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Overview
A lucid and compelling case for a new American stance toward the Islamic world.
What comes after jihad? Outside the headlines, believing Muslims are increasingly calling for democratic politics in their undemocratic countries. But can Islam and democracy successfully be combined? Surveying the intellectual and geopolitical terrain of the contemporary Muslim world, Noah Feldman proposes that Islamic democracy is indeed viable and desirable, and that the West, particularly the United States, should work to bring it about, not suppress it.
Encouraging democracy among Muslims threatens America's autocratic Muslim allies, and raises the specter of a new security threat to the West if fundamentalists are elected. But in the long term, the greater threat lies in continuing to support repressive regimes that have lost the confidence of their citizens. By siding with Islamic democrats rather than the regimes that repress them, the United States can bind them to the democratic principles they say they support, reducing anti-Americanism and promoting a durable peace in the Middle East.
After Jihad gives the context for understanding how the many Muslims who reject religious violence see the world after the globalization of democracy. It is also an argument about how American self-interest can be understood to include a foreign policy consistent with the deeply held democratic values that make America what it is. At a time when the encounter with Islam has become the dominant issue of U.S. foreign policy, After Jihad provides a road map for making democracy work in a region where the need for it is especially urgent.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780374708177 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Farrar, Straus and Giroux |
| Publication date: | 05/15/2007 |
| Sold by: | Macmillan |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 272 |
| File size: | 1 MB |
About the Author
Noah Feldman is a professor at the NYU School of Law. A former Supreme Court clerk, he earned a doctorate in Islamic thought from Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He lives in Manhattan and Washington, D.C.
Noah Feldman is the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard University, where he is also founding director of the Julis-Rabinowitz Program on Jewish and Israeli Law. A leading public intellectual, he is a contributing writer for Bloomberg View and the author of numerous books, including The Broken Constitution, Divided by God, and The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State.
Read an Excerpt
After Jihad
America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy
By Noah Feldman
Farrar, Straus and Giroux
Copyright © 2003 Noah FeldmanAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-374-70817-7
CHAPTER 1
Islamic Democracy, Not Islamist Democracy
Where is the Muslim Solidarnosc? Critics generally pose this question to impugn the democratic possibilities of the Muslim world. The ideal of pro-democracy activism arising spontaneously from the shipyards of Gdansk stands for the hope that in every society, no matter how totalitarian or repressive, there are freedom-loving people who see clearly that democracy is the solution to what ails their country. Yet such popular democracy movements are hard to come by in the contemporary Muslim world.
One explanation is that repression works. All over the Muslim world, autocratic leaders of the kind who flourished during the Cold War—supported by the Soviets, by the United States, and occasionally (if they were very shrewd) by both—took careful note of the events of 1989-91 in Algeria. America's willingness to give tacit approval to the suppression of democracy, when presented as a defense against fundamentalism, emboldened autocrats in the Muslim world; wily about their own survival, the autocrats jailed and executed democracy activists. This well-proven tactic had the desired effect of encouraging other potential activists to keep a low profile or to emigrate. At the same time, until recently, most secular Muslim intellectuals were Marxists or socialists, drawn to familiar modes of anti-colonial and anti-imperial criticism rather than toward democratic ideologies.
But a great number of potential democracy activists in the Muslim world have turned toward Islamist criticism of government. Although autocratic governments repress all their critics, whether secular or Islamist, the Islamists have traditionally enjoyed a structural advantage. The governments of the Muslim world cannot fully suppress Islam and the mosque, which are too deeply a part of everyday culture and society. Islam, in its various forms, plays a central role in the lives of many people. Notwithstanding the failure of Islamist activists to overthrow governments by violent revolution, a large and growing number of Muslims, poor and rich, educated and illiterate, not only respect Islam as a source of personal faith but consider it relevant to government.
Secular nationalism was tried in the Arab world, in Iran, and even in Indonesia—and the consensus is that it failed. Secularism has been discredited by its association with dictatorial nationalism. Islam itself, however, has not been similarly discredited in the realm of politics. Part of its continuing appeal results simply from the fact that Islamists have had relatively few opportunities in government; in an environment of corrupt politics, it is easy for the untried to seem untainted. But the enduring appeal of Islam in the political context cannot be dismissed as mere idealism. Islamists everywhere enjoy a reputation for sincerity and for opposing unjust government. Islamists have repeatedly proven their capacity to mobilize to help the unfortunate—not just earthquake victims or others in crisis, but those suffering under the quiet, constant pressures of poverty.
Islamists also speak a language of truth and values. Like other religious traditions, Islam provides a deeply resonant vocabulary for criticizing government from the standpoint of morality. Muslim scholars, judges, and philosophers have long called for justice and righteousness in the name of Islam. When people in the Muslim world criticize their governments as being "un-Islamic," they are often simply calling those governments unjust, corrupt, and repressive. One of the great strengths of Islam in the political realm lies in the clarity of its moral vision, which holds rulers accountable to justice and the rule of law. The word Islam, conventionally translated as "submission," implies no subjugation of one person to any other. The word implies, rather, a recognition of God's ultimate sovereignty—a sovereignty that places all people on equal footing before the divine Majesty. To mistreat one's fellows not only violates their rights but offends God. Muslims serve God alongside other Muslims who are their equals and partners in the creation of the Muslim community.
So criticisms made in Islamic terms possess greater depth and authority than they would if framed in some other rhetoric. Islam captures the universal aspiration to just society and government better than the failed ideologies of socialism and nationalism. But more than that, because it is not simply another ideology but a vibrant faith, Islam can motivate people to act politically while simultaneously transcending politics. A truly Islamic policy is, by implication, not only advantageous but inherently good; un-Islamic behavior is not merely illegal but wrong in the eyes of God.
In a world where the banners of secularism and nominal democracy have been raised and autocratic repression has followed, Islamic government remains the solution that has not yet been tried. If free and fair democratic elections were held all over the Muslim world, many countries would see sizable turnouts of voters favoring Islamist political parties, just as there were in Algeria in 1990 and 1991. The cause would not be sympathy for particular Islamist policies so much as the feeling that nationalism and secularism have not yielded solutions to the problems of the Muslim world.
The likelihood that Islamist parties would get votes, however, does not mean that democratic Muslim states would become Islamist states on the model of Iran, or some alternative vision of a state governed by classical Islamic law or Muslim clerics. Muslims themselves do not all agree about the extent to which Islam should determine how they live. Islam comprises a complex set of contested ideas, values, and beliefs. Some would say that Islam dictates the right way to act in every sphere of human activity. Others would say that in practice, Islam leaves great swaths of individual and communal choice free. Still others might claim that Islam is limited to the sphere of individual faith. Indeed, so great is the diversity among Muslims about these and other matters that some academic writers prefer to speak of "Islams," plural, rather than "Islam," singular. Despite its image in the West, and some egregious examples of intolerance in places like Iran and Saudi Arabia today, Islam has a rich if imperfect tradition of tolerating intra-Islamic diversity of opinion on matters of religion. Most believing Muslims would say that there is one true Islam and that people disagree about what exactly the right Islam is. Only God knows for sure.
This diversity of views ensures that there is a broad range of ways that Islam and democracy might interact or that Islam might play a role in constitutions and governments. A pure Islamist state based on classical Islamic law is only one of these possibilities. Islam might be the official religion of a state that governed in a basically secular fashion. Islam might provide the basis for family or personal law without infringing on other legal domains. Islam might provide a symbolic basis for general legislation without dictating particular policies. All these are examples of Islamic states that are nonetheless not Islamist. They incorporate Islam and its values into the life of the state but do not insist, as Islamists typically do, that Islam is the only and comprehensive source of law and decision making.
How compatible each of these models is with democracy will depend in part on the definition of democracy one adopts. Democracy may mean simply that the people rule, whether by referendum or by choosing representatives; this structural definition of democracy fits the democracy of Athens and is still serviceable today. A more modern definition requires a range of basic rights to go along with the right to vote and be elected in free elections: broad freedom of speech and association, equality before the law, due process, and more. This liberal democracy includes the panoply of rights that people in Western democracies enjoy.
The range of options for Islamic democracy is thus much greater than the dichotomy of secular state or Islamist state that is sometimes presented as the only set of choices for the contemporary Muslim world. Both Islamists and the autocrats they oppose are heavily invested in arguing that the only options are autocracy or an Islamist state. The Islamists have every reason to present themselves as the sole alternative to the autocratic governments they wish to replace; like candidates everywhere, they have little to gain by emphasizing the chances of some other candidate.
More perversely, the autocrats have discovered that it is also in their interests to depict the Islamists as the only alternative to autocratic rule. Cynically motivated, the autocrats know they are on thin ice with their people, especially during periods when the public is agitated by an issue like the Palestinian cause. Although some monarchies enjoy the limited legitimacy conferred by tradition, and people who live reasonably well are sometimes willing to support autocratic regimes as the price of stability, autocratic rule generally depends on maintaining political strength by coercion, supported by elites within and foreign powers without. Some Arab rulers control oil resources and are able to maintain good relations with countries abroad by keeping the oil flowing. Others, poorer in resources, have to make do with convincing foreign powers that they are necessary for maintaining regional stability—again with an eye to keeping oil flowing.
Either way, autocratic governments need friends abroad, especially in the West. But because these governments repress dissent, their best strategy is to persuade potential Western allies that they are better than the alternatives. In this sense, Islamists are a gift from heaven for the autocrats. The West is suspicious of Islamists, whose political ideals are often expressed in anti-Western terms. The anti-Americanism of the Islamic Republic of Iran has left a deep impression in the Western mind, especially in the United States, and Islamists have also tapped into a vein of anti-American feeling connected with American support of Israel. So when autocratic governments tell the West, "No matter what you may think of us, the Islamists would be a lot worse," this message is heard loud and clear in Washington and other Western capitals.
Preserving the conditions that justify repression is good practical policy for the autocrats. If the autocrats were to destroy Islamist opposition completely, then Western countries might begin to feel confident enough in the possibility of secular democracy in the Muslim world to demand or at least to encourage more democratization. The optimal strategy for the autocrats is therefore to eliminate secular democratic dissent, keeping just enough Islamist opposition alive to make Islamism the only alternative without enabling it to become strong enough to overthrow the government. Autocrats also benefit by telling their own citizens, not just the West, that there is no alternative but the Islamists, because secular-minded Muslims—of whom there are no small number, especially among elites—might prefer autocracy to an Islamic state that imposed religious law on them. Some educated Muslim women might prefer an unfree secular autocracy to a relatively democratic Islamic state in which they could vote and work but might, because of democratically enacted religious regulations, have to wear a head covering and Islamic dress outside their homes. Islamists have, after all, often made women into a central symbolic focus of their efforts, simultaneously demanding separation of the sexes while insisting that mandatory modesty will facilitate women's greater participation in public life.
Beyond the Islamists and the autocrats, some ordinary Muslims cannot yet quite imagine comparatively secular democracy in the Muslim world. This short-term problem, however, may eventually be resolved. There is reason to think that even if Islamists come to power, after a few cycles of Islamist government many people in the Muslim world would start to look for something more secular. That is precisely what has happened recently in Iran, where twenty years of government by mullahs has produced some positive changes in the country but also many negative consequences. The economy is weak, unemployment is high, and the health care system is a shambles. Corruption is rife, and Iran's regional and global political strength has declined by most measures. The government has also grossly violated human rights. The bloom is off the rose, and Iranians have, not surprisingly, been thinking about alternatives. Some would like to see more moderate government, democratic but still Islamist, while others, perhaps a majority, are starting to think that increased separation between religion and state might be desirable. Distinctively Islamic economics, for example, was imagined in Islamist writings as a form of the free market with a human face—but it turns out not to have been terribly distinctive or effective in practice.
There, in a nutshell, is the current problem of government in the Muslim world. Almost certainly, democratizing the Muslim world would produce real gains for Islamists in the short and medium term. Untainted by scandal, and steadfast in challenging autocracy, the Islamists speak the language of the people. They are not perceived as elitists, and they draw on powerful ideals of justice and authenticity. In a truly democratic system, they would have to be given a chance to govern if the people wanted them.
Secular-minded Muslims and most Western governments are justifiably worried that Islamist governments might be undemocratic, oppressive, and anti-Western. Islamist elected governments might call off democratic elections, or leave elections in place but pass laws that oppress women or non-Muslims or political opponents. Like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamist groups might partially transform themselves into domestic political parties without renouncing violence against Israel. Care must be taken to guard against these real and dangerous possibilities.
On the other hand, the alternative to democracy in the Muslim world seems to be more autocracy. If there is to be any way out of the impasse, it will have to come from imagining some kind of Islamic democracy. A democracy of Muslims with Islamic content need not be Islamist democracy, governed exclusively by Islamic law. It is far more likely to draw on Islam's values and ideals while simultaneously incorporating democratic principles, legal protections, and institutions. But even Islamist democracy, if it can be imagined, might have some advantages over autocracy. Even in an Islamist democracy, where the people have chosen to be governed solely by Islamic law, leaders would be responsible to an electorate, and the rule of law might conceivably be enforced more consistently than it is by the unelected autocrats who prevail in the Muslim world today.
CHAPTER 2Islam, the West, and the Question of Opposition
There are various reasons for thinking that democracy and Islam cannot coexist. According to one view, held by some Westerners and some Islamists, there is a fundamental opposition of values between Islam and the West, or alternatively between Islam and modernity, or Islam and democracy. This sort of view is sometimes attributed, not altogether fairly, to Samuel Huntington, the scholar of democratic development and author of The Clash of Civilizations, which proposed a range of new conflicts to replace the Cold War. Although critics expressed deep skepticism about Huntington's suggestion of unavoidable opposition between Islam and the West, after September 11, Huntington looked prescient. The worst attack on American soil had come from an Islamic source. And the attack had not come from a state in the Muslim world but from non-state terrorists, apparently motivated by religious-political beliefs. That made it look like Islamic "civilization" was the source of the attack on America, rather than Muslim governments.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from After Jihad by Noah Feldman. Copyright © 2003 Noah Feldman. Excerpted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Preface to the Paperback Edition,The Revolution that Wasn't,
Islam and Democracy in Contact,
PART ONE The Idea of Islamic Democracy,
Islamic Democracy, Not Islamist Democracy,
Islam, the West, and the Question of Opposition,
Islam and Democracy as Mobile Ideas,
The Resilience of Islam,
God's Rule and the People's Rule,
Islamic Equality,
Islamic Liberty,
The Universality of Mobile Ideas,
PART TWO Varieties of Islamic Democracy,
Democratization and Muslim Reality: An Overview,
Iran: Islamic Democracy in the Balance,
Turkey: The Outlier,
Islam and Democracy in South And Southeast Asia: Mobility and Possibility,
Pakistan: The Islamic State and the Struggle for Stability,
The Diversity of the Arabs,
Monarchies With Oil: The Rentier State in Action,
Kings Without Oil,
The Dictators and the Islamists: The Puzzle of Egypt,
Regime Change and its Consequences: Dictators with Oil,
The Big Picture: Islam, Democracy, and the Contact of Mobile Ideas,
PART THREE The Necessity of Islamic Democracy,
Why Democracy? The Pragmatic Argument,
Neutralizing Anti-Americanism by Refuting It,
Doing the Right Thing,
How to Do It,
Democracy's Muslim Allies,
Imagining an Islamic Democracy,
After Jihad,
Notes,
Acknowledgments,
Index,