Deflationism and Paradox / Edition 1

by JC Beall, Bradley Armour-Garb

Overview

Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199287116
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	01/05/2006
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	290
Product dimensions:	9.30(w) x 6.20(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

J. C. Beall is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut. Bradley Armour-Garb is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Albany, SUNY

Table of Contents

Introduction1. Transparent disquotationalism, JC Beall2. Is the Liar sentence both true and false?, Hartry Field3. Spiking the field artillery, Graham Priest4. Variations on a theme by Yablo, Hartry Field5. A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth, Paul Horwich6. Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox, Bradley Armour-Garb and JC Beall7. Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too, Greg Restall8. Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes, Michael Glanzberg9. Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism?, Anil Gupta10. Semantics for deflationists, Christopher Gauker11. How significant is the Liar?, Dorothy Grover12. The deflationists' axioms for truth, Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten13. Naive truth and sophisticated logic, Alan Weir14. Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes, Jody Azzouni