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Overview
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9780192597175 |
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Publisher: | OUP Oxford |
Publication date: | 05/06/2020 |
Series: | Oxford Legal Philosophy |
Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
Format: | eBook |
Pages: | 224 |
File size: | 1 MB |
About the Author
Table of Contents
1 The Coercion Thesis 1
1 Ambiguities of the Concept-Term Law 1
2 The Coercion Thesis 4
3 The Coercion Thesis and Morality 16
4 The Coercion Thesis and the Motivations of Subjects 18
5 Outline of the Arguments 20
2 Methodology and the Nature of Law 23
1 Explicating the Metaphysical Nature of a Thing: Three Types of Modal Claim 23
2 Conceptual Analysis as a Descriptive Enterprise 28
3 The Distinguishing Task of Conceptual Analysis 30
4 Modest and Immodest Conceptual Analysis 33
5 The Relevant Philosophical Assumptions Are Ours 38
6 Modest Conceptual Analysis and Objective Truth 43
7 The Logical Structure of a Modest Conceptual Analysis 46
3 A Prima Facie Case for the Coercion Thesis: Sanctions as a Paradigmatic Feature of Municipal Law 49
1 The Meaning of the Term Law as Defined by the Canons of Ordinary Usage 50
2 Types of Coercive Sanction in Modern Municipal Law 54
3 The Ubiquity and Centrality of Coercive Sanctions in Existing Municipal Legal Systems 67
4 Sanctions as a Paradigmatic Feature of Law: A Prima Facie Case for the Coercion Thesis 70
4 What Law Must Be Able to Do: The Coercion Thesis and the Need to Keep the Peace 73
1 The Concept of an Artifact 74
2 Characteristic Uses, Basic Purposes, and Conceptual Functions of Artifacts 75
3 The Problem an Artifact Is Needed to Solve as Denning Its Conceptual Function 78
4 Something Must Be Reasonably Contrived to Perform the Conceptual Function of an Artifact to Be Properly Characterized as an Artifact of That Kind 80
5 The Conceptual Function of a Legal System 81
6 Keeping the Peace and Authorized Coercion 91
5 Three Conceptual Problems of Legal Normativity: The Logical Space of Reasons 99
1 The Concept of Normativity 100
2 The Logical Space of Reasons 101
3 The Character of the Reasons to Which the Practices Constitutive of Law Are Reasonably Contrived to Give Rise 112
4 Three Conceptual Problems of Legal Normativity 124
6 The Coercion Thesis and the How Problem of Legal Normativity 127
1 Vindicating the Coercion Thesis (1): Authorized Coercive Sanctions Solve the How Problem of Legal Normativity 128
2 Vindicating the Coercion Thesis (2): There Is No Other Plausible Explanation for Law's Conceptual Normativity 139
3 Are Objective Motivating Prudential Reasons the Wrong Kind of Reason to Solve the How Problem of Legal Normativity? 146
4 Does It Matter that It Is Not the Valid Norms Governing the Subject's Behavior That Provide the Objective Motivating Reason to Comply? 149
5 Coercive Sanctions and the How Problem of Legal Normativity 153
7 The Coercion Thesis and the Order Problem of Legal Normativity 155
1 First-Order, Second-Order, and Exclusionary Reasons 156
2 Sanctions, Exclusionary Reasons, and the Problems of Legal Normativity 160
3 The Basic Sources of Objective Motivating Reasons for Action 162
4 Only the Coercion Thesis Can Explain How Mandatory Legal Norms Governing Non-Official Behavior Give Rise to Objective Motivating Exclusionary Reasons 165
5 Can the Coercion Thesis Explain How Law Creates Objective Exclusionary Motivating Reasons? 167
6 The Claim That Law Provides Objective Exclusionary Motivating Reasons to Comply Explains Nothing That Needs to Be Explained 174
8 The Coercion Thesis and the Content Problem of Legal Normativity 179
1 Intrinsic and Instrumental Motivating Reasons 180
2 Order and Value: The Relationships Among the Various Kinds of Reason 182
3 Morality, Conventions, and Intrinsic Motivating Reasons to Comply 184
4 Law as a Source of Subjective Intrinsic Motivating Reasons to Comply 188
5 Law as a Source of Objective Intrinsic Motivating Reasons to Comply 190
6 The Capacity to Give Rise to Objective Intrinsic Motivating Reasons Explains Nothing That Needs to Be Explained about Law 199
7 The Coercion Thesis and the Problems of Legal Normativity 201
9 Coercive Sanctions and International Law 203
1 Ordinary Usages of the Term International Law 204
2 The System of International Regulation Denned by the U.N. Charter 207
3 Enforcement Mechanisms Authorized by the U.N. Charter 208
4 Objections and Replies 224
5 Conclusion: The Normative System Defined by the U.N. Charter Is Not a Counterexample to the Coercion Thesis 230
10 Can There Be Law in a Society of Angels? 231
1 Law and Real Angels 232
2 Law and Razian Angels 235
3 The Society of Angels and the Canons of Ordinary Usage 238
4 The Society of Angels and the Conceptual Function of Law 239
5 The Society of Angels and the How Problem of Legal Normativity 240
6 The Society of Angels and the Content Problem of Legal Normativity 241
7 Evaluating the Normative Commitments of the Angels 242
8 Revisiting Existing Legal Systems 250
9 Conclusions 252
Appendix-Can There Be a System of Municipal Law with Only Compensatory Damages? 255
Index 263