An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts / Edition 2

by Inïs Macho-Stadler, J. David Pïrez-Castrillo, Richard Watt

Overview

This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. This updated second edition substantially extends the exercises that test students' understanding of the material covered in each section.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199243259
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	05/17/2001
Edition description:	REV
Pages:	302
Product dimensions:	9.16(w) x 6.10(h) x 0.64(d)

About the Author

Inés Macho-Stadler is Associate Professor of Economics at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. He gained his Ph.D. in Economics from the Ecole Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris).
J. David Pérez-Castrillo is Associate Professor of Economics at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. He gained his Ph.D. in Economics from the Ecole Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris).

Table of Contents

1. Introduction2. The Base Model3. The Moral Hazard Problem4. The Adverse Selection Problem5. SignallingMathematical AppendixAdditional Exercises

Editorial Reviews

On the previous edition:"It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics."—Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University

From the Publisher