Economic Analysis of Accident Law

Economic Analysis of Accident Law

by Steven Shavell
Economic Analysis of Accident Law

Economic Analysis of Accident Law

by Steven Shavell

eBook

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Overview

“[This] is certainly a masterpiece.”—Thomas S. Ulen, Journal of Economic Literature

“The strength of Shavell’s book is its lucid, structured development and explication of the economic model. It represents the best systematic presentation of the relevance of economic argument for issues of risk allocation.”—Jules L. Coleman, Yale Law Journal

“Steven Shavell…[has] drawn upon [his] previous path-breaking work to issue [one of] the most important books in the law and economics of tort law since the release in 1970 of Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents…The work is a masterful tribute to the power of economic modelling and the use of optimization techniques…I, for one, was immensely impressed by the richness of the insights that Shavell’s theoretical approach provided into the fundamental issues of tort law.”—John J. Donohue III, Harvard Law Review

Accident law, if properly designed, is capable of reducing the incidence of mishaps by making people act more cautiously. Scholarly writing on this branch of law traditionally has been concerned with examining the law for consistency with felt notions of right and duty. Since the 1960s, however, a group of legal scholars and economists have focused on identifying the effects of accident law on people’s behavior. Steven Shavell’s book is the definitive synthesis of research to date in this new field.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780674043510
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Publication date: 07/01/2009
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 320
File size: 3 MB

About the Author

Steven Shavell is Samuel R. Rosenthal Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.

Table of Contents

Contents
1. Introduction
Use of Models to Examine Two Types of Theoretical Questions
Organization of the Book
2. Liability and Deterrence: Basic Theory
Levels of Care the Only Determinant of Risk: Unilateral Accidents
Levels of Care the Only Determinant of Risk: Bilateral Accidents
Levels of Care and Levels of Activity the Determinants of Risk: Unilateral Accidents
Levels of Care and Levels of Activity the Determinants of Risk: Bilateral Accidents
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
3. Liability of Firms
The Case Where Victims Are Strangers to Firms
The Case Where Victims Are Customers of Firms
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
4. Factors Bearing on the Determination of Negligence
Differences among Parties
Prior Precautions
Uncertainty, Error, and Misperception
Implications of Findings of Negligence
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
5. Causation and the Scope of Liability
Accidents Caused by Injurers
Coincidental Accidents
Uncertainty over Causation
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
6. The Magnitude of Liability: Damages
The Level of Losses
The Probability of Losses
Courts' Uncertainty about the Level of Losses
Pecuniary versus Nonpecuniary Losses
Economic Losses
Particularistic Elements in the Computation of Liability
Victims' Opportunities to Mitigate Losses
Liability in Excess of Losses
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
7. Other Topics in Liability
Multiple Injurers
Injurers' Inability to Pay for Losses
Vicarious Liability
Limited Liability of Shareholders for the Losses Caused by Corporations
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
8. The Allocation of Risk and the Theory of Insurance
Risk Aversion and the Allocation of Risk
The Theory of Insurance
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
9. Liability, Risk-bearing, and Insurance: Basic Theory
Risk Aversion and the Socially Ideal Solution to the Accident Problem
The Accident Problem in the Absence of Liability
The Accident Problem Given Liability Alone
The Accident Problem Given Liability and Insurance
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
10. Liability, Risk-bearing, and Insurance: Extensions to the Basic Theory
Nonpecuniary Losses and Insurance
Awards Optimal for Compensation versus Awards Optimal for Deterrence
Victims' Collateral Insurance Benefits and Injurers' Liability
Injurers' Inability to Pay and Liability Insurance
Structure of a System of Pure Accident Insurance
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
11. Liability and Administrative Costs
Factors Determining Administrative Costs
The Private Motive to Make Claims versus Their Social Desirability
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
12. Liability versus Other Approaches to the Control of Risk
The Different Approaches to the Control of Risk
Factors Bearing on the Appeal of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Approaches
Factors Bearing on the Desirability of Privately Initiated versus State-Initiated Approaches
Factors Bearing on the Appeal of Nonmonetary, Criminal Sanctions
Concluding Observations
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
13. Critical Comments
Predictive and Normative Analysis
Purpose and Future of Accident Liability
References
Index
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