French Indochina War: Reflections for Strategic Resilience (Pearl Orient, #1)

Military mistakes impel strategic reflection.  The French Indochina War (FIW) from 1946-1954 furnishes useful insights with some resonance for current challenges.  A combination of pre-exiting conditions, catalysts and operational drivers caused the cathartic 1954 French defeat.  Pre-conditions included the illegitimacy of the colonial regime and repression that polarised nationalist sentiment.  Economically, pernicious terms of trade suppressed industrialisation but oiled speculation until suddenly reversed by devaluation in 1953 that reflected financial disengagement by France but increased American involvement.  Vacillating  metropolitan and the dubious colonial regime of the 'night club' Emperor, Bảo Đại, fuelled political instability.  Militarily,  after the disastrous evacuation of the RC4 in 1950, Việt Minh men and supplies poured across the Chinese frontier.  In 1954, financial constraints and the looming international peace conference catalysed Navarre, the new French commander, to gamble on a battle of attrition.  He tried to distract the Việt Minh and bet that they would be unable drag artillery to the remote jungle outpost of Diên Biên Phú, but he underestimated their focus, determination, strength, and adaptability.  In early December partisans resented the bungled evacuation of Lai Châu.  The entrenched camp's defences were inadequate and neither 141,500 artillery rounds, infantry sorties nor napalm suppressed VM guns, entrenched in the surrounding jungle-clad hills.  The French aero-logistical sub-system was overstretched, its pilots worn out and significant parachute supplies fell into enemy hands.  Navarre scattered his reserves on a futile and remote side show, Operation Atlante.  The Americans, although financing, supplying and covertly assisting the French, prevaricated and refused to unleash their B29 fleet.  'Iacta alea esto' or 'ἀνερρίφθω κύβος' - let the die be cast.

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French Indochina War: Reflections for Strategic Resilience (Pearl Orient, #1)

Military mistakes impel strategic reflection.  The French Indochina War (FIW) from 1946-1954 furnishes useful insights with some resonance for current challenges.  A combination of pre-exiting conditions, catalysts and operational drivers caused the cathartic 1954 French defeat.  Pre-conditions included the illegitimacy of the colonial regime and repression that polarised nationalist sentiment.  Economically, pernicious terms of trade suppressed industrialisation but oiled speculation until suddenly reversed by devaluation in 1953 that reflected financial disengagement by France but increased American involvement.  Vacillating  metropolitan and the dubious colonial regime of the 'night club' Emperor, Bảo Đại, fuelled political instability.  Militarily,  after the disastrous evacuation of the RC4 in 1950, Việt Minh men and supplies poured across the Chinese frontier.  In 1954, financial constraints and the looming international peace conference catalysed Navarre, the new French commander, to gamble on a battle of attrition.  He tried to distract the Việt Minh and bet that they would be unable drag artillery to the remote jungle outpost of Diên Biên Phú, but he underestimated their focus, determination, strength, and adaptability.  In early December partisans resented the bungled evacuation of Lai Châu.  The entrenched camp's defences were inadequate and neither 141,500 artillery rounds, infantry sorties nor napalm suppressed VM guns, entrenched in the surrounding jungle-clad hills.  The French aero-logistical sub-system was overstretched, its pilots worn out and significant parachute supplies fell into enemy hands.  Navarre scattered his reserves on a futile and remote side show, Operation Atlante.  The Americans, although financing, supplying and covertly assisting the French, prevaricated and refused to unleash their B29 fleet.  'Iacta alea esto' or 'ἀνερρίφθω κύβος' - let the die be cast.

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French Indochina War: Reflections for Strategic Resilience (Pearl Orient, #1)

French Indochina War: Reflections for Strategic Resilience (Pearl Orient, #1)

by Simon Huston
French Indochina War: Reflections for Strategic Resilience (Pearl Orient, #1)

French Indochina War: Reflections for Strategic Resilience (Pearl Orient, #1)

by Simon Huston

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Overview

Military mistakes impel strategic reflection.  The French Indochina War (FIW) from 1946-1954 furnishes useful insights with some resonance for current challenges.  A combination of pre-exiting conditions, catalysts and operational drivers caused the cathartic 1954 French defeat.  Pre-conditions included the illegitimacy of the colonial regime and repression that polarised nationalist sentiment.  Economically, pernicious terms of trade suppressed industrialisation but oiled speculation until suddenly reversed by devaluation in 1953 that reflected financial disengagement by France but increased American involvement.  Vacillating  metropolitan and the dubious colonial regime of the 'night club' Emperor, Bảo Đại, fuelled political instability.  Militarily,  after the disastrous evacuation of the RC4 in 1950, Việt Minh men and supplies poured across the Chinese frontier.  In 1954, financial constraints and the looming international peace conference catalysed Navarre, the new French commander, to gamble on a battle of attrition.  He tried to distract the Việt Minh and bet that they would be unable drag artillery to the remote jungle outpost of Diên Biên Phú, but he underestimated their focus, determination, strength, and adaptability.  In early December partisans resented the bungled evacuation of Lai Châu.  The entrenched camp's defences were inadequate and neither 141,500 artillery rounds, infantry sorties nor napalm suppressed VM guns, entrenched in the surrounding jungle-clad hills.  The French aero-logistical sub-system was overstretched, its pilots worn out and significant parachute supplies fell into enemy hands.  Navarre scattered his reserves on a futile and remote side show, Operation Atlante.  The Americans, although financing, supplying and covertly assisting the French, prevaricated and refused to unleash their B29 fleet.  'Iacta alea esto' or 'ἀνερρίφθω κύβος' - let the die be cast.


Product Details

BN ID: 2940165592287
Publisher: Simon Huston
Publication date: 07/04/2021
Series: Pearl Orient
Sold by: Draft2Digital
Format: eBook
Sales rank: 773,550
File size: 17 MB
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About the Author

Author, academic, analyst, accountant.  Multidisciplinary research for a sustainable world, involving strategy, performance management, sustainable investment, built environments and learning.  Thesis in Geographical Science from the University of Queensland (2010).  Served as a military medic/paratrooper/reconnaissance driver in Djibouti, Central Africa and Chad.  Studied Economics at LSE and Environmental Management at Durham University. Worked as an accountant for Deloitte in UK.  Taught across the education spectrum in Kenya and the Middle East (UAE, KSA, Oman). Worked as a commercial analyst for Queensland Government.  Subsequently, lectured Real Estate and Accountancy at The University of Queensland and three UK universities, including Coventry. 

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