Air Power As A Coercive Instrument / Edition 1

by Daniel L. Byman, Matthew Waxman, Eric Larson

Overview

Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780833027436
Publisher:	RAND Corporation
Publication date:	09/20/1999
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	173
Product dimensions:	6.02(w) x 9.04(h) x 0.49(d)
Lexile:	1570L (what's this?)

About the Author

Eric Larson (Ph.D., Policy Analysis, RAND Graduate School) is a policy analyst at RAND with nearly two decades of experience, primarily in national security and foreign affairs.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction Coercion and U.S. National Security Policy The Role of the USAF Methodology and Cases Examined Organization PART 1. Definitions and Theory Chapter Two: How to Think About Coercion Definitions A Theoretical Starting Point Thinking About Coercion: A Policymaker's Perspective Conclusions PART 2. Successful Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons From the Past Chapter Three: Explaining Success or Failure Conditions for Successful Coercion Common Challenges in Coercive Operations Conclusions PART 3. Coercive Diplomacy Today Chapter Four: Domestic Constraints on Coercion Domestic Politics and the Success of Coercive Diplomacy Constraints and the Democratic System Sources of Domestic Constraints Some Correlates of Public Support How an Adversary Can Exploit U.S. Domestic Politics Conclusions Chapter Five: Coercion and Coalitions The Advantages of Coalitions for Coercers Limits Imposed by Coalitions Coalitions and Adversary Counter-Coercion Conclusions Chapter Six: Coercing Nonstate Actors: A Challenge Types of Missions Characteristics of Coercive Operations Against Nonstate Actors Conclusions PART 4. Coercion and the U.S. Air Force Chapter Seven: Implications and Recommendations Air Power and Escalation Dominance Air Power and Adversary Military Operations Air Power and the Magnification of Third-Party Threats Air Power and Common Challenges in Coercive Operations The Need for Restraint Appendix A. CASES EXAMINED IN THIS STUDY B. CASES AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS C. COERCIVE ATTEMPTS AND COMMON CHALLENGES Bibliography ———————————————————————————————————————- -