Coalitions in Parliamentary Government

by L. Dodd

Overview

For eighty years, students of parliamentary democracy have argued that durable cabinets require majority party government. Lawrence Dodd challenges this widely held belief and offers in its place a revisionist interpretation based on contemporary game theory. He argues for a fundamental alteration in existing conceptions of the relationship between party systems and parliamentary government.

The author notes that cabinet durability depends on the coalitional status of the party or parties that form the cabinet. This status is created by the fractionalization, instability, and polarization that characterize the parliamentary party system. Cabinets of minimum winning status are likely to endure; as they depart from minimum winning status, their durability should decrease.

Hypotheses derived from the author's theory arc examined against the experience of seventeen Western nations from 1918 to 1974. Making extensive use of quantitative analysis, the author compares behavioral patterns in multiparty and majority party parliaments, contrasts interwar and postwar parliaments, and examines the consistency of key behavioral patterns according to country. He concludes that a key to durable government is the minimum winning status of the cabinet, which may be attained in multiparty or majority party parliaments.

Originally published in 1976.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691617152
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	03/08/2015
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #1247
Pages:	306
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.70(d)

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Coalitions in Parliamentary Government

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By Lawrence C. Dodd

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1976 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-07564-8

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Democratic politics is plagued by an overriding dilemma: how to secure responsive yet authoritative government. To produce the desired balance, most Western nations have instituted some form of parliamentary government. In a parliamentary system, executive power resides in the prime minister and his cabinet. The cabinet government is selected by a popularly elected representative legislature. The selection process entails negotiation and bargaining among various factions or parties so that the act of cabinet installation ideally serves to authorize and legitimize the direction of public policy. This direction is reflected in the factional or partisan composition of the cabinet.

The cabinet is held accountable to and can be dissolved by the parliament. In this sense, the executive is democratically selected and can be democratically deposed. While possessing the parliament's mandate, the prime minister and his cabinet have considerable power. Policy formulation and implementation are primarily at the initiation and direction of the cabinet, with the parliament legitimizing public policy by enacting it into law. In addition, the cabinet possesses all of the discretion normally given to a chief executive. Thus parliamentary government provides for strong executive authority.

The neat conceptual symmetry of parliamentary democracy makes it tempting indeed as a solution to the democrat's dilemma. It has found friends even among American political analysts, especially those disconcerted with the deadlock that often characterizes American presidential democracy. Unfortunately, parliamentary government is not without its shortcomings. Because of the desire for a popularly constrained and responsive executive, cabinet governments possess no guaranteed tenure. A prime minister and his cabinet hold office only as long as they have the confidence of a parliamentary majority. This situation allows for intrigue of the highest order, as parties and factions maneuver to bring down one cabinet and replace it with a more acceptable one. Consequently, the history of Western parliamentary democracies is strewn with cabinets that fell from power only days or months after installation.

The rise and fall of cabinets dictate the fate of the common man s interest. The installation of a new cabinet provides for one group's ascendancy, another's demise. With rapid and persistent alteration in cabinet government, no group's interests can be served. Transient cabinets have little time to initiate and pass legislation, much less to supervise its effective administration. Even when cabinet changes are only variations on a dominant ideological or partisan theme, the intrigue surrounding cabinet alterations can destroy the momentum and authority of executive actions.

Despite these problems, parliamentary democracy cannot be dismissed out of hand as an ineffective political institution. The parliamentary world includes among its members some of the most stable regimes of modern times: such nations as Australia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, to list only a few. And in spite of the constant opportunity for cabinet overthrow, all Western parliamentary regimes have experienced durable cabinet government. Indeed, if there is any one behavioral characteristic of parliamentary government in general, it is the diversity of experiences that are found among parliamentary regimes. The durability of cabinets varies tremendously both between countries and within countries over time. The most dramatic example of the former is the contrast between Great Britain (1918-1940, 1945-1974), where cabinets persisted in office over forty months on the average, and the Third and Fourth French Republics (1918-1940, 1945-1958), where cabinets averaged approximately nine and one-half months' duration. The variation within countries is no less dramatic. For example from 1918 to 1932, cabinets in Weimar Germany persisted for approximately ten months; by contrast, in the Federal German Republic (1949-1974), cabinets have lasted for approximately thirty-six months.

Thus the paradox, the mystery of parliamentary government that baffles and fascinates the political analyst. Parliamentary government does exemplify the democrat's search for representative institutions that nevertheless allow a strong executive. Some parliamentary regimes have refined the politics of authoritative yet responsive government to a fine art. Yet the history of parliamentary government also provides eloquent testimony to human contentiousness, to the persistent struggle for power and advantage that, in its most extreme manifestation, makes the spoils of victory meaningless. Why do some cabinets endure whereas others do not? Why do some parliamentary regimes experience a high frequency of durable cabinets while others see them rarely? These are among the most interesting questions of comparative political analysis. They encapsulate a fundamental problem of democratic theory: the foundations of responsive yet authoritative government.

PARTY SYSTEMS AND CABINET DURABILITY: THE LOWELL THESIS

Since the days of A. Lawrence Lowell, students of parliamentary democracy have argued that durable cabinets require majority party government. As Lowell writes:

It is ... an axiom in politics that, except under very peculiar circumstances, coalition ministries are short lived compared with homogeneous ones.

A cabinet which depends for its existence on the votes of the Chamber can pursue a consistent policy with firmness and effect only when it can rely for support on a compact and faithful majority.

Thus, Lowell concludes, "the parliamentary system will give a country strong and efficient government only in case the majority consists of a single party."

Since the publication of Lowell's argument in Governments and Parties in Continental Europe in 1896, virtually every generation of political scientists has echoed and reaffirmed his thesis. This can be seen in a brief review of some of the most noted political classics written in the past fifty years:

Lord Bryce, Modern Democracies, 1921:

An administration formed by a coalition of parties is usually weak, not merely because the combination is unstable, but because men whose professed principles differ are likely to be entangled in inconsistencies or driven to unsatisfactory compromises. [In multiparty parliaments, each party] becomes a focus of intrigue. [The parties] make bargains with one another and by their combination, perhaps secretly and suddenly formed, successive ministries may be overturned, with injury to the progress of legislation and to the continuity of national policy. Since there must be parties, the fewer and stronger they are, the better.

Harold Laski, in Parliamentary Government in England, 1938, reviews the argument that durable government requires a majority party system:

With some writers, indeed, this position has assumed the position of an axiom; and it is strongly argued that this is the best method of working representative government. I believe this to be true. ... The multi-party system ... either makes for coalition government, with its inherent erosion of principle; or for minority government, which is always likely to be weak.

Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, 1951:

Multipartism weakens the government in a parliamentary regime. ... The absence of a majority party makes it necessary to form heterogeneous ... cabinets based on a coalition, or else minority cabinets. ... A programme of government action is therefore possible only for a very short period, for limited objectives, and very lukewarm measures. ... Cabinet collapses which are exceptional and rare under the two party system become normal and frequent and are scarcely mitigated by the fact that the same men are often to be found in different ministerial combinations.

In our own generation, Lowell's thesis is reflected in the work of Jean Blondel, who writes that the "duration [of cabinet governments] is unquestionably influenced by the type of party system prevailing in the country." According to Blondel:

Two factors ... appear to contribute to the relative duration of governments in parliamentary systems: the fact that the system is a straight clash between two parties and the fact that one-party government prevails. The two factors are quite clearly connected: one-party governments are not possible without at least one large party, except on a temporary basis. On balance, ... it does seem that one-party government ... is the factor contributing most decisively to the stability of governments.

In contrast to one-party governments, Blondel concludes that "coalition, whether small or large, appears directly antagonistic to stable government...." Blondel is joined in this perspective by Hans Daalder who hypothesizes that "coalition cabinets are bound to be unstable" and concludes that although "there is no great difference between one-party and two-party coalitions, the hypothesis seems confirmed."

The empirical evidence presented in the foregoing works has been of two different types. Scholars from Bryce to Duverger supported Lowell's thesis by comparing the chaotic experience of France or Weimar Germany to the durable governments of the United Kingdom, implying that the former were typical multiparty regimes whereas the latter was the typical majority party system. Blondel and Daalder have made major advancements by expanding the number of countries examined: Blondel analyzes behavior in seventeen Western parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1966, focusing on the average differences in cabinet durability between party systems; Daalder analyzes ten smaller European democracies from 1918 to 1969.

These writers are not alone in their emphasis on the perils of multipartism and the benefits of majority partism. Similar statements can be found in many other works on party systems. The result is a phenomenon that can be termed "the myth of multipartism": (1) governments in multiparty parliaments must be minority cabinets, coalition cabinets, or both; (2) by their very nature, minority cabinets and coalition cabinets are quite transient; (3) multiparty systems are consequently undesirable since they produce transient governments.

Two corollaries of this myth are the myth of party coalitions: coalition governments are necessarily nondurable; the myth of majority partism: countries seeking durable cabinets must achieve majority party government and hence a majority party system.

THE MYTH OF MULTIPARTISM REVISITED

On its face, the myth of multipartism appears supported by the evidence. It is a fact that majority party governments last longer than multiparty governments. For the countries and time periods listed in Table 1:1, majority party governments have persisted for an average of fifty-five months; multiparty cabinets have lasted for an average of twenty-six months. Despite these differences, however, a degree of uneasiness should exist. Averages fail to indicate the diversity of experiences in multiparty and majority party parliaments. Can we conclude that multiparty parliaments are devoid of durable cabinets?

Table 1:2 presents life-span frequencies for all cabinets in the countries and time periods listed in Table 1:1. While it is true that cabinets in majority party systems are generally durable, it is not true that cabinets in multiparty parliaments are necessarily transient. There is wide variation in cabinet durability among multiparty parliaments, with 23 percent of all cabinets in multiparty parliaments lasting forty months or longer. Table 1:3 presents equally intriguing patterns among multiparty parliaments, providing a frequency distribution of the durability of shortest cabinets per parliament and coalition cabinets. As with Table 1:2, this table indicates the dramatic differences that can obtain when we shift our focus from averages to frequencies and from individual cabinets to parliaments. Over the past fifty years 33 percent of the multiparty parliaments had no cabinet that lasted less than forty months; the percentage would be higher if we included those parliaments in which no new cabinet formed but during which an old cabinet continued. Among all coalition cabinets in multiparty parliaments, 22 percent lasted forty months or longer. And among all cabinets lasting fifty months or longer (including cabinets in majority party parliaments), approximately 60 percent were coalition cabinets from multiparty parliaments.

While the average durability of cabinets may be low for all multiparty parliaments, a large number of durable cabinets have survived in multiparty regimes. The durable cabinets are concentrated in certain parliaments. In other words, multiparty parliaments do not experience some constant proportion of durable cabinets and some constant proportion of transient cabinets. Just the opposite holds: some multiparty parliaments produce durable cabinets; other multiparty parliaments produce transient cabinets. Unequivocal statements maintaining that peacetime multiparty parliaments cannot produce durable cabinets are unwarranted. Multiparty parliaments experience a wide variation in cabinet durability, including a significant number of durable governments.

DETERMINANTS OF CABINET DURABILITY: THE THESIS

The purpose of this book is to explain the variation in cabinet durability among modern parliaments, identifying parliamentary conditions that are conducive to durable government. Most parliaments during the past fifty years have been multiparty parliaments, as Tables 1:4a and 1:4b indicate. Most of the variation in cabinet durability occurs among multiparty parliaments, as Table 1:2 demonstrates. Consequently, an analysis of cabinet durability must focus most extensively on behavior that characterizes multiparty parliaments.

Multiparty politics has been described quite aptly by Maurice Duverger as a "parliamentary game." The object of the game is to form and control the government. In the game, a durable cabinet "must find support from a coalition of associated parties: their alliance is always uneasy and intrigues are perpetually being hatched in the lobbies of parliament to break up the early combination and replace it with a new one." Some intrigues succeed and a cabinet falls; other intrigues fail and a cabinet endures. An explanation of cabinet persistency lies in understanding the parliamentary game.

This study is based on the simple premise that parliamentary government can be viewed as a game. As Middleton argued forty years ago, success in the game depends on "the nature of the coalition" that forms the cabinet. The concept of game is not used for poetic expression or imagery. It is an analytic tool, a conceptual strategy that can help order the apparent chaos of multiparty politics. Through this analytic orientation, we may discover systematic patterns of cabinet formation and maintenance that were previously hidden.

The structure of my argument is as follows:

1. The object of the parliamentary game is to control the cabinet. The actors in the game are the parliamentary parties. These parties, as cohesive units, behave in a rational manner. Specifically, parties act to maximize their power within the government; thus they attempt to attain and maintain cabinet status. In their efforts, parties are constrained by the a priori ideological or cleavage commitments they have made to their constituents.

2. In the parliamentary game, a cabinet is installed by parliamentary vote. If a party is to guarantee that it will be in the cabinet it must gain the support of a parliamentary majority. In a multiparty parliament this majority must be built through the combination of votes from more than one party. Under certain circumstances parties may be under such ideological or cleavage constraints that no coalition is possible; under such conditions, a minority cabinet will be installed. Under other conditions, a majority cabinet may form through the coalition of two or more parties that possess a majority of the parliamentary votes. In such a coalition each party gains a proportion of the cabinet seats in return for its votes within parliament.

3. Analytically, three different types of cabinets can form:

(a) minimum winning cabinets: a cabinet that contains sufficient parties to ensure a parliamentary majority, but that contains no party unnecessary to majority status.

(b) oversized or greater-than-minimum winning cabinets: a cabinet that contains a party that is unnecessary to ensure the cabinet's parliamentary majority.

(c) undersized or less-than-minimum winning cabinets: a cabinet that does not contain sufficient parties to ensure a parliamentary majority.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from Coalitions in Parliamentary Government by Lawrence C. Dodd. Copyright © 1976 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents

• Frontmatter, pg. i
• Contents, pg. vii
• Tables, pg. ix
• Illustrations, pg. xiii
• Acknowledgments, pg. xv
• Abbreviations, pg. xvii
• 1. Introduction, pg. 1
• 2. A Theory of Cabinet Formation and Maintenance in Multiparty Parliaments, pg. 33
• 3. Party Systems and Coalition Processes, pg. 54
• 4. Party System Fractionalization and Stability, pg. 73
• 5. The Degree of Cleavage Conflict, pg. 97
• 6. Cabinet Coalitional Status and Cabinet Durability, pg. 115
• 7. Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments, pg. 127
• 8. Party Government and Cabinet Durability: All Peacetime Parliaments, pg. 156
• 9. Interwar-Postwar Contrasts, pg. 182
• 10. The Analysis of Parliamentary Coalitions: Problems and Prospects, pg. 207
• 11. Party Systems and Democracy, pg. 229
• Appendix A, pg. 245
• Appendix Β: The Location of Parliamentary Parties on Salient Cleavage Dimensions, pg. 247
• Selected Bibliography, pg. 257
• Index, pg. 279