Between Slavery and Freedom: Philosophy and American Slavery

by Howard McGary, Bill E. Lawson

Overview

Using the writings of slaves and former slaves, as well as commentaries on slavery, Between Slavery and Freedom explores the American slave experience to gain a better understanding of six moral and political concepts—oppression, paternalism, resistance, political obligation, citizenship, and forgiveness. The authors use analytical philosophy as well as other disciplines to gain insight into the thinking of a group of people prevented from participating in the social/political discourse of their times.

Between Slavery and Freedom rejects the notion that philosophers need not consider individual experience because philosophy is "impartial" and "universal." A philosopher should also take account of matters that are essentially perspectival, such as the slave experience. McGary and Lawson demonstrate the contribution of all human experience, including slave experiences, to the quest for human knowledge and understanding.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780253012791
Publisher:	Indiana University Press
Publication date:	02/22/1993
Series:	Blacks in the Diaspora
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	176
File size:	525 KB
Age Range:	18 Years

About the Author

HOWARD MCGARY, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, has published widely in African American philosophy and social philosophy. BILL E. LAWSON, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware, is the editor of and a contributor to The Underclass Question. His research has focused on issues regarding political obligations and political oppression.

HOWARD MCGARY, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, has published widely in African American philosophy and social philosophy. BILL E. LAWSON, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware, is the editor of and a contributor to The Underclass Question. His research has focused on issues regarding political obligations and political oppression.

Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

Oppression and Slavery

BILL LAWSON

In 1850 Virginia planter George Fitzhugh wrote:

The slaves are all well fed, well clad, have plenty of fuel, and are happy. They have no dread of the future-no fear of want. [The slaveholder] is the least selfish of men.

The institution of slavery gives full development and full play to the affections.

Fitzhugh was not alone in his opinions. There were many apologists for chattel slavery in the United States. Most historians of the American slave experience, however, have concluded that slaves were oppressed, although they disagree over what the mark of oppression was during slavery. Some, like Stanley Elkins in his influential work Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual life, have defined the mark of oppression as the psychological damage done to slaves. Others, such as Frank Tannenbaum and Orlando Patterson, have focused on slaves' alienation. Kenneth Stampp saw the cruel treatment of slaves as the defining mark of slavery. Finally, commentators such as James Oakes claim that the role of the government in keeping slaves oppressed was the defining feature of slavery.

When, however, we examine what the slaves had to say about their own oppression in slave narratives, ownership of human beings was identified as the mark of oppression. Unfortunately, most commentators have played down the moral implications of owning another human being. I think that slaves understood the institution of slavery and correctly identified the concept of human ownership as the mark of their oppression. I shall make use of Frederick Douglass's paradoxical remark that ex-slaves were more oppressed after emancipation than during slavery in my argument that ownership was the defining feature of oppression for slaves.

Most philosophers and social scientists have attempted to define the term "oppression" with an eye to its etymological root: to press. When one is oppressed, one is "pressed down": one's position is made lower, or one is held in a lowly state.

If we take this as our working definition of oppression, we can see why psychological indoctrination and alienation, cruelty, and unjust acts by the government can be oppressive. Still, I want to argue that they are not the defining marks of American chattel slavery. Psychological indoctrination and alienation, cruelty, and unjust acts by the government are important features of slavery, but none of these give American chattel slavery its distinctive twinge. Why is this so?

Psychological Indoctrination and Slavery

Possibly the best-known work with the premise that psychological indoctrination was the defining mark of slavery is Elkins's book. It was Elkins's contention that psychological indoctrination was a direct result of the closed nature of the slavery system: the restrictions on the behavior of slaves were so tightly enforced that the personality of blacks became deformed. Elkins used the "Sambo thesis" to explain the manner in which blacks had been psychologically indoctrinated by the slavery system:

Sambo, the typical plantation slave, was docile but irresponsible, loyal but lazy, humble but chronically given to lying and stealing; his behavior was full of infantile silliness and his talk with childish exaggerations. His relationship with his master was one of utter dependence and childlike attachment: it was indeed this childlike quality that was the very key to his being.

Elkins argued that the behavior exhibited by slaves was similar to that of concentration camp prisoners. What is important for us here are Elkins's tests for a non-Sambo personality. Acts such as resistance, suicide, and hatred, according to Elkins, were exhibited by few slaves Thus, he concluded that they were "Sambos." Needless to say, Elkins's thesis has been the subject of much debate.

John Blassingame has argued that the "Sambo" personality was role-playing by slaves and that it should be viewed as one of three white stereotypes of slaves — the others being rebellious Nat and tricky Jack. Blassingame contended that the system was not as closed as Elkins contends. Slaves, he argues, developed their own culture within the slave society. This culture was dedicated to achieving freedom. As Stampp wrote: "Slaves showed great eagerness to get some — if they could not get all — of the advantages of freedom." Accommodating behavior by slaves had to be understood in the context of the lives they were forced to live: "If slaves yielded to authority most of the time, they did so because they usually saw no other practical choice." Slaveholders understood this and worked to construct a system that would make slaves stand in fear.

If Blassingame and other historians are correct, their conclusions call into question Elkins's thesis of a "Sambo" personality. If by psychological indoctrination we mean that slaves were made into "Sambos," and if there were non-Sambos as Elkins claims, then psychological indoctrination cannot have been the defining feature of slavery. It is not surprising, however, that Elkins fails to see that slaves did pass his test for being non-Sambos. In chapters 3 and 6, we will see why some commentators fail to appreciate the various forms of resistance by slaves and why the surprising lack of hatred and resentment in the slave narratives should not be interpreted as meekness or compliance.

One can hold that psychological indoctrination is the defining mark of slavery without endorsing the "Sambo" thesis. Some might argue that psychological indoctrination could have occurred during slavery without producing "Sambos." If this is true, psychological indoctrination could still be the defining mark of American chattel slavery. People who take this position most often claim that psychological indoctrination leads to alienation and that this alienation was the mark of oppression during slavery.

Alienation and Slavery

Sociologist Orlando Patterson thinks that alienation was the defining mark of slavery. Like Elkins, Patterson claims that the system of slavery was closed, but, unlike Elkins, he does not believe that the closed system created a "Sambo" personality. Patterson believes that slaves suffered from "natal alienation," defined as:

the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations. It also has the important nuance of loss of native status, of deracination. It was this alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of "blood," and from any attachment to groups or localities other than chosen for him by the master, that gave the relation of slavery its peculiar value to the master.

Patterson develops this view of the slave from a comparative study of slavery in the United States and other parts of the world. He was looking for the essential features of any slave system. Perhaps his failure to appreciate alternative accounts of the psychological condition of the slave can be attributed to his global perspective. Reading American slave narratives, one quickly observes that many of the features of Patterson's "natal alienation" thesis are not found. Again, if one looks at the work of Blassingame, Stampp, and Stuckey on the slave community, one questions whether slaves in the United States suffered from "natal alienation." Any attempt to use alienation as a defining feature of American chattel slaves must discount the contrary evidence found in slave narratives. What we do find in the commentaries on slavery and in slave narratives is the various forms of cruel treatment that slaves were forced to endure. This has led some people to conclude that cruelty was the defining mark of slavery.

Cruelty and Slavery

When we examine the slave narratives, it is clear that cruelty was an important feature of slavery. Slave narratives are replete with examples of the cruelty of slaveholders. Slaves were brutalized physically and subjected to psychological abuse. Slaves were subject to the whims of their master or mistress. This cruel treatment of slaves did cause their position to be lower than that of the slaveholders and nonslaves. Yet there was a wide range of behaviors exhibited by slaveholders toward their slaves. This behavior ranged from unbelievable cruelty to clearly humanitarian treatment. But even though slaveholders could be kind, slaves knew that cruelty was a mechanism available to the slaveholder for keeping them in check.

Frederick Douglass's story of his being sent to Covey, the negro-breaker, is an excellent example of the use of the threat of cruelty and then actual cruel treatment to keep slaves under control. Female slaves were not spared the cruelty of slavery. The cruel treatment of Linda Brent is well known. The knowledge that cruel behavior could be exhibited by the slaveholder to keep control may be thought to show that cruelty was the defining feature of slavery.

Historian Kenneth Stampp thought that it was. He saw cruelty as a way to break the will of the slave. The cruel treatment of slaves reinforced the idea that slaves had no control over the most intimate aspects of their lives. Slaves could be forced to have sexual intercourse and then endure the pain of being separated from their children with little regard for the psychological or physical welfare of either. As a consequence of the cruel behavior of slaveholders, a social etiquette of race relations developed which had as its sole purpose the social control of slaves. All of these actions were designed to make the slave "stand in fear" and to reinforce the position that slaves were chattel.

But it is clear that some slaves were never treated cruelly. Some slaveholders were troubled by the institution of slavery. Patrick Henry wrote: "Every thinking honest man rejects slavery in speculation, how few in practice? Would anyone believe that I am Master of slaves of my own purchase? I am drawn along by the general inconvenience of living without them; I will not, I cannot justify it." Henry's remark should not be taken to imply that like-minded slaveholders sold or freed their slaves. But as remarks by Douglass and other ex-slaves show, there were some humane (if that is the correct word) slaveholders. This would not defeat, however, the claim that the defining feature of slavery was its cruelty. Remarks like those of Douglass only show that not all slaveholders were cruel.

If Stampp's position can be interpreted to mean that slavery was the cruelest of cruel institutions, then this would be a consistent position. But Stampp also claims that at the end of slavery "all blacks lost were their chains." By this Stampp seems to mean that blacks were treated just as cruelly after emancipation. We find similar claims in the writings of Frederick Douglass. If Douglass and Stampp are right about the cruel treatment of blacks after slavery, and if cruelty is the defining mark of slavery, then either slavery continued after emancipation or cruelty is not its defining mark.

Of course, one may want to claim that given the continuation of cruel treatment, blacks were still enslaved. This position is consistent but counter-intuitive. After my discussion of human ownership as the defining feature of slavery, I will show why cruelty cannot be the defining feature. But for now let us turn to the claim that the mark of slavery was the government's role in establishing and maintaining the subjugation of blacks.

Governmental Action and Slavery

Historian James Oakes argues that American chattel slavery was dependent upon the political system, not the reverse. Oakes admits that the relationship between slaveholders and the legal system was paradoxical: "the fact that slaves were 'totally' subordinate to the masters did not mean that the master's power over the slave was absolute." The state regulated the behavior of slaveholders toward their slaves. Citing John Codman Hurd, Oakes gives the following definition of slavery: "that condition of a natural person, in which, by the operation of law, the application of his physical and mental powers depends, as far as possible, upon the will of another who is himself subject to the supreme power of the state." How much power did the state have? Oakes thinks that beyond bringing slavery into existence, "the government's role in regulating and maintaining the master-slave relationship was essential." The state provided guidelines for who could and could not be a slave.

Consider the situation of black women during slavery. At one point in American history, both blacks and whites could be held in bondage. Then, as early as 1604, some owners adopted the practice of considering blacks, and the children of bound black women slaves for life, even before it was part of the legal system. This put the relative advantages of white and black bondage in a different light.

Of all the discriminatory practices of slavery, the concept of partus sequitur ventrem — that the child follows the condition of the mother — was the most damaging. It put the stamp of social inferiority on children born to black women regardless of the race of the father and put a premium on childbearing. This practice also kept the institution of slavery alive.

By the time Linda Brent published her narrative, the concept of partus sequitur ventrem was established law. Brent wrote:

Sometime, when my master found that I refused to accept what he called his kind offers, he would threaten to sell my child. "Perhaps that will humble you," said he.

Humble me! Was I not already in the dust? But his threat lacerated my heart. I knew the law gave him power to fulfil it; for slaveholders have been cunning enough to enact that "the child shall follow the condition of the mother," not the father; thus taking care that licentiousness shall not interfere with avarice. ... When they told me my new-born babe was a girl, my heart was heavier than it had ever been before. Slavery is terrible for men; but it is far more terrible for women.

The power of the state, according to Oakes, was overwhelming and the slaveholders "never seriously questioned the state's right to say who was a slave." One reason the state's codification of black slavery was accepted was that it was just assumed that "slaves should be Negroes and Negroes should be slaves." Oakes notes: "This was the universal supposition by the eighteenth century, and it served to mask the awesome implications of authority the state exercised when it codified that presumption."

The state also had the job of defining who was a "Negro." Miscegenation raised a problem for those persons who believed in racial purity. Where genetics failed,

the law stepped in to provide official sanction as well as clarification for a powerful cultural proposition. ... "Every person who has one-fourth, or other larger part, of negro blood, shall be deemed a mulatto," the Kentucky legislature decreed in 1852, "and the word negro, when used in any statute, shall be construed to mean mulatto as well as negro."

The government also regulated the conditions under which slaves could be set free. In addition, the government could confiscate slaves for non-payment of taxes and take slaves if the slaveholder was convicted of a criminal offense. And finally, the state could set limits on what the masters could do to slaves, but such laws often permitted far from humane treatment. For example, Moses Roper wrote in his narrative:

This is according to law: after three call they may shoot a runaway slave. Soon after the one on horse came up with me, catching hold of the bridle of my horse, pushed a pistol to my side; the others soon came up, and breaking off several of the branches from the trees, they gave me one hundred blows. This they did near the planter's house. The gentleman was not at home, but his wife came out and begged them not to kill me so near the house.

According to Oakes, slavery could not survive without some legal recognition of its existence: some legal determination of who was and who was not a slave and some rudimentary definition of slavery itself.

When we examine the role of the government, we find a better candidate for the mark of oppression during slavery. The effects of government sanctions, restrictions, and codes were everywhere. Individuals acted in ways that were cruel, harmful, and unjust, but the government played a crucial role in defining, enforcing, and maintaining the ways blacks were subjugated. Many scholars have called attention to this fact and have detailed the specific ways that the government sanctioned slavery. What is often missing from their account, however, is the importance that slaves attached to the government-supported view that blacks were chattel.

(Continues…)

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Excerpted from "Between Slavery and Freedom"
by .
Copyright © 1992 Bill E. Lawson and Howard McGary.
Excerpted by permission of Indiana University Press.
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Table of Contents

Preface
Acknowledgments
Philosophy and American Slavery: An Introduction
Howard McGary and Bill Lawson

One. Oppression and Slavery
Bill Lawson

Two. Paternalism and Slavery
Howard McGary

Three. Resistance and Slavery

Four. Citizenship and Slavery
Bill Lawson

Five. Moral Discourse and Slavery

Six. Forgiveness and Slavery
Howard McGary

Notes
Bibliography
Index