| Table of Cases | xi |
| Table of Legislation | xix |
| Introduction | xxv |
1 | Theoretical Background | 1 |
1.A. | States and Globalisation | 1 |
1.A.1. | The Approach | 1 |
1.A.2. | The Structural Approach: Globalisation and Diversity | 5 |
1.A.3. | The Link between Constitutional and Socio-Economic Structures: Diversity and Domestic Legitimacy | 9 |
1.B. | Unfair Trade Instruments and Protectionism | 14 |
1.B.1. | The Basic Elements of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures | 14 |
1.B.2. | The Basic Elements of Market Access Instruments | 19 |
1.B.3. | The Background of Unfair Trade Instruments: The Relation between the Domestic and the External Sphere | 22 |
Part I | United States Trade Policy | |
2 | The Domestic Structures of United States Trade Policy | 35 |
2.A. | Introduction | 35 |
2.B. | The Domestic Socio-Economic Structures of the United States | 41 |
2.B.1. | The Origins | 41 |
2.B.2. | The Weakness of the US Government | 42 |
2.B.2.a. | The Decentralisation of Congress | 43 |
2.B.2.b. | The US Executive | 47 |
2.B.2.c. | The United States Government 'Hands Off' Policy | 49 |
2.B.3. | The Plurality of the American Market | 50 |
2.B.4. | The Way the US Socio-Economic Structures Affect American Trade Policy | 54 |
2.C. | The Constitutional Framework of United States' Trade Policy | 57 |
2.C.1. | Principal Constitutional Features of the United States' International Trade Policy | 57 |
2.C.2. | Congress in the United States' International Trade Policy Making Process | 65 |
2.C.2.a. | The Powers of Congress in International Trade | 65 |
2.C.2.b. | The Trade Committees in Congress | 70 |
2.C.2.c. | Congress and Trade Policy | 71 |
2.C.3. | The Executive and the Independent Agencies in the United States' International Trade Policy Making Process | 73 |
2.C.3.a. | The Trade Powers of the President | 73 |
2.C.3.b. | Congressional Delegations of Powers: The US Trade Agencies | 76 |
2.C.4. | The Procedures to Conclude International Trade Agreements | 83 |
2.C.4.a. | The Treaty Procedure | 83 |
2.C.4.b. | Congressional-Executive Agreements | 85 |
2.C.4.c. | Fast Track | 89 |
3 | United States' Unfair Trade Instruments as a Reflection of its Domestic Sphere | 95 |
3.A. | The United States Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Research and Development Subsidies | 95 |
3.A.1. | Introduction | 95 |
3.A.2. | United States' Background on the R&D Subsidies Agreement | 96 |
3.A.3. | The Uruguay Round R&D Subsidies Agreement | 99 |
3.A.4. | The Agreement's Implementation Process in the US | 101 |
3.A.5. | The Final Legislation Implementing the R&D Agreement | 105 |
3.A.6. | The Post Uruguay Round Administrative Countervailing Duty Practice on R&D Subsidies | 109 |
3.A.7. | Some Remarks | 112 |
3.B. | United States' Countervailing Duty Policy | 112 |
3.B.1. | Introduction | 112 |
3.B.2. | The Legal Background of US Countervailing Duty Policy | 113 |
3.B.3. | US Countervailing Duty Practice Against Developing Countries | 115 |
3.B.4. | The Rationale for US Countervailing Policy | 117 |
3.B.4.a. | The Deterrence Approach | 117 |
3.B.4.b. | Comparing Market Systems | 121 |
3.B.5. | An Illustration of the US Rationale: The GATT 1994 Steel Cases | 125 |
3.B.6. | Some Remarks | 130 |
3.C. | Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act: A Metaphor of United States Trade Policy | 131 |
3.C.1. | Introduction | 131 |
3.C.2. | The Concept of Unreasonableness in Section 301 | 132 |
3.C.3. | Action under Section 301 | 135 |
3.C.4. | Some Remarks | 139 |
Part II | The European Union's Common Commercial Policy | |
4 | The Domestic Structures of the European Union | 143 |
4.A. | Introduction | 143 |
4.B. | The Domestic Structures of France and Germany | 150 |
4.B.1. | Introduction | 150 |
4.B.2. | The Domestic Structures of France | 151 |
4.B.3. | The Domestic Structures of Germany | 158 |
4.B.4. | The Persistence of Differences in Europe | 163 |
4.C. | The Constitutional Structures of the Common Commercial Policy | 166 |
4.C.1. | Legal Basis, Competence and Procedure in the Common Commercial Policy | 166 |
4.C.2. | The External Trade Powers of the European Community: Article 133 | 176 |
4.C.2.a. | The Debate About Article 133 | 176 |
4.C.2.b. | Opinion 1/94 and its Aftermath | 184 |
4.C.3. | Actors and Process of the Common Commercial Policy | 193 |
4.C.3.a. | Introduction | 193 |
4.C.3.b. | The Commission | 194 |
4.C.3.c. | The Council and its Committees | 201 |
4.C.3.d. | The European Parliament | 208 |
5 | The Community's Unfair Trade Instruments as a Reflection of its Domestic Sphere | 213 |
5.A. | Constructed Normal Value, the Audio Tapes in Cassettes Panel and its Aftershock in the Community | 213 |
5.A.1. | Introduction | 213 |
5.A.2. | The Community's Constructed Normal Value Methodology | 214 |
5.A.3. | Asymmetry, the Audio Tapes in Cassettes Panel and its Aftershock | 220 |
5.A.3.a. | The Background | 220 |
5.A.3.b. | The Community's Asymmetry Methodology | 223 |
5.A.3.c. | The Audio Tapes in Cassettes Panel | 229 |
5.A.3.d. | The Implementation of the Panel Report in the Community | 231 |
5.A.4. | Some Remarks | 233 |
5.B. | The Community's Trade Barriers Regulation: An Example of the Common Commercial Policy | 234 |
5.B.1. | Introduction | 234 |
5.B.2. | The Intra-Community Bargaining | 235 |
5.B.3. | The TBR's Strict Commitment to the Standard of International Trade Law | 243 |
5.B.4. | The Procedure and Scope of the TBR | 253 |
5.B.5. | Conclusions | 260 |
6 | Conclusions | 263 |
| Bibliography | 273 |
| Index | 297 |