Elites Against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933

by Walter Struve

Overview

Since the beginning of the current era of imperialism in the late nineteenth century, there has been a striking contrast between bourgeois political thought in Germany and the West. Walter Struve demonstrates how German political culture went through a phase in which great emphasis was placed on the establishment of a new political elite recruited on the basis of merit and skill, but ruling in an authoritarian way, and not controlled by the populace. He suggests that this type of elitism, many aspects of which were vital to the political culture of Nazi Germany, seems today to be widespread in the West.

The development of this concept of an open-yet-authoritarian elite is approached through the analysis of the political ideas and activities of nine elitists, among them Max Weber, Walther Rathenau, and Oswald Spengler. The author relates biography to intellectual, political, social, and economic history, so that his work becomes a study in the political and social context of intellectual history.

Originally published in 1973.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691618890
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	03/08/2015
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #1581
Pages:	500
Product dimensions:	5.90(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.10(d)

Read an Excerpt

Elites Against Democracy

Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933

---

By Walter Struve

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1973 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-10020-3

---

CHAPTER 1

Patterns in the Development of German Elite Theories During the Nineteenth Century

Despite the emergence of some militantly democratic ideas, the concept of an elite subject to little popular control prevailed in Germany during the nineteenth century. As an increasingly large proportion of the population took an active interest in public policy, elite theorists talked more and more about "merit" and "achievement" as qualifications for decision makers. Emphasis upon birth and class decreased. Yet the predominant elite theorists circumvented the issue of popular control by recommending that an elite might accept some individuals, but no direct pressures from below. An effective elite had to select its own members and formulate decisions without external interference.

Conservative Elite Theories

The conflict between the nobility and its opponents during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century led to the development of modern conservatism as a weapon for the defense of the nobility. The apologists for the nobility employed many arguments which, although often in somewhat different forms, were to remain typical of later German elite theories. Because particularly in Prussia the nobility continued to play a major political role well into the twentieth century, the doctrines of conservatism made significant contributions to the development of other German elite theories.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the nobility no longer occupied an unquestioned place in German society. During the latter part of the Enlightenment, bourgeois opinion became overtly hostile toward the nobility. Despite extensive concessions to the nobility, especially in Frederician Prussia, the absolute state of the eighteenth century exerted a leveling influence upon German society. The virtual destruction of most of the local and provincial diets deprived the nobility of an important channel of political participation. The expanding state administrative apparatus grew partly at the expense of the nobility. Changes in agriculture weakened the material foundations of the nobility. In Prussia, for example, the Junkers, the east Elbian noblemen, were becoming a class of large landowners rather than remaining an estate with specific economic and political privileges. The customary division of society into three estates had lost much of its significance, but until the French Revolution, Germans lacked enticing images of a new social and political order.

Even before the growth in Germany of a strong bourgeoisie, German political thought received a tremendous impetus from the new France, for the work and ideas of the French Revolution went far beyond the mere destruction of the old nobility. The events of the revolutionary period presented a direct threat to the previous conception of nobility, as well as positive alternatives. The initial phases of the Revolution eventuated in a model for an attempt to implement the will of the majority through popularly elected representatives and to construct a constitutional democracy based upon the concepts of popular sovereignty and equal political rights. Shortly thereafter, the rule of the Jacobins provided a model for the temporary dictatorship of a select few, whose own social origins were unimportant and whose task was to raise all men to a similar level. Finally, came the example of Napoleon's institution of a new "nobility of merit." This last example became more potent through its association with the strand in the development of absolutism that culminated in attempts by Enlightened Despots, most notably by Joseph II, to create a new social hierarchy dependent upon the state.

The consequences of Napoleon's victory over Prussia provided still another stimulus to the development of a conservative ideology. The reorganization of Prussia under Stein and Hardenberg, who tried to meet the challenge of a new era by creating a modern administrative state and by providing for popular political participation, provoked the opposition of an important segment of the Prussian nobility. The tenets of what was to become the main stream of German conservatism were forged largely in Prussia in order to defend the position of the nobility as an independent estate marked by special, formally recognized privileges.

The close association of romanticism with early conservatism provided conservative elite theories with much of their intellectual embroidery. Novalis, Arnim, Friedrich Schlegel, and other Romantics idealized the role of the nobility in the Middle Ages. Viewing the absolute state as an artificial mechanism and the Revolution's destruction of a corporate society in France as an abomination, Romantic conservatives like Adam Muller searched for the "organic," "natural" bases of society and found them in a hierarchically ordered series of estates, each with its own functions, duties, and privileges. In such a social order, the most important political and military functions belonged solely to the nobility and the prince.

Conservatives strove for a society in which the nobility, acting in concert with the prince, monopolized the processes leading to the formulation of the more important decisions. Although Prussia had tended to produce a nobility whose raison d'être lay in service as military officers, conservatives made claims that would have raised the nobility, as a group, above all other institutions except the throne. Since many early conservatives were highly critical of the king, his role could often even appear secondary in comparison with that of the nobility. The tendency to characterize the king, in accordance with medieval terminology, simply as primus inter pares, further decreased the relative importance of his role. Yet the elite theories of conservatism seldom approached a strict bipartite model with the nobility on one side and all "the people" on the other side. The populace was regarded as consisting of two or more highly differentiated estates.

The concept of a special estate, or stratum, entrusted with political leadership reappeared in most later elite theories. Similarly, the conservative notion of the nobility as mediator between crown and people eventually became that of an elite mediating between a "mass" on one side and a "great leader" on the other side. Indeed, mediation could come to entail primarily the execution of a single leader's decisions.

Of the arguments used by the early conservatives to justify a hierarchically ordered society only some were to be accepted by later, nonconservative elite theorists. Despite the permeation of most German thought since the early nineteenth century by historicism, appeals to tradition and historical privileges exercised only a limited attraction upon other elite theorists. More important for the future was the conservative's claim to supernatural sanction for his view of society. He could utilize the Lutheran emphasis upon the concept of a divine "calling" and upon the concept of reciprocal privileges and duties among men. Completely secularized versions of such concepts, in the form of the division of labor, later buttressed claims for an elite on functionalist grounds. The functionalist arguments of the early conservative rested upon premises involving organic interdependence; much of later functionalism would assume a mechanistic tone.

Perhaps most important for later developments was the conservative's insistence upon human inequality. The conservative conceived of inequality as permanent and ineradicable. He contended that certain characteristics appeared only in noblemen. Whereas both German neo-humanism and the early liberal-democratic movement emphasized the importance of environment, the conservative emphasized the importance of heredity. As advanced by neo-humanists as divergent as Lessing and Wilhelm von Humboldt, the conception of Bildung, of the enormous possibilities for the development of the individual's mind and personality, constituted a serious threat to the claims of uniqueness on the part of the nobility. If the individual could master the process leading to Bildung, noble birth had no special significance. Although the neo-humanist conception of the acquisition of Bildung involved the cultivation of capacities already present in the individual, the possession of these capacities was not confined to men from any one segment of the population. Even the modest version of the process presented by Goethe in part two of Wilhelm Meister asserted the potential of the individual. Realism, not inherent limitations lead Wilhelm to renounce the attempt to develop every aspect of his abilities and to concentrate upon a profession that will provide him both security and satisfaction. The world in which he lives demands specialization, and in any age the true master must establish priorities for himself in his work.

The conservatives countered the neo-humanist position by claiming that only a noble possessed an "inherent" character of the type suitable for political and social leadership. Only a noble could have a "harmonious," "integrated" personality. The Romantic's concern for individuality and unique traits, for Eigentümlichkeit and Einzigartigkeit, reinforced the claims of the nobility. To the conservative, the characteristics of nobility could not be acquired. They could be developed only over the course of many generations. Although German conservatives did not resort to the racism of an eighteenth-century defender of the French nobility such as Boulvanvilliers with his thesis of the "two nations" comprising France, their arguments implied the inheritance of acquired characteristics and the hereditary transmission of character traits. German conservatism fostered a pattern of thought in which "inherent" characteristics furnished a precondition for political leadership. Prior to political participation, these characteristics could not be developed through it. Later, such ideas would merge with the concept of the "born leader" and the "political genius." For conservatives, as for many subsequent German elite theorists, "on the job" training for political leadership was inconceivable.

While the conservatives spoke of the desirability for some sort of rapport between the nobility and "the people," their doctrines affirmed a need for "distance" on the part of the nobility. Dignified withdrawal, although not complete isolation, from the people was, the conservative contended, essential to the maintenance of the nobility. In order to perform its role, the nobility had to maintain a high degree of cohesiveness within its ranks, as well as a united front vis-à-vis nonnobles. Family ties, special privileges, and special duties were to ensure the necessary unity of outlook and action. Stress on exclusiveness and solidarity called for an elite effectively insulated from popular pressures. Not only was access to the nobility as an estate to be minimized by virtually excluding outsiders, but also any direct popular influence upon the nobility was deemed highly undesirable. Although cohesiveness as an essential elite attribute would remain a component of most German elite theories, the methods for achieving it would change. Many later elite theorists abandoned the criterion of birth for admission to the elite, but they generally retained the notion of effective insulation from nonelite pressures.

Conservatives rarely excluded the possibility of some reforms in the nobility. Were not the conservatives attempting to create a society on the basis of an idealized version of the past? In addition, the challenge of liberalism and new social forces had, especially by the middle of the nineteenth century, induced some reformist conservatives to make appreciable concessions in an endeavor to reinvigorate the concept of nobility. From the modest suggestions of early conservatives to the more demanding proposals of reformist conservatives, the English aristocracy served as a model which inspired many a plan to reform the German nobility.

The projected reforms of early conservatives aimed at strengthening the position of the nobility, but without altering its basic character. Beginning with Ludwig von der Marwitz, the indefatigable Junker opponent of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, many prominent conservatives agreed on certain practical reforms. They suggested, for example, numerous schemes to retain the landed basis of the nobility. Thus Marwitz demanded that a grant in land accompany every patent of nobility. Although the divisibility of landed estates among all male heirs had contributed to the economic difficulties of the nobility, attempts to introduce primogeniture in Prussia always failed. Nevertheless, the substitution of English practices regarding inheritance remained a favorite project of conservatives. The introduction of primogeniture would have established a definite channel for departure from the nobility. There was also virtual unanimity among conservatives that other provisions for leaving the nobility must be established. By envisioning definite avenues of ascent into and descent from the nobility, conservatives suggested that the superiority of the nobility could not be maintained by preserving it as a castelike institution.

By developing similar proposals still farther, reformist conservatives such as Joseph Maria von Radowitz had, by the middle of the nineteenth century, conceived projects for a new "nobility of merit." Basic to most of these projects was the transformation of the nobility into a "microcosm" of the entire society. The old nobility would have been formally opened to men from other estates or classes. Changes in the structure of German society would thus have found formal recognition. Portions of the upper middle class would have fused with the nobility in order to make the latter more "representative" of the nation as a whole. The nobility would then have been in a better position to reaffirm its claim to occupy a superordinate position and to represent the interests of the community as a whole.

No more than in earlier conservatism were "the people" to exercise any control over the nobility. The reformist conservatives regarded recruitment of the nobility from a larger segment of the population as obviating any need for popular control over the decisions or actions of the nobility. A partially open elite sufficed to permit the rejection of claims for direct controls by the populace. The optimal amount of popular influence would have entered the nobility through the new nobles. The question of popular control, insofar as adjudged worthy of discussion, had been subsumed under the heading of elite recruitment. Many later German elite theorists would continue to equate a formally open elite with sufficient popular control over the elite.

The views of Paul de Lagarde, a bitter critic of Bismarck and the Bismarckian Reich, provide an excellent example of reformist conservatism during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Lagarde's writings, which were "rediscovered" in the twentieth century, reached the height of their influence during the Weimar Republic. His plans for a "reorganization" of the nobility consisted in a notable admixture of hereditarily transmittable status with an aristocracy of talent. A fervent admirer of the English gentry, he hoped for a social stratum which, although possessing few formally recognized privileges, would conduct the affairs of the nation. Only insofar as necessary for the execution of its duties should the nobility possess special privileges. For "rights always come by themselves when duties are taken seriously." Like the early conservatives, Lagarde regarded duties as an effective check upon the nobility, but he advocated supplementing the individual's sense of duty with external means of enforcing it. He envisioned formal machinery for expelling members of the nobility.

Lagarde laid down detailed admission requirements for newcomers to the nobility. In accordance with the tradition of state service that had taken root in the nobility and sections of the middle class and bourgeoisie, his new nobility would have been open to families with three generations of "direct or indirect service to the state." Military officers, university-educated state officials, clergymen, and teachers together with their entire families would have become eligible for admission to the nobility, if enough of their ancestors had held similar positions. The strong étatist element in Lagarde's recommendations was symptomatic of a trend which would eventually prevail in conservative thinking, but in his programs this element was still overshadowed by a concern for the autonomy of family, nobility, and prince.

(Continues...)

---

Excerpted from Elites Against Democracy by Walter Struve. Copyright © 1973 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

---

Table of Contents

• Frontmatter, pg. i
• Contents, pg. vii
• Preface, pg. ix
• Acknowledgments, pg. xi
• Introduction, pg. 1
• PART I. Intellectual Traditions, pg. 21
• PART II. Liberals in Search of Elites, pg. 51
• PART III. Conservatives in Search of Elites, pg. 217
• Bibliographical Essay, pg. 465
• Index, pg. 477