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Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric
Confederate Policy for the United States Presidential Contest of 1864
By Larry E. Nelson The University of Alabama Press
Copyright © 1980 The University of Alabama Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8173-8970-3
CHAPTER 1
Emergence of a Dual Challenge:
"It is the crisis with our oppressors."
Interest among Confederates in the Northern presidential contest dated at least from the year previous to the election. The New York Herald endorsed Abraham Lincoln for a second term in June 1863, and an editor at Richmond, bristling with defiance, seconded the nomination with the comment that reelection of the incumbent would be the finishing blow to the United States because his administration was ruining the finance and commerce of the nation while bungling the conduct of the war. Whether the journalist really hoped Lincoln would be reelected seems doubtful, but he was expressing an early Southern interest in the course of Northern presidential politics.
As the year of the election opened, Northern politicians scrambled for position, and Confederates from Virginia to Texas watched and commented on developments. Evidence of apparent intensification of tension in the enemy section encouraged expectations among Southerners that peace through a favorable outcome of the election was a genuine possibility. Northern distress also invited Confederate intrigue in Federal politics, and Southerners privately and publicly speculated on means to influence the canvass. The external and internal challenges of the Northern presidential election for the government of Jefferson Davis emerged during the first months of 1864: Meaningful manipulation of Northern politics seemed possible, and Southern expectations of peace through the election were aroused.
The Northern troubles that Confederates found most promising involved finances, conscription, and unrest in the Northwest. Early in the war, Southern observers learned that the value of greenbacks in the Northern money market fluctuated with the ebb and flow of public confidence in Lincoln's war policy. Many Confederates also concluded that the financial strain of the simultaneous loss of revenue from Southern exports and the cost of waging the war would eventually bankrupt the enemy section. The Northern financial situation in early 1864 prompted a Southern editor to remark: "With gold at the North nearly two for one; the commercial collapse so long talked of cannot be much longer postponed. With financial derangement, the overthrow of the party who will be held responsible for all the mischief will be inevitable." The journalist added that financial chaos would prevent the North from prosecuting the war even if Lincoln's successor should desire to continue the conflict.
Resistance in the North to conscription was another subject commonly discussed among Confederates. On February 1, 1864, Lincoln ordered another draft, which increased the number called within the past six months to five hundred thousand men, and the Confederate press reported criticism and resistance in the North. A bureaucrat in Richmond, impressed by this apparently widespread opposition to conscription, concluded that the majority of resisters were "peace men at heart" only awaiting an opportunity to immobilize the Lincoln administration.
Southerners carefully observed the Northwest, where events in the past had seemed propitious for Southern hopes and where prospects for the future were bright. When describing a dispute in the Federal Congress between representatives of the Northwest and the Northeast over fishing bounties, an editor in South Carolina remarked: "Nothing gives our readers more unfeigned pleasure than the evidences that are daily multiplying, of the existence of a feeling of jealousy and discord between the sections North and West, into which the United States are divided." The development of secret, and allegedly disruptive, societies in the Northwest was particularly promising. When the Chicago Tribune published an exposé on one of these groups, the Knights of the Golden Circle, the Augusta Constitutionalist eagerly relayed the report to its readers: "This organization has a double object in view, first, the election of a Copperhead like McClellan or Vallandigham to the Presidency, by which the independence of the rebels may be secured, with slavery restored to them; or, failing in that, the kindling of the flames of civil war in the North, which shall compass the same object, and to this end these clubs are being extended all over Illinois, and will rapidly spread through the other States."
Confederates had long predicted that tensions in the North would eventually erupt in violence, and reports of scattered outbursts seemed like prophecy on the verge of fulfillment. After a Copperhead newspaper in the Northwest warned Democrats to arm and prepare for interference from abolitionist mobs, an editor in Georgia commented: "We trust the little speck of trouble which has now appeared in the Northern political sky will prove to be the forerunner of a tempest of blood and ruin which will sweep over that section of the old Union." When a mob destroyed a Copperhead press in Illinois, Southern newspapers gleefully carried the story. Speculating on the election and the condition of Northern sentiment, I. B. Cohen, an attorney in Columbia, South Carolina, noted: "The germ of revolution seems to be budding in the North and I hope it will break forth, whether in blood or in violent opposition to the continuance of a fruitless war I care not."
Southerners also listened to the comments of Northern peace advocates in hopes of discerning some indication of their conduct in the campaign and election. The Constitutionalist, for example, dutifully copied the following advice given by the New York News to the peace Democracy: "We mean peace — let us talk it and act up to our words. Let us look about for a true Peace man to bear the standard, and then, its folds to the breeze, we will advance in the name of Peace, State Sovereignty, and self-government." In analyzing the composition of the peace party, the Northern editor concluded that it was an amalgam of persons who accepted the validity of secession or acknowledged that the South was exercising a legitimate right to revolution, opposed the conflict because of the high cost in blood and treasure, and believed that continued war was futile. At any rate, "The peace party has increased and is increasing rapidly."
Southerners took particular interest in the activities of peace leaders in the Federal Congress, of whom some were exceedingly vociferous. An editor in Georgia described the Congress that met during the first half of 1864 as "mainly a hustings for the next presidency." Southerners read of peace resolutions introduced into the Federal House of Representatives, analyzed the congressional votes that indicated the nature and depth of peace sentiment, and studied statements from the caucus of congressional Democrats. An editor in Texas surveyed such evidence and concluded that "the peace party in the Federal Congress is gradually on the increase."
Without question the most exciting revelations of feeling among Northern opponents of the war came from speeches delivered on the floor of the House of Representatives by peace Democrats. An address by William J. Allen, Copperhead from Illinois, that attacked Lincoln for his conduct of the war, his favorable attitude toward blacks, and the astronomical cost of the war, caught the attention of the Confederate press. A speech by Alexander H. Long, Copperhead from Ohio, precipitated a bitter row in the North and created a sensation in the South. The representative charged that Lincoln deliberately sought war against the South and was subverting civil liberties in the North. After three years of war, Long contended, the Confederacy was still strong and vigorous despite the administration's predictions of a short war and statements that the rebellion was almost exhausted. He alleged that harsh and vindictive policies of the Lincoln administration, such as emancipation and confiscation, prolonged the war by inspiriting Southerners to resist subjugation. Without qualification, he pronounced the war unconstitutional and destined to destroy the Union forever.
The portion of the speech of most interest to Southerners and Northerners alike was Long's expression of willingness to recognize Confederate independence: "I am reluctantly and despondingly forced to the conclusion that the Union is lost never to be restored. I regard all dreams of the restoration of the Union ... as worse than idle. I see, neither North nor South, any sentiment on which it is possible to build a Union." In remarks that must have set Confederate hearts to palpitating, Long expressed his opinion on the position the Democratic party should take in the forthcoming presidential election:
Nothing could be more fatal for the Democratic party than to seek to come into power pledged to a continuance of the war policy. Such a policy would be a libel upon its creed in the past and the ideas that lay at the basis of all free government, and would lead to its complete demoralization and ruin. I believe that the masses of the Democratic party are for peace, that they would be placed in a false position if they should nominate a war candidate for the Presidency and seek to make the issue upon the narrow basis of how the war should be prosecuted.
The unabashed call for peace and recognition of the Confederacy incited four days of vitriolic debate in the Federal House of Representatives in which supporters and opponents of Long hurled verbal brickbats at each other. Republicans sought to expel him, but his Democratic colleagues sprang to his defense although they did not necessarily share his sentiments. One who did agree with Long was Benjamin Harris, peace Democrat from Maryland, who had owned slaves and was dedicated to the cause of peace. Insisting that peace might reunite the nation but that war never could, he said: "I am a peace man, a radical peace man; and I am for peace by the recognition of the South, for the recognition of the southern confederacy; and I am for acquiescence in the doctrine of secession." In the end, the Republicans were unable to muster the votes to oust Long and had to settle for a resolution of censure.
Southerners watched and marveled at the fight in the Federal House of Representatives. Some Confederate newspapers published the speeches of Long and Harris and the subsequent proceedings in Congress and also reproduced comments from the Northern press and public favorable to these representatives. From abroad Henry Hotze reported that Europeans were studying the speech of Representative Long and related materials and were interpreting the events as a symptom "of a revulsion of feeling in the North" against the war. As might be expected, Southern newspapers lauded the controversial addresses as evidence that "honest men at the North are coming to their senses, and Abolition scoundrels are coming to justice." In Shreveport, Louisiana, a regular correspondent of the Galveston News was particularly impressed with the significance of Long's address and described it as "the most important speech in the United States since the commencement of the war, and by far the most honest and able." The Augusta Chronicle & Sentinel reported that the speech would furnish the "platform upon which the Democratic party of the North will make the issue in the coming Presidential election."
Southern editors provided liberal excerpts from Northern newspapers and the statements of politicians that gave Confederates some understanding of the maneuvering among the various presidential contenders. The newspaper accounts sometimes garbled details and made inaccurate predictions, but Confederates who read one of the major journals of their section knew that serious intraparty and interparty strife racked the Northern political structure. With reference to "caucuses, conventions, resolutions, and platforms" in the rival section, one Southern editor commented, "The political cauldron is beginning to bubble, and expectation is aroused to see what will emerge from its agitated depths."
Among the likely possibilities for the Republican nomination were Nathaniel P. Banks, who had led Union forces at Port Hudson; Benjamin Butler, "Beast Butler"; John C. Frémont, former commander in Missouri; Salmon P. Chase, secretary of the treasury; and, of course, Abraham Lincoln. The latter three proved the strongest contenders, and Southern newspapers chronicled the evolution of their candidacies. As early as January, the Confederate press reported Frémont's determination to run as an independent, if necessary, and Southern readers caught a glimpse of his position on the issues when a meeting of his friends in New York informally nominated him and wrote a platform. This declaration of sentiments attacked Lincoln, called for civil rights for blacks, and pledged to subdue the rebellion.
Confederates could study the rivalry between Chase and Lincoln through reports of public meetings endorsing Chase and excerpts from Northern newspapers discussing the struggle. Commenting on the dispute generated by the Pomeroy Circular, one Southern editor said: "We are glad to notice that the discord so much talked about in Republican ranks is beginning to show itself openly. If the rascals get into a good jolly fight politically among themselves, and refuse to settle amicably, all the better for us."
Among the Democrats, the persons suggested for the nomination were such disparate personalities as Ulysses S. Grant, who had won a shining reputation in the West; Franklin Pierce, former president of the United States, who was sympathetic to the South; and George B. McClellan, who had commanded the Army of the Potomac. Identified with the war faction of the party, McClellan clearly emerged as the front-running Democrat. Reports focused upon the peace and war divisions of the Democratic party of which Southerners had long been aware. An editor in Georgia, for example, insisted that the Democrats would provide a strong opposition to Lincoln but was uncertain "whether a Democrat 'pledged to vigorous prosecution of the war,' or a conservative man willing to cease on some more equitable terms the desolating strife" would bear the Democratic standard.
In addition to monitoring developments within the Democratic party, Southern editors provided their readers with generous excerpts and summaries from the endless flow of criticism against Lincoln generated by Democratic politicians and newspapers. Confederates castigated the Republican champions, but not all comments were automatically in favor of the Democrats. Arguing that the principal benefit of the Northern election was the accompanying strife and dissension, the Charleston Mercury said, "For the South, as matters stand at present, there is small reason to desire the success of one candidate more than the other." Declaring a similar disenchantment with the most likely candidates, the Richmond Sentinel expressed a preference for the incumbent: "Lincoln is likely to wear out sooner than a fresh man, and is, therefore to be preferred." The North Carolina Standard described the Democrats as "the party at the North that is out in the cold and have not got the beef and shoddy contracts, and hence wish a change of administration, that they may carry on the war on their own account."
The heightened tensions and open calls for peace at any price in the North encouraged Southerners to indulge in hopes that peace might come through Federal political developments. Some Confederates expected that the election might bring a beneficial change of administration at Washington or that the stress of the campaign might palsy the Northern war effort. Speaking of the election, the editor of the Richmond Examiner said: "Although it is difficult to penetrate the dark curtain of the future, and to discern exactly how our own welfare may be affected by the political complexion of the United States, yet it is evident that the whole solution of the mighty question which agitates the continent may hang upon it, and scarcely possible that it will not be essentially concerned by it." In a similar vein, an editor in Georgia reviewed the situation and declared, "It is the crisis with our oppressors." Such sentiments extended into the Confederate army, where a soldier wrote to his wife, "I don't think the war can last much longer unless Lincoln is reelected."
Even if the candidates proved unacceptable to the South, many Confederates eagerly anticipated the campaign. One Confederate said: "It is in the contest itself, in the feuds and disintegration produced by the struggle for plunder that she [the South] may hope for relief from the attacks which have heretofore been concentrated upon her." A commentator in Savannah, Georgia, expected to see "the North torn by intestine feuds, and utterly demoralized in the Presidential election."
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric by Larry E. Nelson. Copyright © 1980 The University of Alabama Press. Excerpted by permission of The University of Alabama Press.
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