Cognitive Phenomenology

by Tim Bayne, Michelle Montague

Overview

It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive "cognitive phenomenology"—that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.

Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199579938
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	02/20/2012
Pages:	388
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.20(d)

About the Author

Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008).

Michelle Montague lectures in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and she has published in these areas in philosophy journals including Nous, Philosophical Studies, and Analysis. She is currently writing a book on the notion of content, with particular reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.

Table of Contents

Contents1. Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction, Michelle Montague and Tim Bayne2. The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology, Peter Carruthers and Benedicte Veillet3. From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed, Terry Horgan4. Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content, Uriah Kriegel5. On The Phenomenology of Thought, Joseph Levine6. The Phenomenology of Particularity, Michelle Montague7. Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content, David Pitt8. The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology, Jesse Prinz9. A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology, William Robinson10. On Behalf of Cognitive iQualia/i, Christopher Shields11. Phenomenal Thought, Charles Siewert12. Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology, Maja Spener13. Cognitive Phenomenology: real life, Galen Strawson14. Is There a Phenomenology of Thought?, Michael Tye and Briggs Wright15. Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking, David Woodruff-Smith

Editorial Reviews

"The volume is an important contribution to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. It should be of interest to philosophers of mind working on consciousness, cognition, and their intersections." —Mind

From the Publisher