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CHAPTER 1
Report of the Chief of Staff
by General der Infanterie Günther Blumentritt
I. OB West Situation Prior to Invasion
During the period 6 June–24 July 1944, I was the Chief of Staff, OB West. OB West, under OKW, was responsible for the areas of Holland, Belgium, and France only with regard to coastal defense. Directly subordinate to OB West were Army Group B (Fifteenth Army, Seventh Army, and troops in Holland) and Army Group G (First Army, Pyrenees security forces, and Nineteenth Army). Third Air Force and Navy Group West were subordinate only for the tactical defense of the coast. The Militärbefehlshabers (military commanders) of France and Belgium — northern France were under OB West only for defense against invasion. However, the Militärbefehlshaber of Holland was not subordinate.
The chain of command was very complicated and muddled; there was no absolute responsibility as was given to Field Marshal Montgomery or General Eisenhower. The C-in-C West was responsible only for the defense of the West Front against invasion. Only the elements of the Heer (Army Group B and Army Group G, with their subordinate units) were directly under OB West. Third Air Force, Navy Group West, and the two Militärbefehlshabers were independent, being under OKL, OKM, and OKW, respectively. All of these commands not under the Heer had a direct channel to their superior command and without having to contact OB West. The C-in-C West could give direct orders to these non-Heer commands only on matters pertaining to the coastal defense.
The Waffen SS, subordinate to the various commands for tactical purposes only, were in direct contact with RF-SS Himmler, over the head of the Heer. The Militärbefehlshabers had their own security troops, responsible to them only. The C-in-C West could only request the service of these troops. For the Heeres troops, there was no court martial jurisdiction above Army level. The Navy, Luftwaffe, SS, and Militärbefehlshabers had their own military courts, with independent jurisdiction. OB West had no courts and no jurisdiction.
Moreover, OB West had only limited authority, and this only in strategic and tactical matters pertaining to the defense of the area against invasion. The C-in-C West was actually only the senior strategic head, not a commander-in-chief — primus inter pares in strategic matters. As a result, responsibility for the area and for all strategic and tactical measures was made considerably difficult. The commanders-in-chief of the Navy, Luftwaffe, and SS (Dönitz, Göring, Himmler) were close to Hitler and their wishes received more attention than those of the C-in-C West, who had no such representation in OKW.
A dictator does not favor putting too much power in the hands of one man. "Divide et impera!" this example be a warning of how not to organize the high-level commands. Formerly the German principle was "The man in whom I put my trust will have power over all in order to accomplish his mission, but he will also be absolutely independent and will have full responsibility. If he is not equal to the task, then another shall take his place." It was otherwise in Germany in 1939–45 ...
The first three commands had forward command posts which were temporarily occupied as the situation demanded.
In OKW strategic reserve were Panzer Lehr Division and the 12th SS Panzer (Hitlerjugend) Division, west of Paris approximately in the area northeast of Le Mans, and the 1st SS Panzer (Leibstandarte) Division, in the vicinity of Brussels. OB West had no strategic reserves. (The possibilities in the event of invasion had been considered. The fronts not under attack were to free certain previously designated divisions for OB West use. OB West, after obtaining permission from OKW, would then be able to commit these divisions in the invasion area. These preparations were made in detail on all fronts.) Army Group B and Army Group G had their own divisions or units in reserve.
The rear positions in Holland were the Grebbe Line and the Yssel Position. In all of Belgium and France there was no prepared rear position. Once the Allies had broken through the coastal defenses, there would be nothing to stop them until they reached the West Wall on the German frontier.
On the map (only on paper) there was a line Abbeville–Amiens–Compiègne–Soissons–Re ims–Chalons-sur-Marne–St Didier–Chaumont–Langres–Gray–Dole&nda sh;Swiss border, following the Somme, Aisne, Marne, and suitable high ground. However, this position was never constructed; there was no labor or material available and no time. Even if the position had been constructed, there were no troops available to occupy it. For political and psychological reasons, OKW permitted only a "secret" reconnaissance of the position, but no actual construction. We were to hold the coast and not to think of "rear" positions. (The same principle applied on the Eastern Front.) Only after the invasion was this position to be hastily constructed by Gen Fl Kitzinger. At that time, of course, construction was still less possible.
The West Wall, built before 1939, was close to the Western frontier of Germany and ran south of Aachen–Belgium–Luxembourg border–along the Saar to Saarbrücken–south of Pirnasens–Bienwald–Rhine river–along the east bank of the Oberrhein to the east of Basel. The West Wall was built primarily for political reasons. It was not nearly as strong as propaganda abroad purported. Since the fortifications were erected before 1939, they were unable to withstand aerial bombs of 1944; their concrete works were too weak. The West Wall was only a chain of bunkers and lacked the depth that every defense must have. Once through the weak, thin line, the enemy would find no fortified defense in depth. After 1940, the West Wall was neglected and no longer improved upon. Permanent weapons were removed and sent to the fronts. Wire entanglements were taken up and used elsewhere. Thus, in 1944, the West Wall was not a strong position; above all, it lacked sufficient occupying troops for its defense.
The last rear defense line was the Rhine. When the Allies crossed this river there would be no further obstacles and the war would be virtually over. Only the Upper Rhine (West Wall) between Rastatt and east of Basel had weak fortifications. The Middle and Lower Rhine were not fortified. In addition, the Middle Rhine is so narrow that between Bingen and Andernach it does not represent a strong barrier. Moreover, there were no permanent security troops. Actually the only "rear position" was the West Wall.
The unusual command channels in the service of supply made strategic leadership more difficult. Supply of the entire area was under the direction of the Oberquartiermeister West in Paris (Gen Finch, previously Gen Eckstein). This officer was subordinate to OB West, the Militärbefehlshaber for France, and the Generalquartiermeister of OKH (Gen Wagner, later Gen Toppe). Thus, he was under three separate commands and received orders from three different men! The supply situation, during the invasion from the high-level standpoint of OB West, was as follows:
a. There was not enough motorized transport to meet the needs of the action in Normandy. OB West had no motorized columns of its own and therefore was forced to borrow these from the armies in the West. These columns were composed of purchased French and Belgian trucks of all types and ages. The drivers were French civilians, insofar as they would drive voluntarily. The transport columns of the Seventh Army were in no way sufficient. Only the Panzer-type divisions had organic transport columns; the infantry divisions had none.
Since the French and Belgian railroads had been disrupted by Allied air attacks and the French Resistance movement, they could be used very little. On many days, only seven to ten trains could be moved during a 24-hour period. These trains also had to carry supplies of coal and food to the population of Paris and southern France in addition to troops and tracked vehicles. This railroad net, crippled by air attacks on the Seine and Loire bridges and on important railroad yards, could therefore transport only a small percentage of the supplies. Thus, the few motor transport columns were even more burdened. The crippled rail net forced us to unload troops and supplies far behind the front and resulted in an extraordinarily long supply line. As the Allied air force destroyed many moving convoys, the available transportation dwindled more and more.
b. The supply of fuel was so critical that our few planes were unable to fly because of the shortage of gasoline. The fuel requirements for Panzer-type divisions, for the Luftwaffe, and for the Navy (U-boats) were so great that, even with the available motor transport, gasoline supply was insufficient. (Fuel requirements for the Eastern Front, the Balkans, and Italy were also very great.)
c. There was no shortage of small-arms ammunition, but artillery ammunition, particularly for light and medium field howitzers (Model 1918), was very critical. The great number of foreign weapons with varied types of ammunition increased the difficulties of ammunition supply.
d. Medical and veterinary services in general were adequate.
e. Spare parts for the much too many types of tanks and motorized vehicles were often unavailable. Tank and vehicle repair often took weeks because the required spare parts were not in stock.
The OB West right boundary was the German–Dutch border to the mouth of the Ems river on the North Sea. Adjacent on the right was the North Sea Naval Command at Wilhelmshaven. The left boundary of OB West was the Franco–Italian border at Menton (Mediterranean). The adjacent command on the left was OB Southwest in Italy (Genfldm Kesselring).
The mission of OB West was as follows: "OB West is to prevent any hostile landing in its area. The MLR is the high tide line on the coast. Should the enemy land at any place, they are to be immediately thrown back into the sea."
Essentially this was the text of the order given by the Führer (OKW). The order would have been of value only if OB West were permitted freedom of action to carry it out in detail. OB West should have been able to order the disposition of divisions and should have reserved full freedom to bring up, without approval, all divisions suitable to the existing situation. However, this was not the case, and every detail was ordered or approved by the Führer (in East Prussia!). Thus, command leadership of the type in which we had been schooled was made impossible.
We had been educated to work according to general operational instructions issued by responsible high command, which gave the commander a free hand. From 1942 until the Spring of 1944, OB West had requested similar general instruction several times, the last time in late June 1944 when the Führer was in the West for 24 hours. (The Führer's headquarters were northeast of Soissons, on the Soissons–Laon road.) These instructions were not issued. In accordance with our training, these instructions could have been approximately as follows: "The mission of OB West is to prevent a hostile landing on the coast of its area. Should the enemy, contrary to expectations, succeed in landing, they are to be thrown back immediately with all free and available forces. In the event of an enemy breakthrough deep into the OB West area, they are to be defeated by a fluid field operation under the direction of OB West, even if southern France has to be given up. If this operation does not achieve results, then OKH will issue further instructions according to the situation. In the closest circle of the OB West staff, a planned retreat to the West Wall in order to conserve forces should be contemplated. This plan is to be kept secret and is not to go beyond OB West. In any event, the final decision rests with OKW."
Thus, our best strategist, Genfldm von Rundstedt, would have been free to conduct operations in the manner taught by Moltke, Schlieffen, and Hindenburg — boldly and independently.
I shall evaluate the divisions in the West only from the high-level viewpoint of OB West. We had a total of about 60 divisions of all types and all degrees of efficiency.
a. The bulk of the SS Panzer divisions and Heeres divisions were the best. A few SS and Heeres Panzer divisions had not yet completed their reorganization and were inadequately equipped with tanks. The 21st Panzer Division (Feuchtinger) was an expedient, having been assembled and organized with obsolete French armored vehicles. The personnel were better. The Panzer Lehr Division (Bayerlein) and 2nd Panzer Division (von Lüttwitz) were probably the best equipped. Both divisions were combat-experienced and energetically and well led. The command leadership of most of the SS divisions was less satisfactory. By 1944, all divisions had been employed both in the East and in the West. They had been reorganized several times and were not the divisions of 1939–40. Because of the fuel shortage, tank drivers were not sufficiently experienced and therefore were not good enough to drive in rough terrain and were responsible for the large number of tanks deadlined.
b. The Fallschirm divisions were next in the evaluation. These divisions did their best under the proved, experienced leadership of Gen Meindl (II FS Corps). (These divisions, however, had no parachutes!) The Panzer and Fallschirm divisions were preferential units with the best personnel, the best equipment, and the longest rest periods.
c. In third place came those infantry divisions which were not employed in the coastal fortifications. However, these divisions were for the most part newly reorganized, only hastily trained, and weakened by combat in the East. These were horse-drawn divisions. Their personnel and equipment were much less suitable for a large-scale war of matériel than the Panzer and Fallschirm divisions.
d. In last place were the coastal divisions. Most of these divisions had only two organic infantry regiments, weak artillery, and very limited mobility. For a long time they had been occupying a rigid defense of a broad front and were unaccustomed to mobile warfare in open terrain. Most of the officers and men had been wounded and were in limited assignment status. Their weapons were no match against a modern, well-equipped enemy. One division was composed only of men with stomach ailments.
e. The Luftwaffe Feld divisions varied in quality; some were good, some were inferior. The men and equipment were good, but the personnel did not have adequate training in ground combat.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Fighting the Invasion"
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