Acts of Compassion in Greek Tragic Drama

by James Franklin Johnson

Overview

The ability of human beings to feel compassion or empathy for one another—and express that emotion by offering comfort or assistance—is an important antidote to violence and aggression. In ancient Greece, the epics of Homer and the tragic dramas performed each spring in the Theater of Dionysus offered citizens valuable lessons concerning the necessity and proper application of compassionate action. This book is the first full-length examination of compassion (eleos or oiktos in Greek) as a dramatic theme in ancient Greek literature.

Through careful textual analysis, James F. Johnson surveys the treatment of compassion in the epics of Homer, especially the Iliad, and in the works of the three great Athenian tragedians: Aischylos, Euripides, and Sophokles. He emphasizes reciprocity, reverence, and retribution as defining features of Greek compassion during the Homeric and Archaic periods. In framing his analysis, Johnson distinguishes compassion from pity. Whereas in English the word “pity” suggests an attitude of superiority toward the sufferer, the word “compassion” has a more positive connotation and implies equality in status between subject and object. Although scholars have conventionally translated eleos and oiktos as “pity,” Johnson argues that our modern-day notion of compassion comes closest to encompassing the meaning of those two Greek words. Beginning with Homer, eleos normally denotes an emotion that entails action of some sort, whereas oiktos usually refers to the emotion itself. Johnson also draws associations between compassion and the concepts of fear and pity, which Aristotle famously attributed to tragedy.

Because the Athenian plays are tragedies, they mainly show the disastrous consequences of a world where compassion falls short. At the same time, they offer glimpses into a world where compassion can generate a more beneficial—and therefore more hopeful—outcome. Their message resonates with today’s readers as much as it did for fifth-century Athenians.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780806151663
Publisher:	University of Oklahoma Press
Publication date:	05/16/2016
Series:	Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture , #53
Pages:	320
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 8.90(h) x 1.20(d)

About the Author

James Franklin Johnson is Professor Emeritus of Classics at Austin College, Sherman, Texas, and is coeditor of Workbooks I and II to accompany Athenaze, a textbook series for learning ancient Greek.

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Acts of Compassion in Greek Tragic Drama

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By James Franklin Johnson

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS

Copyright © 2016 University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Publishing Division of the University
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8061-5492-3

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CHAPTER 1

HOMER AND ARCHAIC GREECE

The Traditional Elements

Perhaps the most conspicuous occurrence of compassion in ancient Greece is in response to the phenomenon of supplication: the suppliant falls to his or her knees or crouches, clasps the knees and sometimes touches the chin of the person being supplicated while reciting, either briefly or at length, his request. He or she usually tries to encourage a positive response by citing reasons why he should receive compassion or mercy, such as recalling previous service to the supplicandus, promising future ransom, or invoking family ties. Supplication can (1) be made directly to the person to be supplicated or (2) take the form of first seeking asylum at the altar of a god or on other sacred ground and then asking for aid or protection from an individual or a group. Although the latter method does not occur and is very rarely alluded to in Homer, the former technique or ritual is common even in our earliest Greek epics.

THE RELIGIOUS NATURE OF SUPPLICATION

Apart from previous ties that the suppliant may invoke as an owed debt, the sanction that allows a suppliant to expect that his request for compassion or mercy will at least be heard and possibly be granted is primarily religious in nature. Zeus is not only the protector of oaths (Zeus Horkios) but also the protector of strangers, hosts, and guests (Zeus Xeinios) and the protector of suppliants (Zeus Hiketesios or, later, Hikesios). The aspects of Zeus Xeinios and Zeus Hiketesios are occasionally linked. Zeus's protection is so formidable that even other gods are said to be obliged to respect the sanctity of suppliants (Odyssey 5.447–48), for aggression against Zeus's ward is aggression against Zeus himself. Pedrick (1982) denies that divine sanctions enforce acts of supplication in the Iliad, but finds such protection in the Odyssey. Indeed, the latter epic makes Zeus's protection of suppliants much more explicit, but Zeus's assurance to Priam (Iliad 24.184–87, discussed below) that Akhilleus "is neither senseless nor rash nor sinful, but will very thoughtfully spare a suppliant" suggests that suppliants in the Iliad, apart from the crisis situation on the battlefield, also have some protection from the gods against being harmed by the champion they supplicate. Furthermore, Apollo's reinforcement of Chryses' supplication in Iliad 1 is a dramatic example of divine protection. Pedrick, nevertheless, correctly asserts that whether the suppliant succeeds in getting his or her request granted generally depends on the suppliant's ability to arouse compassion in the champion and/or persuade him or her with claims of past benefits or with promises of rewards to come. My argument will seek to show that claims of reciprocity in suppliant appeals, including offers of ransom, need not inhibit the suppliant from seeking to arouse the champion's reverence and compassion as well. Priam, indeed, does both in Iliad 24 (501–6). Indeed, Naiden (2006: 82) correctly argues that the reciprocity of ransoming found in Homer should not be confused with a notion of "compensation," which implies guilt on the part of the suppliant.

The language used of suppliants and those who honor them emphasizes the religious nature of Zeus's protection of suppliants. For example, Pausanias, in discussing Zeus's anger at those who violate suppliants, cites an ancient oracle of Zeus himself at Dodona: "Do not kill these, nor do injustice to suppliants, for suppliants are holy and sacred." This religious connection is continued into the fifth century, in which those who succor suppliants are called eusebês (pious) and hosios (holy), as noted by Adkins (1960a: 132–33). In Herodotos's story of Paktyes' supplication at Kyme (1.157–60), the oracle of Apollo described the people of Kyme as "having committed sacrilege" (asebêsantes) for even consulting the god about whether they could give up the suppliant to his pursuers. Euripides describes the religious sanction that protects the suppliant as a pollution of "blood which cries out for vengeance" upon those who kill a suppliant. The connection between supplication and religion is also reflected in the use of the concept of aidôs (reverence, awe, shame) in the Homeric poems. Both Schadewaldt (1955: 138) and Pohlenz (1956: 56) define aidôs as quasireligious, quasi moral restraint or reverence that is shown both toward superiors, such as kings and parents, and toward inferiors, such as the weak and suppliants. The religious quality is brought out explicitly by the use of aidôs and its cognate forms to refer to the gods' protection of suppliants: one's reverence toward the gods should lead one to revere and show restraint toward suppliants. The same authors also discuss Homer's yoking of aidôs with eleos, and they agree that whereas aidôs represents a feeling of divine-moral obligation (imposed by the gods and society), eleos is the complementary feeling of "pure" or internally aroused compassion that one feels at the sight of human misfortune. Pohlenz, who describes eleos as an emotion that stimulates action (see above, intro. p. 10), argues that it is eleos which turns the inhibition or awe caused by aidôs into an act of deliverance. In any case, this aggregate of religious, social, and personal feeling not only strongly inhibits the supplicated from harming the suppliant but also provides an impulse to assist him or her. Aidôs is the specifically religious element of the mix and, as Gould shows (1973: 87–89), continues to denote a feeling of inhibition with religious overtones in fifth-century tragedy. According to Gould, this aidôs "represents, more than any other quality, the characteristic feeling-tone of the supplication situation."

Not only language but also action reveals the religious nature of supplication. The suppliant can either seek asylum at an altar or some other holy ground before supplicating an individual, or as happens often on the battlefield in the Iliad, he can or must approach the supplicandus directly and assume the suppliant posture. Whereas the religious nature of asylum at an altar is obvious, that of supplication of an individual is less patent. Gould (75–78) argues that the link between the two forms is the "ritual significance of physical contact," which is made with either the altar of a god or the body of the supplicated. With this assumption, he develops a distinction between "complete" supplication, in which the ritual contact is made and maintained, and "figurative" supplication, in which it is not made, avoided, or broken. His argument is that "figurative" supplication lacks the "full ritual significance" and the "full binding force" of the "completed" supplication. In spite of some uncertainty about the validity of this distinction, I do agree that supplication of an individual by assuming the suppliant stance and touching the supplicated is a ritual or ceremonial act involving assumed religious sanctions, specifically the protection of Zeus, just as asylum at the altar of a god would be. So far we have seen the religious quality of the language and behavior of supplication, but let us now examine how the connection between compassion and reciprocity is developed in Homer (cf. n.6, above).

COMPASSION AND RECIPROCITY: EARLY CONNECTIONS

That the ancient Greeks in general had a strong sense of reciprocity is evident in their literature from Homer on. M. I. Finley describes the reciprocity of gift-giving in the Homeric world, which he likens to other "primitive" or traditional societies in this respect:

The word "gift" is not to be misconstrued. It may be stated as a flat rule of both primitive and archaic society that no one ever gave anything, whether goods or services or honors, without proper recompense, real or wishful, immediate or years away, to himself or to his kin. The act of giving was, therefore, in an essential sense always the first half of a reciprocal action, the other half of which was a counter-gift. (1965: 62)

This reciprocity is part of the distinction that Bolkestein (1939) draws between "charity" in the pre-Christian West (Greece and Rome) and East (Egypt and Israel). Whereas the autocratic cultures of the East developed a rigid class distinction between rich and poor, with relief to the poor serving to highlight the contrast between classes, the more egalitarian Greeks did not direct their charity so much toward social inferiors as toward equals who had suffered misfortune. The understanding, expressed or not, was that such peers would return the favor when their misfortune had passed. Indeed, such reciprocal service played a large role in the development of "friendship" or philia: the beneficent deed not only obligated the recipient to make a return but also tended to form the basis for a friendship through which both parties usually acquired status and security. Such alliances would be especially important in societies, such as that which Homer describes, in which the oikos or household was so independent. Gill (1998a: 309–13) shows how reciprocity in Homeric society provided a basis for social solidarity and mutual benefit. He uses the famous speech of Glaukos to Sarpedon (Iliad 12: 310–38) to illustrate the working of this society based on ideals of reciprocity.

Here is where xenia (guest-friendship) and the related phenomenon of hiketeia (supplication) enter the picture. The reciprocal nature of xenia is well known: the hospitality shown to a stranger is to be returned by him when the occasion arises. This institution serves to form alliances and friendships between strangers as well as to lessen the danger and fear of travel in the ancient world. Xenia, therefore, not only reduces the anxiety and hostility that might be felt in encountering a stranger; it also seeks to bring the outsider within the group as, for example, a potential ally against enemies. Gould (1973: 92–94) argues that hiketeia is closely related and that it too brings an outsider (the hiketês) within the group. He describes both xenia and hiketeia as forming a "spiritual kinship" between the parties involved, and he cites two passages from early Greek literature in which the xenos and the suppliant are described in the language of kinship or in the context of remarks about kin (Odyssey 8.546–47; Works and Days 327–32). He also mentions the encounter of Diomedes and Glaukos (Iliad 6.215–36), which suggests that the bonds developed through these means are passed on through generations, much like the obligations of blood kinship.

As with gift-giving between xenoi in Homer or the mutual service by members of the upper classes in later times, compassion tends to be shown to those who can be expected to make a return of compassion or of some equivalent service or to those with whom a relationship of philia (friendship, love, affection) or xenia has already been established by previous experience of favors or mutual service. Adkins (1963: 34–35) notes that a suppliant becomes a philos (friend, loved one) only if he is an equal and has the possibility of returning the favor and, furthermore, that philotês (friendship, love, affection) in Homer is shown by action rather than by mere intention or expression of sympathy. He says of the suppliant, "What he needs is not primarily sympathy or affection, which are luxuries for a man in his position, but actions: the provision of food, shelter, and protection if he needs it — in short timê [honor]" (35). Adkins rightly emphasizes the behavioral nature of philia to the extent that he says that "philein [to love] is an act, which creates or maintains a cooperative relationship; and it need not be accompanied by any friendly feeling at all: it is the action that is all-important." Compare with this Pohlenz's emphasis on the behavioral nature of eleos in Homer (see above, intro. p. 11). Here, as in our discussion of the reciprocal nature of compassion in the introduction (pp. 17–20), we need to carefully observe that compassion is not the operation of simple, normal xenia (xeiniê) or philia (philotês) but is called for in instances where the philos or xenos is in a state of serious or extreme misfortune, distress, or need that requires the action of the person supplicated.

Some examples of reciprocity functioning in supplications or other appeals for compassion are the following: in Iliad 1, as Akhilleus is requesting Thetis to make an appeal to Zeus to restore his honor, the hero prompts her to "supplicate (lisai) Zeus, if you have ever gratified (or, benefited) his heart by word or by deed" (1.394–95). Akhilleus then proceeds to provide his goddess mother with one such example: the time when she rescued Zeus from the other Olympians who sought to bind him (1.396–406). Indeed, in her appeal to Zeus, in which she performs the full suppliant ritual, Thetis begins with, "Father Zeus, if I ever benefited you among the immortals by word or deed ..." (1.503–4). Of course, this example features a goddess appealing to a god, but there is nothing in the mode of supplication or in the rhetoric of the appeal that appears to mark it as different from a supplication and an appeal that human beings might perform among themselves. The Chryses supplication that begins the Iliad is clearly framed in terms of reciprocity: the father not only offers ransom for his daughter (i.e., terms of an actual exchange) but also prefaces his supplication by expressing a good wish for the Achaians' success at Troy and safety on their return home (1.17–21). How do these two examples relate to compassion? If we define compassion as action that relieves suffering or misfortune (including the restoration of honor), we can see how Thetis's appeal to restore Akhilleus's injured honor and Chryses' appeal for the restoration of the daughter who has been taken from him are effectively appeals for compassion (cf. D1). Further examples of reciprocity in appeals for compassion between friends are discussed below in connection to Akhilleus's relationship with his comrades.

SHARED HUMANITY AND COMMON VULNERABILITY

Another aspect of the reciprocal nature of compassion is that not only does one show compassion to someone of the same class because he or she can make a like return, but also one tends to benefit peers out of a recognition of shared humanity (a sense of one's own similar nature and vulnerability) that is expressed in terms more general than strict this-for-that reciprocity (D2, D5). Thus the man who is asked for compassion by a suppliant who was once prosperous like himself tends to feel compassion and to aid the person because there is always the chance that he himself will be in the same lowly condition some day. This traditional feature of Greek compassion is given explicit expression by later writers, especially tragedians. Anaximenes, the philosopher, is reported to have said, "The rich are not accustomed to pity (oiktirein) the unfortunate in the same way that the poor do. For, out of fear for themselves they [the wealthy] pity (eleein) the misfortunes of others." Herodotos (1.86) describes how Kyros came to spare Kroisos, whom he had placed alive on a burning pyre, "when he considered that he himself, a human being, was burning to death another human being who had once been no less prosperous than he was. Furthermore, because he feared retribution and discerned that nothing in human affairs was secure, he ordered the blazing fire to be extinguished." And there is Odysseus's response to the humiliation of Aias in Sophokles' Aias (121–26); Odysseus says he pities (epoiktirein) Aias, even though he is an enemy: "I'm considering what concerns me no less than him. For I see that all of us who live are nothing but phantoms and empty shadow." Thus compassion for others was aroused by the sight of a misfortunate human being along with the fear that one's similarity to such a person entails.

Doubtless this kind of fear was increased by the evident lack of security in the ancient world (cf. Odyssey 18.130–42) and perhaps also, especially among the upper classes, by the notion expounded by poets and dramatists that the prosperous are especially liable to downfall because of the gods' envy. From this commonplace of situation and reasoning eventually comes Aristotle's famous yoking of "pity and fear" (eleos kai phobos), which he puts at the heart of his description of the spectator's experience of tragedy (Poetics 1449b) and on which he discourses at length in the Rhetoric (1385b–86b).

(Continues...)

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Table of Contents

Introduction 3

1 Homer and Archaic Greece 25

The Religious Nature of Supplication 25

Compassion and Reciprocity: Early Connections 28

Shared Humanity and Common Vulnerability 31

Compassion toward Enemies 33

The Case of Akhilleus 39

Limitations of Compassion toward Friends 42

The Poet's Perspective 43

Compassion in the Archaic Period 45

Conclusion: Compassion in Homer and Archaic Greece 46

From Epic to Tragedy 47

2 Fifth-Century Athens 49

Athenian Tragic Theater 52

Athenian Courts 54

The Athenian Assembly 57

Athenian Social Structure 61

Limitations and Denials of Compassion 65

Conclusion 68

3 Aischylos 70

Seven Against Thebes 72

Persians 74

Suppliants 76

Oresteia 82

Prometheus Bound 88

Conclusion with Reflections on the Trilogy 100

Concluding Reflections on Aischylos and Compassion 101

4 Euripides 105

Compassion Shown but Problematized 106

Compassion Denied 113

Summary and Discussion of Other Examples of Compassion Denied or Not Felt 126

Compassion Abused 128

Human Compassion in Defiance of Divine Spite: Herakles 130

Concluding Reflections on Euripides and Compassion 142

5 Sophokles 145

Early Sophoklean Plays and Fragments 146

Elektra 154

Philoktetes 168

Oidipous at Kolonos 206

Concluding Reflections on Sophokles and Compassion 212

Conclusion 215

Compassionate Heroes, Gods, and Choruses 217

Common Patterns 218

Compassion and Character 219

Benefits of Compassionate Behavior 221

Compassion and Reciprocity: Concluding Considerations 222

Notes 225

Bibliography 289

Index 305