan; and the Mughals, from Timur (r. 1370–1405) of the Timurid dynasty. Lineage was important because it limited the number of possible claimants to the throne, making it difficult for upstarts from new families to challenge those already established as rulers throughout the region. It was nevertheless possible for a new family to rule, provided it had the military might and was able to coax a member of a legitimate ruling family to act as a figurehead. For example, when the Seljuks conquered Baghdad in 1055, they could not rule in their own name because they had no lineage granting them the independent right to do so. Instead, they received accreditation from the Abbasid caliphs to rule in the Abbasid name. Even Timur, who would come to rule over the powerful Timurid Empire, which produced many other dynasties in the region, had to rule from behind a member of Genghis Khan's family for a few years before he and his successors could rule on their own. Once in power, all of the ruling families bolstered their legitimacy by claiming they ruled in order to protect the Islamic faith and its believers; they also built grand mosques, tombs, and schools and provided security for the ulama as they adjudicated shari'a law.
Anatolia in the late 13th and early 14th centuries was a mélange of Turkic and Christian principalities loosely overseen by the Byzantine emperor. The Ottomans came to the military fore because they cleverly married into families of Muslim and Christian faith — and even into a faction of the Byzantine ruling family — as part of their gambit to become the strongest power broker in the region. From the earliest days, the Ottoman leadership also constructed a narrative that provided the family with a lineage tailored for ruling an empire. The sultans commissioned historical works of the family's ancestors that, in various chronicles, tied the Ottomans back to the oldest son of Oghuz Khan, who conquered much of Central Asia, or to the last Seljuk sultan, who designated an Ottoman leader as his official successor. These stories, however fictitious, designated the Ottoman family as standing among the small group who could demand allegiance because of their connections to great conquerors of the past.
Religious Mandate
From the beginning of their Anatolian enterprise, the Ottomans attracted followers because they presented themselves as divinely guided warriors for Islam (ghazis) fighting against the Christian infidel princes and the Muslim Turkic tribes who refused to follow their lead. But by the time of the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman sultans were turning away from this fervid charisma-based militancy and began to represent themselves as protectors of Sunni orthodoxy. The story of heterodox frontier warriors new to Islam and lacking in religious legitimacy gave way to the Ottomans as uniquely qualified to oversee the affairs of the Sunni faith. They had defeated the Eastern Orthodox Byzantine Empire in the name of Islam and, as of the early 16th century, presided over Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, the holiest sites in Islam. To strengthen this perception, sultans built grandiose mosques and schools, necessary emblems of religious overlordship and, simultaneously, proof of the exceptional wealth and power the Ottomans wielded since no other family could build such architectural gems. Chronicles of this era also manufactured stories of Ottoman ancestors who served the major figures of monotheism, such as Abraham and Muhammad.
Governance Mandate
The Ottoman sultans presented themselves not only as guardians of the faith but as the purveyors of just governance for their subjects. The Ottomans dispersed authority among many stakeholders throughout the empire so that no one group could grow too powerful or abusive over those they ruled. The sultan's subjects were obligated to fulfill their duties to him; in return he protected them from the worst depredations of those in power. To establish this system, the Ottomans promised to guarantee security along the trade routes for merchants large and small; protection for urban artisans producing the manufactured goods of the empire; and at least a subsistence level of living for the peasants, the largest group of the sultan's subjects. A concomitant element of this concept of just governance touched on the protection role the Ottomans claimed for themselves over the Sunni faith. The state provided the stability that allowed the ulama to adjudicate the Islamic faith and for the followers to feel secure in practicing its tenets.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from A History of the Modern Middle East by Betty S. Anderson. Copyright © 2016 the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
Contents and AbstractsPrologue: Islam and the Prophet's Successors chapter abstractThis chapter introduces the historical events surrounding the rise of Islam, the main pillars of the faith, and the reasons behind the schism between Sunnis and Shia. It follows the Arab armies as they moved beyond the Arabian Peninsula and established empires led by caliphs in Damascus (Umayyad) and Baghdad (Abbasid). During the reign of the Abbasids, religious scholars codified Islamic law (sharia) by using reasoned interpretations of the messages contained within the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet. The Abbasid Empire collapsed with the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258. The topics of this chapter are referenced throughout the book as later empires ruled over the Muslim world and as Arabs looked back on these days as a golden age defining the beginnings of their national identities.
1Birth of Empires: The Ottoman and Safavid Empires through the 18th Century chapter abstractThis chapter begins with the founding stories of the Ottoman and Safavid Empires and ends in the 18th century with the fragmentation of the former and the destruction of the latter. The chapter analyzes the systems of governance established in each empire because the institutions built within them proved influential well into the 19th and 20th centuries. The Ottoman sultans presented themselves as protectors of Sunni Islam and succeeded in ruling over a diverse population by training slaves for political and military positions in the halls of imperial governance and contracting with intermediaries to govern the provinces. The Safavid shahs established Shii Islam as the state religion and centralized an Iran that had been politically fragmented for centuries. Both empires faced increasing economic and military pressure from the British, French, Russians and Austrians.
2Reform and Rebellion: The Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Qajar Iran in the 19th Century chapter abstractThis chapter examines the reform programs initiated in the 19th century by leaders in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and the newly established Qajar Empire. Western-style military, educational, legal, and administrative reforms were introduced with the hope that centralized governance could be achieved which would be able to prevent European incursions. The Ottoman Empire and Egypt went into debt paying for these reforms, Egypt was colonized by Britain, and the Qajars struggled to centralize, but the reforms within these territories had lasting effects on governance and society. Newly trained provincial and imperial leaders gained power, and populations were brought into direct contact with their governments through taxation and conscription. The relationship between monarch and subject began to transform into a relationship between state and citizen, mediated by constitutions and the standardization and codification of law.
3Social Transformations: Workers and Nationalists in Egypt, Mount Lebanon, and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century chapter abstractThis chapter examines how populations reacted to the reforms discussed in Chapter 2. The reforms were top-down measures introduced by shahs, sultans and their representatives but the opportunities they created for individuals to enter new schools, professions, and military roles catalyzed widespread socio-economic changes unanticipated by the reforms' authors. Rebels opposed European colonial incursions and state attempts to centralize control. New landowners built powerful client networks, consolidating economic and political power. Workers went on strike in industries that had not existed in the Middle East before the middle of the 19th century. Egyptians, Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, and the peoples of the Balkans organized national movements to gain new political rights from the Ottoman Empire and the European colonizers.
4The Great War: Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire from Revolution to World War I chapter abstractThis chapter details the formation of Iranian and Turkish national identities and the revolutionary movements that instituted constitutions and parliaments in Qajar and Ottoman governments on the eve of World War I. Newly trained soldiers, students, and professionals in the Ottoman Empire pushed the old elites from power. In Qajar Iran, the ulama and bazaaris rebelled alongside the new social cadres to weaken the power of the shah. The war ended with the collapse of the empires, and new Iranian, Turkish and Egyptian states emerged. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan became mandates under French and British rule. The British and French created these new states with little input from the people living within them, while also promising that the Zionist movement of Europe could establish a national homeland in Palestine.
5State Formation and Colonial Control: Turkey, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia in the 1920s and 1930s chapter abstractThis chapter examines the difficulties the Iranians, Turks, British, French, and the newly designated Syrians, Lebanese, Transjordanians, Saudi Arabians, and Iraqis faced in establishing new states. Rebellions in Turkey and Iran led to the formation of independent and authoritarian governments under Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal. In the Arab mandates, the British and French repressed rebellions and set up local governments led by the old notables who had performed the same function for the Ottoman Empire before the war. The notables' authority was challenged by the new social cadres protesting government collusion with the colonizers and the hegemony of local elites. This chapter illustrates how difficult it was to establish new states in the Middle East because the borders were artificial and few new citizens were being served by their governments.
6Rebels and Rogues: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, and Israel in the Interwar Years chapter abstractThis chapter analyzes how the Great Depression, in concert with the expanded school systems, industrial bases, and militaries, politicized many in the growing urban populations. Starting with Egypt, the chapter examines the country's dysfunctional electoral process and its uneven economic development. Students, workers, professionals, and military and paramilitary units took to the streets demanding that government become more participatory. World War II ended with the independence of the Arab mandates. None of the protesters' demands were addressed, however, despite the withdrawal of British and French forces. The conflict between the Palestinians and Jews in Palestine culminated in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the establishment of the state of Israel, with Israel claiming most of Palestine, and Egypt and Jordan controlling the remainder.
7Military Coups: Politics and Violence: Iran, Turkey, and the Arab States, 1952 - 1980 chapter abstractThis chapter examines the ideologies of the most influential political parties that emerged in this period and describes the military coups that overturned governance throughout the region. Rebellions broke out after WWII as students, professionals, workers, paramilitary and military units demanded more populist and socialist policies. In the Arab countries, the Bath and Communist parties pushed for more equitable economic structures and independence from imperialist control. Military officers in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq staged military coups to introduce reforms, and the kings of Jordan and Saudi Arabia were forced to adjust their economic policies to address citizen demands. In Turkey, years of vibrant electoral competition were followed by short periods of military rule. The Iranian shah became increasingly authoritarian after the US CIA helped him subdue a rising nationalist movement.
8Cold War Battles: The Suez Crisis, Arab-Israeli Conflicts, and the Lebanese Civil War chapter abstractThe chapter examines the wars that emerged within the context of the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Starting with the Baghdad Pact, the states of the Middle East chose sides in the Cold War, with Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and initially Iraq joining the United States' side and the others trying to remain neutral but finding themselves drawn to the Soviet side. Arabs and Israelis fought each other in the Suez Crisis of 1956, the 1967 War, and the 1973 War. Egypt made peace with Israel; the Palestinians formed their own fedayeen units to fight Israel. The Israelis and the Palestinians—as well as the surrounding Arab states, the US, and the Soviet Union—all participated in the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1990 in which the country's sectarian groups were pitted against each other.
9Rulers for Life: State Construction, Consolidation, and Collapse chapter abstractThis chapter examines how the leaders in the Middle East managed to hold power for extended periods. They succeeded because they controlled their country's military forces but they also had to address the needs of their populace. States expanded the social safety nets to bring schooling, health care, and jobs to most of the population. Constitutions, parliaments, political parties, and elections mobilized populations for state projects but personality cults, security organizations, and control over all aid and state funds ensured presidential and monarchical hegemony for decades. The only state leader to fall was the Iranian shah because he faced massive nationwide protest against his rule. All the tools he and his colleagues used to maintain their authority failed, and the shah's government was replaced by a new Islamic Republic.
10Upheaval: Islamism, Invasion, and Rebellion from the 1990s into the 21st Century chapter abstractThis chapter examines economic and political challenges of recent years. The 1970s witnessed a privatization process of nationalized industries in Egypt and Turkey, and the other countries followed suit. The breakdown of the states' social welfare nets helped catalyze rebellions against the states, first from left-leaning students and workers and then from religiously-oriented Sunni university and professional groups. Most participants wanted to reform society so that people could live pious lives. A small number were militant Islamists who wanted to forcibly inaugurate Islamic elements. Shia and Kurds in Iraq organized to fight for national rights, and the US invaded Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11. Palestinians and Israelis unsuccessfully worked toward peace.
Epilogue: Revolution, Reaction, and Civil War chapter abstractThe 21st century witnessed massive demonstrations to overthrow longtime government leaders, reflecting the collective mobilization that had taken place for years within new political parties, labor unions, and social media. However, societies also became fragmented, making sectarian division, civil war, and conflict ever-present. Syria has become the epicenter because the protests over authoritarian state policies that began in 2011 evolved within only a couple of months into a countrywide civil war. Its effects have spread throughout the region and into Europe. Groups such as ISIS in Syria and Iraq are fighting to overthrow the foundations of their governing bodies. Because of the civil war in Syria, the failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and dire economic conditions across the region, millions of refugees struggle to gain access to basic foodstuffs, jobs, health care, housing, and education. The direction from here is uncertain.