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Overview
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9780472074235 |
---|---|
Publisher: | University of Michigan Press |
Publication date: | 09/03/2019 |
Pages: | 256 |
Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.90(d) |
About the Author
Olga Shvetsova is Professor of Political Science and Economics at Binghamton University.
Table of Contents
List of Tables xi
List of Figures xiii
Acknowledgments xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Designing Formal Models 2
1.1.1 The Place of Formal Models in Research Design 2
1.1.2 Formal Models and Theoretical Replication 4
1.2 Models as Methodological Tools 6
1.3 Theory, Models, and Evidence: A First Look 7
1.4 Why This Book? 12
1.4.1 Why Care about Models: Epistemology and Function 12
1.4.2 Who This Book Is For 15
1.5 Map of the Book 16
2 Epistemology: A Path to Knowledge from Story through Narrative to Model 19
2.1 Formal Models in Research Design: A Closer Look 20
2.2 Why and When the Use of Formal Models Improves Theories 22
2.2.1 How the Theory Informs the Model: T → M 22
2.2.2 How Models Test and Build Theories (M → T', part 1) 24
2.2.3 Strategies for Reconciling Theory and Model (M → T', part 2) 29
2.2.4 Limits of Reconciliation between a Theory and a Model 34
2.3 The Connection between Models and Evidence (Ei → M and M → E) 35
2.3.1 Modeling- Life, the Universe, and Everything (Ei → M) 36
2.3.2 What Is a Narrative and How Is It Constructed? Ei → N or T → N? 38
2.3.3 Thick vs. Thin Narratives: The Art of Finding the Balance 40
2.3.4 Overextending the Inductive Step: The Special Case of the Fusion of Narratives and Formal Models in the Method of Analytic Narratives 41
2.3.5 Models to Evidence: M → E 42
2.4 Single Story, Multiple Narratives, Even More Models 45
2.5 Models in the Big Picture 46
3 Methodology: Strategy and Practice in Modeling for Substantive Research 49
3.1 The Primacy of Theory 49
3.1.1 The Distinctiveness of Formal Theory as a Methodology 50
3.1.2 The Question as Prism 51
3.2 The Technology of Modeling: Types of Formal Models 52
3.2.1 Expected Utility Maximization 53
3.2.2 Decision Theory 55
3.2.3 Social Choice Theory 55
3.2.4 Cooperative Game Theory 56
3.2.5 Noncooperative Game Theory 57
3.3 Knowing the Steps and Stepping in Sequence 58
3.4 The Generality of a Model 63
3.4.1 Assumptions: The Fewer the Better 64
3.4.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma: Illustrious and Illustrative 65
3.5 Conclusion 68
4 Community Effort: Rewarding or Requiring a Reward? 71
4.1 What Is in It for the Chief? 75
4.1.1 The Chief as a Traditional Officeholder 76
4.1.2 Model 4.1: The Chiefs Utility Function 78
4.1.3 A Few Testable Implications from Model 4.1 81
4.2 What Is in It for the Villagers? 81
4.2.1 The Villagers' Responses to the Awards 83
4.2.2 Model 4.2: The Utility of Two Types of Villagers 85
4.2.3 Testable Implications from Model 4.2 87
4.3 Does Turning to Awards Point to an Erosion of Traditional Identity? 88
4.3.1 Redefining a Contemporary Traditional Community 89
4.3.2 Model 4.3: Villagers' Compliance with (Redefined) Community Values 91
4.3.3 Testable Implications from Model 4.3 93
4.4 Conclusions 93
5 Industry Regulation: Rationale and Stakeholders (with Julie Van Dusky-Allen) 95
5.0 Extant Knowledge as the Baseline 98
5.1 Negative Externalities to Agents Outside a Regulatory Regime 103
5.1.1 Technology Choice to Minimize Costs Is Costly for Others 103
5.1.2 Model 5.1: Not in Common! 106
5.1.3 Testable Implications from Model 5.1 110
5.2 Proposing a Change in Regulatory Provisions to Best Advance a Policy Goal 110
5.2.1 Regulation as an Object of Design 111
5.2.2 Reassessing Technology Choice under Variable Monitoring Thresholds 114
5.2.3 Hypotheses: Instruments for Assessing Policy Experimentation 116
5.3 How to Regulate Use of Two Resources at Once? 118
5.3.1 How Hard Would a Subnational Agency Push for Regulatory Change? 118
5.3.2 Balancing Stakeholders' Interests 121
5.3.3 Testable Implications 126
5.4 Conclusions 127
6 Setting the Agenda to Manipulate the Outcome (with Benjamin Farrer) 129
6.1 All in a Day's Work: International Diplomacy on the Prime Minister's Multifold Agenda 132
6.2 Social Choice Agenda Setting Model 136
6.3 The Same Narrative Modeled as a Cooperative Game 146
6.4 No Testable Propositions: Outcomes of Agenda Manipulation Compared to Counterfactuals 152
6.5 Conclusions 153
7 Games and Uncertainty in U.S. Criminal Justice Systems (with Andrei Zhirnov) 155
7.1 Why Do Guards Abuse Prisoners? 158
7.1.1 Rationalizing Norms of Illegal Behavior within Law Enforcement 158
7.1.2 The Game between Guards and Prisoners 160
7.1.3 Hypotheses from Model 7.1 165
7.2 Why Do the Deputies Obstruct the FBI Investigation? 167
7.2.1 Risk, Obstruction, and Monitoring 167
7.2.2 The Game between the Sheriff's Deputies and the Federal Agents 169
7.2.3 Hypotheses from Model 7.2 173
7.3 What Does the Judge Hope to Accomplish beyond Punishing the Guilty? 175
7.3.1 Guilt, Punishment, and Precedent 175
7.3.2 The Game between the Sheriff's Deputies and the Judge 176
7.3.3 Hypotheses from Model 7.3 181
7.4 Conclusions 183
8 The Rote of Modeling in How We Know What We Know 185
8.1 The Epistemological Place of Formal Models 186
8.1.1 Models Test Theory 186
8.1.2 Models Build Theory 189
8.2 Formal Models in Research Design 189
8.2.1 Models Enhance Hypotheses 190
8.2.2 Models Enable Theoretical Replication 191
8.2.3 Models Advance Knowledge Accumulation 192
8.3 Our Epistemological Claims 193
8.4 The Meta-Method of Formal Modeling 194
8.5 Broad Implications and the Agenda Looking Forward 195
Notes 199
References 205
Author Index 229
Subject Index 233