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A System Of Pragmatic Idealism
Volume II The Validity Of Values A Normative Theory of Evaluative Rationality
By Nicholas Rescher PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1993 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-07393-4
CHAPTER 1
The Reach of Reason
The Universality of Reason
Rationality is a matter of the intelligent pursuit of appropriate objectives—of proceeding in what we do in line with cogent reasons. Whether in cognitive, practical, or evaluative matters, rationality accordingly has two distinguishable although inseparable aspects: the one personal, private, and particular; the other impersonal, public, and universal. The private (particularized) aspect turns on what is advisable for the agent, duly considering his or her own personal situation and circumstances—the agent's idiosyncratic information, experience, opportunities, capabilities, talents, objectives, aspirations, needs, and wants. (Note that we here construe "circumstances" very broadly, including not only the outer and situational but also the inner conditions that relate to a person's physical and psychological condition and makeup.) The universal aspect of rationality turns on its being advisable by standards that are person indifferent and objectively cogent for anyone in those circumstances to proceed in a "rationally appropriate" way in the matters at issue. The standards of rational cogency are unrestricted and general, in the sense that what is rational for one person will also be rational for anyone else who is in the same condition. Both aspects, the situational and the universal, are inseparable facets of rationality as standardly conceived.
For a belief, action, or evaluation to qualify as rational, the agent must (in theory at least) be in a position to "give an account" of it on whose basis others can see that "it is only right and proper" to resolve the issue in that way. An intelligent, detached observer, apprised of the facts of the case, must be in a position to say: "While I myself do not happen to believe or pursue or value these things, I can see that it is appropriate that someone in the agent's circumstances should do so and in consequence realize that it was altogether sensible for the agent to have proceeded in that way." People's circumstances differ, but the standards of rationality that govern their comportment are universal. It lies in the very meaning of the concept of rationality as such that if something is indeed "the rational thing to do," then it must be possible in principle for anyone to recognize the rational sense of it once enough information is secured.
To be sure, considerations of rationality may not constrain to uniqueness. We speak of the rational resolution of an issue when there indeed is only one, but also of a rational resolution when there are various alternatives that are inherently no less acceptable. Moreover, while it is indeed irrational to make rationally suboptimal judgments, this is capable of degrees where there are ever more serious deviations. Departures from rationality are certainly not of a piece in point of severity.
Rational belief, action, and evaluation are possible only in situations where there are cogent grounds (and not just compelling personal motives) for what one does. The idea of rationality is in principle inapplicable where one is at liberty to make up one's rules as one goes along—to have no settled and predetermined norms or standards at all. The dictates of rationality proceed under the aegis of objective and impersonal standards. This matter of good reasons and cogent grounds is not something subjective or idiosyncratic; that good reasons indeed are good reasons is something that is objective and lies in the public domain. Both the appropriateness of ends (for a person of particular makeup, talents, tastes, and the like) and the suitability of particular means for pursuing those particular ends pose objective issues that are open to others every bit as much as to the agents themselves. Indeed, with respect both to someone's needs and to their best interests, other informed people (one's doctor, one's lawyer, one's tax adviser, and so on) may well be in a position to make better and wiser—that is, more rational—judgments than the individual can. An isolated Robinson Crusoe may well act in a perfectly rational way, but he can do so only by doing what hypothetically would make sense for others in similar circumstances. He must in principle be in a position to persuade other people to endorse his course of action by an appeal to impersonal general principles to show them that his actions were appropriate in the circumstances, either uniquely or no less so than the alternatives. Rationality is thus something inherently universal in its operations.
The circumstantiality of reason reflects an unavoidable element of person relativity. Our concrete rational commitments are indeed universal, but only circumstantially universal in a way that makes room for the variation of times, places, and the thousands of details of each individual and situation. What it was rational for Galen to believe in his day, given the cognitive state of the art in antiquity regarding medical matters, is in general no longer rational for us to believe today. The routines of training and practice that a young man who is a "natural athlete" can appropriately set for himself may not make sense for a young cripple or an active septuagenarian. Obviously, what it is rational for someone to do or to think hinges on the particular details of how one is circumstanced—and the prevailing circumstances differ from person to person and group to group. The rulings of rationality are indeed subject to person relativity, but one that proceeds in an impersonal way in taking personal conditions and circumstances into account.
Consider an example. I am hungry; I go to a restaurant; I order a meal. Have I acted rationally? Of course. But why exactly? Because a long story can correctly be told about what I have done, a story in which all of the following play a significant role: my well-evidentiated beliefs that eating food alleviates hunger pangs and nourishes the body; my appropriate conviction that restaurants provide food; my sensible preference for physical health and for the comfort of satiation over the discomfort of hunger; my custom of doing what I effectively can to alleviate discomfort and promote well-being, and the like. The whole chain—alleviate discomfort, proceed to secure food, go to a food supplier, order food—is part and parcel of the rationality-dictated rationale of my action. If the chain were severed at any point (if, for example, I realized that the restaurant had run out of food last week), then my action in proceeding to the restaurant to order that meal would cease to be rational in the circumstances.
One proceeds rationally only when one's actions can be subsumed under a universal principle of rationality that holds good generally and for everyone. In the restaurant I study the menu and order steak. Was it rational of me to do so? Of course—because I was hungry, came to eat something at the restaurant, and found steak to be the most appealing entry on the menu, thus proceeding on the principle "Presented with various options for food (and other things being equal), select that which one deems the tastiest." (To be sure, other things may not be equal—my choice of beef might deeply offend my dinner guest, who deems cattle sacred.) Here we have a strictly universal principle, one that it makes perfectly good rational sense for anyone to act on. Though clearly not every sensible person would order steak, nevertheless, under the aegis of the indicated principle, I could be said to have acted rationally only when I have done what any sensible person would. Similarly, any rational choice must be "covered" by a universally valid desideratum. It must implement, in its particular context, a principle that is of strictly universal validity—although, to be sure, one that is of a conditional nature.
Again, some things we desire for ourselves ("Mary as a wife"); others we see as universal desiderata that hold generally and for everyone ("having a good spouse if married"). Now, the crucial fact is that a personal want or preference qualifies as rational only insofar as it can be subordinated to something that is an unrestrictedly universal desideratum (all else being equal). Only insofar as I am convinced that Mary will prove to be an instance of something that everyone can acknowledge as desirable at a sufficiently high level of generality (having one's marriage partner be "a good spouse," "a caring helpmeet," "a desirable mate," "a delightful companion," or some such) will my own personal desire to have her for a wife be a rational one. Only those acts that instantiate in this way something that deserves the rather pompous title of a "universal principle of reason" can qualify as rational. It is not "being the last to cross the bridge safely" that would be rationally advisable for anyone and everyone to opt for in relevant circumstances but only something like "gaining one's way to safety from a dangerous situation." Only those acts whose salient characterization is universally rational at some level of abstraction are rational at all.
The ground of the universality of reason is not far to seek. It is rooted in the nature of interests. Something can be in my (real) interests only by being an item of a generic type that is in everyone's (real) interests. It is in my interest to take a particular medicine because it is generally in anyone's and everyone's interest to care for their health. Any valid interest—any that merits the acknowledgment of reason—must inhere in a universal interest (as the validity of an interest in tennis rooted in a generic need for exercise or skill development). And the very raison d'etre of reason is as a servant of our interests, in being both the ultimate arbiter of what those interests are and the appropriate guide to their realization.
The contention "What's rational for you need not be so for me" is certainly correct—within limits. Consider the medical analogy. You might do well to eat chocolate to provide the calories needed for the strenuous outdoor life you lead; for me, with my diabetes, it would be a very bad thing indeed. And so, low-level recommendations like "Eat chocolate" indeed fall into the range of the just-stated dictum. But with "Eat the foods conducive to maintaining your health" the matter stands very differently, and we have moved to a much higher level of generality. And finally with "Do what best furthers the realization of your real best interests" we have reached a level where there is no variability. What is right and proper here in point of rationality is right and proper for everybody. Similarly, at the higher level of governing principles, rationality is increasingly compelling and universal. The uniformity of overarching rational principles transcends the variability of their particular cultural implementations. Different cultures do indeed implement a rational principle like "Be in a position to substantiate your claims" very differently. (For one thing, there are culturally or historically different standards as to what constitutes a proper "substantiation" for claims.) But they cannot simply abandon it. If they convert to "It's all right to maintain anything that suits your fancy," they do not have a different mode of cognitive rationality; rather, in this respect at any rate, they are simply deficient in cognitive rationality. The characteristic nature of the cognitive enterprise as such imposes limits in its appropriate pursuit.
To be sure, the question "What is the rational thing to believe or to do?" must receive the indecisive answer: "That depends." It depends on context and situation, on conditions and circumstances. At the level of the question "What is rational; what should properly be believed or done?" a many-sided and pluralistic response is called for. The way in which people proceed to give a rational justification of something—whether a belief, an action, or an evaluation—is unquestionably variable and culture relative. We mortals cannot speak with the tongues of angels. The means by which we actually pursue our ends in the setting of any major project—whether rationality, morality, communication, or nourishment—are "culture dependent" and "context variable." Nevertheless, those projects themselves—in terms of the objectives and ideals that define them and of the basic principles that implement these objectives, aims, and ideals—have a uniform and universal validity. Greek medicine is something very different from modern medicine. But the aims of the enterprise—-"the maintenance of health," "the relief of distressing symptoms," "the prolongation of life," and the like—are similar throughout. These aims, after all, define the issue, indicating that it is medicine we are talking about rather than, say, basket weaving. This is so with rationality itself as well. Rationality is, after all, a definite sort of enterprise with a characteristic goal structure of its own—the pursuit of appropriately adopted ends by intelligently selected means. The defining principles that determine rationality's particular nature as the sort of thing it is make for an inevitable uniformity.
Cultivation Hierarchies
But how can the absolutistic universality of the defining principles of rationality—themselves rooted in the monolithic uniformity of "what rationality is"—be reconciled with the pluralistic diversity of appropriate answers to the question "What is it rational to do?"
The answer lies in the fact that various intermediate levels, or strata, of consideration separate the "basic principles of rationality" from concrete decisions about what it is rational to do in the various particular conditions that prevail. The tabulation of display 1.1 depicts this descending hierarchy of principles, norms and standards, rules, and (finally) rulings, which composes the structure of rationale development. There is a distinctive hierarchical continuum of levels throughout. At the top of the hierarchy, the defining principles of rationality specify the characterizing aims of the enterprise. They explicate what is at issue: the giving of good reasons for what we do, the provision of a reasonable account, the telling of a sensible story (logon didonai, rationem reddere). The characteristic mission of rationality is that of providing an account of our dealings, of committing ourselves in the context of our affairs to "making sense," of rendering our dealings intelligible, of conducting our affairs intelligently. At the next level down, the governing norms and standards are our yardsticks of rational procedure: basic principles of logic, canons of inductive reasoning, standards of evidence, and the like, which already admit of some variation.
Then, descending further, we encounter the "rules of the game" that specify the procedures through which we implement ends and objectives of the enterprise in the concrete context of particular cases. Finally, at the bottom level, come the specific resolutions for particular cases achieved through the subsumption of concrete cases under the rules. (It is clearly these last that vary most of all.) Such a "cultivation hierarchy" (as we shall call it) characterizes any purposively oriented human endeavor. It takes the format:
1. governing "finalities": the characterizing aims of the enterprise (governing principles);
2. implementing policies (guiding norms and standards; basic values and desiderata);
3. methods of procedure (operating rules);
4. specific rulings.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from A System Of Pragmatic Idealism by Nicholas Rescher. Copyright © 1993 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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