Anatomy of Victory: Why the United States Triumphed in World War II, Fought to a Stalemate in Korea, Lost in Vietnam, and Failed in Iraq

by John D. Caldwell

Overview

This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies.

Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans.

A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781538114780
Publisher:	Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Publication date:	11/09/2018
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	568
File size:	39 MB
Note:	This product may take a few minutes to download.

About the Author

John D. Caldwell (1940–2019) retired in 2007 after a fifty-year career in defense think tanks and aerospace companies. Trained as a political scientist with a PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, he was first posted to Saigon in 1968 as part of a classified research project for the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency. Caldwell joined TRW Space & Defense in 1982 to work on major defense, NASA, and intelligence community programs. He continued as a consultant at Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, which acquired TRW in 2002.

Table of Contents

Maps, Figures, and Table

Preface

Acknowledgments

PART I: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: INTRODUCTION

PART II: WORLD WAR II

1 Battle of Britain: Winning by Not Losing

2 Battle of the Atlantic: Protecting the Maritime Lifeline

3 Invasion of Russia: Hitler’s Strategic Mistake

4 Battle of El Alamein and Operation Torch: Cracking German Invincibility

5 Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal: Regaining Initiative in the Pacific

6 Strategic Bombing Offensive: Breaking German Airpower

7 Invasion of Italy: Deciding to Fight Somewhere in Europe in 1943

8 D-Day and the Battle for Normandy: Retaking the Continent

9 Battle for the Rhine: Attacking Germany’s Vitals

10 Battle of Okinawa and the Bombing of Japan: Ending the War

11 The Strategic Architectures of World War II

PART III: THE KOREAN WAR

12 Battle of the Pusan Perimeter: Getting the Most Out of a Bad Situation

13 Inchon—Operation Chromite: MacArthur’s Masterstroke

14 Crossing the 38th Parallel and Driving North to the Yalu: The Risks of Overreaching

15 Operations Ripper and Killer: Recovery and Frustration

16 The Strategic Architectures of the Korean War

PART IV: THE VIETNAM WAR

17 Battle of the Ia Drang Valley: Not Fighting the Decisive Battle

18 Bombing Campaign and High-Tech Initiatives: Operations Rolling Thunder and Igloo White Airpower and Technology Indecisive

19 The Pacification Program (1967–1968): Failing to Change Behavior

20 The Tet Offensive (1968): Strategic Disaster

21 Vietnamization: Never a Winning Strategy

22 The Final Years (1969–1975): The Losing Path

23 The Strategic Architectures of the Vietnam War

PART V: THE IRAQI WARS

24 Iraqi War I, Persian Gulf War: Defeating Saddam, Losing Politically

25 Iraqi War II, Thirteen-Year Air Conflict: The Limits of Airpower

26 Iraqi War III, Invasion of Iraq: Winning without an Endgame

27 Iraqi War IV, the Insurgency and the Surge (2007–2008): Relearning Counterinsurgency

28 Iraqi War V, the Rise of ISIS: A New, More Violent Enemy

29 The Strategic Architectures of the Iraqi Wars

PART VI: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: THE ENDGAME

Acronyms and Selected Glossary

Notes

Selected Bibliography

Index

Editorial Reviews

12/03/2018
Caldwell, a defense analyst, offers up a strategic survey of America’s major wars since 1941 to determine why the U.S. was victorious in WWII but has not meet its objectives in the major wars since. According to accepted strategic theory, ends, ways, and means must be aligned to ensure victory, and, according to Caldwell, they have not been in these more recent conflicts. The book’s conclusions are somewhat obvious: WWII was largely successful because the key Allied leaders ensured that strategic ends (unconditional surrender) were clear, the means were adequate to achieve them, and the allied generals successfully fought campaigns to do so. On the other hand, he argues, in Korea the offensive north of the 38th parallel in 1950 didn’t match the desired end (stopping the North’s invasion of the South) and was not adequately resourced; in Vietnam the U.S. failed to pursue the end of creating a viable and appealing alternative to North Vietnamese communism; and in Iraq the U.S. failed in its objective by not establishing a self-sufficient democratic government. Readers well-versed in history and strategic theory may not find much that is new here, but for those who are interested in but have not read deeply on military strategy, this will be illuminating. Illus. (Nov.)

Publishers Weekly

As interesting a book as it gets.. .. The central problem the author addresses is the unsatisfying outcome to the conflicts after 1945. This is something few of us who witnessed the World War think about. Why has the good Uncle become such a patsy?. .. Caldwell offers a set of guidelines about how to think about involvement in any continuing or future conflict. They make a lot of sense. First and foremost is to align an overseas mission goal with America’s core interests and how to achieve that goal. If alignment fails, however, the mission risks failure beyond America’s control.

Takimag

Caldwell’s book is a reflection of a lifetime spent studying and analyzing U.S wars at several defense think tanks for more than 50 years.. .. As he walks readers though history, Caldwell provides both civilian and military strategists at all levels—including the Presidents—with the necessary information to understand how strategies evolved or disintegrated, succeeded brilliantly or fell short, or simply muddled along, wasting lives and national treasure in the process.. .. For civilian policymakers and military officers alike, Anatomy of Victory will yield lessons not only for strategy, but also for fostering and maintaining healthy relations.. .. Having lived athwart the wars and leaders he profiles, Caldwell has given readers a readable and important work that will help civilian and military leaders refine their abilities to develop and understand grand strategy. As we enter an era of renewed great power competition, these abilities have become vital.

the flagship publication of the U.S. Naval Institu Proceedings Magazine

Anatomy of Victory is exceptionally well written. It includes exceptional maps and other graphics that provide a conceptual framework in analyzing past conflict. Its detailed accounts of key events and decisive battles provide a clearer understanding of decisions made by policy makers and military leaders at the strategic and operational levels of war. It is a must read for policy makers and military planners in considering the strategic architecture in planning for future conflict.

Military Review

Anatomy of Victory puts four wars side-by-side in a scientific analysis of what went right and what went wrong to produce the differing outcomes in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq.. .. Why the wars after 1945 turned out badly is easy to understand—it's in a paragraph on page 431.. .. Caldwell succinctly tells us what went wrong and what you must do if you don't want a failed war.. .. His cogent conclusions define the criteria by which staff leaders must evaluate staff proposals, by which the president must evaluate cabinet proposals, by which Congress must evaluate the work of the executive, and by which the public must judge the performance of its political leaders.. .. None of this has been done for more than half a century. That's the point and that's the profound importance of Anatomy of Victory.

Jeffrey Race

Readers can learn from and enjoy every page of this book, which displays the rare ability to seize immediately upon the essence of military questions. Unfortunately, not many of our generals—and far fewer of our elected leaders—have Caldwell’s talent for prescribing the necessities of victory and proscribing the causes of defeat. In masterful summaries that are equal parts history and analysis, he takes us on a truly professional tour of our wars since 1941, allowing us to share his great gift for strategic clarity.

Mark Helprin

Caldwell compares planning and operations in World War II to later limited wars that have nonetheless had enormous national consequences: Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. His detailed, well-documented account indicates that the U.S. forces repeatedly suffer from ill-conceived strategies and increasing lack of realism. His. .. critique of limited war is knowledgeable and compelling.

The American Conservative

Excellent! Fills an important void in our understanding about policy, strategy, and operations.

H. R. McMaster

Caldwell presents an excellent framework for a unified theory of victory in warfare and seeks to equip decision-makers to answer Clausewitz’s first strategic question: What is your policy objective? . . . For civilian policymakers and military officers alike, Anatomy of Victory will yield lessons not only for strategy, but also for fostering and maintaining healthy relations. . . . Having lived athwart the wars and leaders he profiles, Caldwell has given readers a readable and important work that will help civilian and military leaders refine their abilities to develop and understand grand strategy. As we enter an era of renewed great power competition, these abilities have become vital.

Proceedings