Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents

by William Thomson, Terje Lensberg

Overview

This book extrapolates on the Nash (1950) treatment of the bargaining problem to consider the situation where the number of bargainers may vary. The authors formulate axioms to specify how solutions should respond to such changes, and provide new characterizations of all the major solutions as well as the generalizations of these solutions.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521027038
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	06/22/2006
Edition description:	Reissue
Pages:	224
Product dimensions:	5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.63(d)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments; 1. Preliminaries; 2. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a fixed number of agents; 3. Population monotonicity and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; 4. Population monotonicity and the egalitarian solution; 5. Truncated egalitarian and monotone path solutions; 6. Guarantees and opportunities; 7. Stability and the Nash solution; 8. Stability without pareto-optimality; 9. Stability and the leximin solution; 10. Population monotonicity, weak stability and the egalitarian solution; 11. Stability and collectively rational solutions; 12. Invariance under replication and juxtaposition; Bibliography; Index.

Editorial Reviews

"This is one of the best books ever written on normative collective choice." Ehud Kalai, Social Choice and Welfare

"For both he sympathetic and the critical reader, the well-written monograph is the reference book covering this strand of literature." Hans Haller, Mathematical Reviews

From the Publisher