Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications / Edition 1

by Jerzy A. Filar, Vladimir Gaitsgory, Koichi Mizukami

Overview

This volume includes selected papers from the "1996 Symposium of the I nternational Society of Dynamic Games." The symposium featured plenary lectures on the topics of duopoly and differential games; equilibria of stochastic and recursive games; dynamic network models; and linear complementarity problems in static and dynamic games. Its program also included invited and contributed papers covering a broad spectrum of topics related to dynamic games and their applications in pursuit-evas ion techniques, finance, economics, and other fields.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780817640026
Publisher:	Birkhäuser Boston
Publication date:	03/30/2000
Series:	Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games , #5
Edition description:	2000
Pages:	461
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.36(d)

Table of Contents

I Robust Control Design and H?.- Worst-Case Rate-Based Flow Control with an ARMA Model of the Available Bandwidth.- H? Output Feedback Control Problems for Bilinear Systems.- H? Control of a Class of Infinite-Dimensional Linear Systems with Nonlinear Outputs.- Nonstandard Extension of H∞-Optimal Control for Singularly Perturbed Systems.- II Pursuit-Evasion (P-E) Games.- Geodesic Parallel Pursuit Strategy in a Simple Motion Pursuit Game on the Sphere.- Real-Time Collision Avoidance: Differential Game, Numerical Solution, and Synthesis of Strategies.- Rendezvous-Evasion as a Multistage Game with Observed Actions.- Identification and Construction of Singular Surfaces in Pursuit-Evasion Games.- On the Numerical Solution of a Class of Pursuit-Evasion Games.- III Coupled Dynamic and Shastic Games.- Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games with Coupled State Constraints.- Constrained Markov Games: Nash Equilibria.- Piecewise-Deterministic Differential Games and Dynamic Teams with Hybrid Controls.- A Game Variant of the Stopping Problem on Jump Processes with a Monotone Rule.- IV General Game Theoretic Developments.- Refinement of the Nash Solution for Games with Perfect Information.- A Perturbation on Two-Person Zero-Sum Games.- The Linear Complementarity Problem in Static and Dynamic Games.- Weighted Discounted Shastic Games with Perfect Information.- Shastic Games with Complete Information and Average Cost Criteria.- V Applications.- Crime and Law Enforcement: A Multistage Game.- Global Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Bounded Rationality.- A Multistage Supergame of Downstream Pollution.- Solution and Stability for a Simple Dynamic Bottleneck Model.- Cumulants and Risk-Sensitive Control: A Cost Mean and Variance Theory with Application to Seismic Protection ofStructures.