Designing Regulatory Policy with Limited Information

by D. Besanko, D. Sappington

Overview

Examines policy design when the policy maker in imperfectly informed, focusing on cases where the regulated firm possesses better information about its technology than the regulator.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780415274630
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	12/06/2001
Series:	Harwood Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics Ser.
Pages:	96
Product dimensions:	5.44(w) x 8.50(h) x (d)

About the Author

David Besanko, David E M Sappington

Table of Contents

1. Background: History and Related Literature 2. Adverse Selection 3. Auditing 4. Regulation and Moral Hazard 5. Multiperiod Models of Regulation and Information 6. Intertemporal Commitment 7. Interfirm Comparisons 8. Extensions and Future Directions