| Foreword | ix |
| Preface | xiii |
| I | Origin | |
| 1 | Trade Politics: The Root Problem, the Continuing Crisis | 3 |
| 2 | The Old System: Protection for Congress | 11 |
| Protecting Congress from Trade Pressures | 14 |
| The "Bargaining Tariff" | 16 |
| The "Bicycle Theory" and "Export Politics" | 17 |
| The Executive Broker | 18 |
| "The Rules" | 21 |
| Deals for "Special Cases" | 24 |
| Strong Congressional Committees | 27 |
| Trade as a Nonparty Issue | 30 |
| The System's Advantages and Limits | 32 |
| The Contradictions of the System | 34 |
| The "Bargaining Tariff" as Vanishing Asset | 34 |
| International Openness Versus Domestic Intervention | 35 |
| Success as Multiplier of Trade Pressures | 36 |
| The Dilemma of the Rules | 37 |
| II | Erosion | |
| 3 | A Tougher World: Changes in the Context of Trade Policy | 41 |
| 15 August as Prologue | 41 |
| The Trade Explosion | 45 |
| The "Decline" of the United States | 47 |
| The Rise of New Competitors | 50 |
| The Erosion of the GATT | 53 |
| Stagflation | 54 |
| Floating Exchange Rates and Dollar "Misalignment" | 57 |
| Economic Tripolarity and the End of the Cold War | 61 |
| A Tougher World | 62 |
| 4 | A Less Protected Congress | 65 |
| Congressional Reform and the Weakening of Ways and Means | 67 |
| Renewing the Delegation of Power: The "Fast-Track" Procedures | 71 |
| Industry-Specific Proposals: The Automobile Case | 77 |
| Committee Competition and Policy Entrepreneurship | 80 |
| The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Pressure Contained | 84 |
| 1985-88: The Years of Trade | 89 |
| The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 | 92 |
| Mexico and Fast-Track Renewal | 98 |
| 1984 and After: The Leadership Difference | 103 |
| 5 | An Embattled Executive | 105 |
| STR's Early Ups and Downs | 107 |
| Strauss and the MTN: The STR on Center Stage | 109 |
| The Executive Broker and Its Critics | 114 |
| The Carter Reorganization | 117 |
| Reagan I: Commerce Versus USTR | 118 |
| USTR and Presidential Ambivalence | 120 |
| Liberal Words, Protectionist Deeds | 122 |
| Reagan II: An Eight-Month Vacuum | 123 |
| Reagan II: The Shift to Activism | 125 |
| Targeting the World: Section 301 | 126 |
| Targeting Japan: From MOSS to Semiconductor Sanctions | 128 |
| Working the Trade Bill: Damage Limitation | 131 |
| Carla Hills and Super 301 | 132 |
| Geneva Versus Mexico City? | 134 |
| Broker in Need of a Breakthrough | 135 |
| The USTR Enters Its Thirties | 137 |
| 6 | Changing the Rules: The Rise of Administrative Trade Remedies | 139 |
| Through the Early 1970s: Little Relief | 141 |
| The Trade Act of 1974 | 142 |
| The Result: Slightly More Relief | 145 |
| The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 | 148 |
| The Declining Use of the Escape Clause | 150 |
| The Decline of Trade Adjustment Assistance | 152 |
| The Upsurge in "Unfair Trade" Cases | 154 |
| Forcing Political Solutions | 157 |
| Steel Wins Comprehensive Protection | 159 |
| Trade-Remedies Reform: The Gibbons Bill | 162 |
| The Omnibus Legislation of 1986-88 | 164 |
| Administrative Remedies: A Balance Sheet on the 1980s | 166 |
| The Limits of Administrative Remedies | 170 |
| 7 | The National Arena: More Open, More Partisan | 175 |
| An "Amazing Political Reversal"? | 176 |
| A Newly Ambivalent Elite | 181 |
| Challenges to Laissez-Faire Trade Doctrine | 185 |
| New Patterns of Interest-Group Politics | 191 |
| Conclusions | 198 |
| III | Summation and Prescription | |
| 8 | Summing Up: The System Held, But Stay Tuned | 203 |
| First, Some Good News | 204 |
| Next, The Bad News | 208 |
| Looking Ahead | 214 |
| 9 | 1992-94: Missions Accomplished? | 217 |
| From Bush to Clinton | 218 |
| The NAFTA Debate: Clinton Cedes the Field to the Critics | 222 |
| Clinton Recovers, and Wins Big | 224 |
| Japan, China, and APEC | 229 |
| Brussels and Geneva: Completing the Uruguay Round | 231 |
| US Business, Human Rights, and the China Market | 233 |
| Japan: Failure and Modest Success | 236 |
| Implementing the Uruguay Round: A Slow Start | 238 |
| Antidumping: Reversing the Round | 240 |
| The Loss of Future Fast-Track | 244 |
| The WTO and US "Sovereignty" | 245 |
| Delaying the Process: Dole, Hollings, and Gingrich | 247 |
| From Partisan Wrangle to Bipartisan Victory | 251 |
| Looking to the Future | 255 |
| 10 | What to Do? A Framework for Future US Trade Policy | 259 |
| Policy for the Near Term | 260 |
| A New Agenda? | 260 |
| More Effective Trade Advocacy | 261 |
| A Trimmed-Down Fast-Track Process | 261 |
| Managing Trade Policy: A Basic Prescription | 264 |
| How Not to Cure Trade Imbalances | 269 |
| Trade With Japan: Right Problem, Wrong Solution | 270 |
| Getting Serious About Trade Imbalances | 276 |
| Education | 276 |
| Macroeconomic Policy | 277 |
| Microeconomic Policy: Promoting Adjustment and Productivity Growth | 280 |
| The Role of Trade Policy | 285 |
| Can the System Be Salvaged? | 286 |
| Policy Tools: International Negotiations | 289 |
| Flexibility on Fast-Track | 290 |
| Revising the Trade-Remedy Laws | 290 |
| Keeping Section 301 | 293 |
| Using Section 301: Strategic Trade Policy or Sectoral Reciprocity? | 294 |
| A Separate Trade Policy Toward Japan? | 297 |
| A USTR-Based Trade Reorganization | 298 |
| Policy Tools: New Approaches to Trade Adjustment | 302 |
| In Defense of Trade Brokering | 305 |
| Glossary | 309 |
| Index | 325 |
| Figures | |
| 3.1 | United States: nominal effective exchange rates, 1980-93 | 58 |
| 6.1 | Escape clause investigations, 1975-94 | 151 |
| 6.2 | Countervailing duty and antidumping investigations, 1979-94 | 151 |
| Tables | |
| 3.1 | United States: merchandise imports, exports, and trade balance, 1960-94 | 45 |
| 6.1 | Antidumping, countervailing duty, and Section 201 investigations initiated, 1979-94 | 166 |
| 6.2 | Antidumping cases and results, 1980-93 | 168 |
