Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

by Peter T. Leeson

Overview

In Anarchy Unbound, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance. Relying on experience from the past and present, Professor Leeson provides evidence of anarchy “working” where it is least expected to do so and explains how this is possible. Provocatively, Leeson argues that in some cases anarchy may even outperform government as a system of social organization, and demonstrates where this may occur. Anarchy Unbound challenges the conventional self-governance wisdom. It showcases the incredible ingenuity of private individuals to secure social cooperation without government and how their surprising means of doing so can be superior to reliance on the state.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781107629707
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	04/07/2014
Series:	Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	270
Sales rank:	839,007
Product dimensions:	8.70(w) x 5.90(h) x 0.80(d)

About the Author

Peter T. Leeson is a Professor of Economics and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University, Virginia. He is also the North American editor of Public Choice. Previously, he was a Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, the F. A. Hayek Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Visiting Fellow in Political Economy at Harvard University, Massachusetts. Professor Leeson is the author of The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (2009) and a recipient of the Fund for the Study of Spontaneous Order's Hayek Prize, which he received for his research on self-governance.

Table of Contents

1. Anarchy unbound; Part I. Self-Governance and the Problem of Social Diversity: 2. Social distance and self-enforcing exchange; 3. The laws of lawlessness; Part II. Self-Governance and the Problem of Violence: 4. Trading with bandits; 5. Efficient plunder; Part III. Social-Governance and the Problem of 'Bad Apples': 6. Pirates' private order; 7. Criminal constitutions; Part IV. Self-Governance as Superior to the State: 8. Efficient anarchy; 9. Better off stateless; 10. An argument for anarchy in LDCs; 11. A future for thinking about self-governance.

Editorial Reviews

"In the best tradition of Coase, Peter Leeson shows how, in most surprising times and places, individuals managed to organize their lives and affairs cooperatively without any help from government. The history in this book is fascinating; the economics is powerful; and the writing is beautiful."
Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University

"With compelling arguments and examples from many different times and societies, Leeson shows how bottom-up institutions of governance work and why their results are often better than what governments achieve. The book is fascinating reading for all economists, and will be an eye-opener to many."
Avinash Dixit, Princeton University, author of Lawlessness and Economics

"A lively, insightful, and masterly work. In taking aim at Thomas Hobbes’ view that governments are invariably essential, Leeson invokes historical examples such as the institution of Caribbean pirates and sociological concepts such as social distance. It is rare for an economist to offer riches to social scientists of every stripe."
Robert C. Ellickson, Meyer Professor of Property Law, Yale Law School

From the Publisher