From East Germans to Germans?: The New Postcommunist Elites
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From East Germans to Germans?: The New Postcommunist Elites
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Overview
Although the quick transplant of a ready-made democratic system supported by West German financial backing and expertise provided benefits, problems arose for the development of postcommunist political leadership and for the growth of mass support for the democratic system. Jennifer A. Yoder analyzes the implications of the transition process for democratic legitimation and integration. Based on field research in East Germany that included interviews with parliamentarians, her study addresses issues such as culture, identity, and the lack of continuity between the old and new political elites. Although the availability of West German role models, together with pressure to conform, allowed the process of decommunization to occur much faster than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the cultural differences between east and west are more extensive and complex than previously assumed. Unification has also been followed by a reinvigoration of regional interests. Yoder shows how some political elites have adopted western German patterns, while others openly criticize many of the practices and policies originating in Bonn and present themselves as democratic alternatives and advocates for East German interests in the new Germany. Indeed, for many East Germans, these new regional elites are regarded as the only representatives of their interests in the western-dominated political system.
Providing insight into elite-building at a time of transition and a valuable alternative to the “institutions versus culture” debate found in traditional analyses of political change, this book will interest political scientists and students and scholars of European politics and German studies.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780822396826 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Duke University Press |
| Publication date: | 06/01/2012 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 304 |
| File size: | 608 KB |
About the Author
Jennifer A. Yoder is Assistant Professor of Government at Colby College in Maine.
Read an Excerpt
From East Germans to Germans?
The New Postcommunist Elites
By Jennifer A. Yoder
Duke University Press
Copyright © 1999 Duke University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8223-9682-6
CHAPTER 1
Elite Building after Communism
Following forty years of one-party rule, the establishment of parliamentary democracy in the new Länder marked the dawn of a new political age for eastern Germans. As the protagonists of the new institutions of representative democracy, the new state parliamentarians play a significant role in the consolidation of postcommunist democracy and the integration of east and west Germany. The purpose of this book is to examine who these new important players are, how they were recruited to the new institutions, and what factors shape how they perceive and carry out the functions of elected representatives. Before we turn to the elites themselves, we must first consider the context in which elite building occurs. The particular institutional and cultural dimensions of system change in eastern Germany present certain possibilities and challenges to elite building.
The Institutional and Cultural Dimensions of System Change
Nineteen eighty-nine will be remembered as the year that the people of Eastern European communist countries peacefully challenged their governments to fundamentally change themselves. First a few brave individuals and then groups of citizens came forward demanding more freedom and pressuring their governments to be accountable to the people. As one slogan chanted by East German demonstrators in late 1989 told the GDR leaders, "We are the people–you answer to us!" Citizens' demands, combined with fundamental changes in international relations and, in particular, on the part of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, culminated in moves toward large-scale political and economic reform. This marked the reinvention of politics–a politics no longer to be determined by communist party elites and imposed on the citizenry. Human rights, "living in truth," and citizen voice and participation were the watchwords of the newly mobilized publics. The meaning of democracy was richly debated, and the future seemed full of possibilities. It was the year of the citizen and a time of hope.
The celebrations of the fall of Soviet-type communist regimes in Eastern Europe quickly faded. The mass public receded into the private sphere of everyday activities, while policymakers and scholars began to focus on institutional design and political stability. This demobilization is understandable, as one of the first tasks of the transition to democracy was to provide a framework for a new political system. This usually consisted of amending communist-era constitutions or drafting new ones in order to delineate the lines of power, to provide limits to power, and to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. Most Eastern European polities began the transition toward democratic rule by abolishing the monopoly on power of the communist party and arranging for free elections. The political and economic transition tasks were numerous and complex and, ultimately, were addressed in various ways and sequences by different countries.
Underlying most democratization studies is a belief that nondemocratic societies can and should follow Western models of representative democracy–that given the "correct" institutional framework, they will follow in the footsteps of established democratic systems. However, no institutional change occurs in a vacuum; rather, each one unfolds in a particular societal and cultural context. Certain political values and norms for behavior exist in each society–the product of years of individual and collective experiences. In the cases of former communist societies, people experienced four decades of rule that systematically attempted to wipe out any impulses toward democracy, be they individual freedoms or group/organizational autonomy. How does democracy develop roots in such societies?
Democratization, from the root demos, is about people and their attitudes and behaviors, not just about structures and processes. Systemic change entails more than institutional transformation, the development of functioning stable norms, rules, and structures for governance. How such societies and cultures respond to the systemic changes is also of consequence, as the nature and extent of societal/cultural responses are likely to affect the functioning and sustainability of the new democratic system. Without the acceptance and practice of those system norms by the citizenry, the system remains a hollow shell. Institutionalization and Culturalization are interrelated processes, although the former usually occurs more quickly and is more readily observable than the change of attitudinal and cultural norms.
Democratic culturalization demands special attention in the context of postcommunism. For four decades, the communist countries of Eastern Europe stood apart from, indeed in opposition to, the West, representative democracy, and capitalism. Individualism, competition, uncertainty, and risk were not familiar values and conditions. As a result, the challenges posed by the transplant of Western norms and institutions are formidable. To adopt institutions of democracy and the free market is one thing, but to encourage people to identify with those institutions and to participate in them is quite another. People carry with them deeply ingrained attitudes, habits, customs, and memories. The values and behaviors of the state socialist regimes are likely to be deeply embedded in the culture of postcommunist societies. A distrust of political elites and organizations, a tendency toward apoliticism, and the expectation of a dirigist state are attitudes and habits that may take a generation or more to change. Introducing new "objective" conditions such as political rules and terms does not necessarily mean the "subjective" realm of hearts and minds automatically or necessarily follows. While these challenges confront every society that experiences dramatic system change, they are particularly acute in the case of east Germany, where the mode of system change and the intervention of an external actor in the transitions process are unique factors and have several important consequences for democratic culturalization.
The Mode of Transition: System Transplant
In postcommunist eastern Germany, the ready-made West German system was transplanted to East Germany, without modification for indigenous circumstances, experiences, or preferences. Rather than a gradual introduction of the new system, a swift harmonization of institutions occurred through the replacement of eastern structures with western ones. The planning and implementation of institutional transplant paid little attention to culturalization. There was no period of preparation in eastern Germany for the new FRG norms and procedures. The eastern German people–those most affected by the transplant of new structures–were effectively demobilized in the unification process. In comparison with the role of citizens in the breakdown of the old regime, the transplant relegated people to being subjects, rather than agents, of change. The process left little or no room for citizen input. It was the hour of the policymaker and the bureaucrat, and few stopped to consider whether the attitudes and shared experiences of East German society might be compatible with the new norms and routines. In particular, there was little attempt made to understand the nature of state-society relations and political culture in the GDR, or to question how a society emerging from decades of bureaucratic socialism might react to the elite-driven transplant of democracy. It is not surprising that some eastern Germans believe not much had changed: it is still "them up there and us down here." The mode of system change in the East German case belies both an optimism about the transplantability of a ready-made democratic system and culture and a pessimism about the role that citizens potentially play in political development. After the initial optimism of 1989-90, however, it became increasingly obvious that beneath the surface of common linguistic and historical ties, east and west Germany were very different societies and that neue und alte Bundesbürger (new and old citizens of the FRG) often hold very different political attitudes, expectations, and behavioral norms, shaped by markedly different life experiences since the end of World War II.
An External Actor: The FRG
In addition to the unique mode of transition in East Germany, there is another unique transition element that affects democratization: the presence of an external actor–the FRG, broadly speaking–and its role in guiding the process of political change after 1989. The East German transition to democracy may be described as exogenously driven. As later chapters of this book will demonstrate, West German political actors began to exert significant influence in the development of the political parties in the GDR, on the 1990 negotiations between the two German states, and in the implementation of the system transplant. The latter process was aided by as many as twenty thousand managers and aides who went east after 1990. As a result, more than any other transition case in the region, the East German democratization process raises the question of the legitimacy of an "imported" (and some would even say, though inaccurately, "imposed") system. Rather than being a homegrown political system, whose rules and institutions have been fashioned by the society and its leaders, according to their own preferences and visions for the future, the eastern Germans now live in a system they had no role in developing. Moreover, the politicization of this system transplant created unrealistic expectations in the east about how quickly and completely Bonn politicians could deliver prosperity, and it deepened a sense that eastern Germans' fate lay in the hands of distant elites and a paternalistic state. Perhaps the clearest example of the primacy of politics over prudence, in this case economic prudence, was the Kohl government's decision to allow East Germans to exchange their ostmarks at a 1:1 rate with the German mark. Against the advice of economics experts and with an eye on the upcoming elections, Kohl bent to public pressure in the east for a 1:1 conversion rate. Instead of the economic miracle that East Germans desperately hoped for, however, the move rendered eastern industries too costly and unable to compete in the open market, triggering massive layoffs and unleashing a process of de-industrialization in the east. Another effect of this decision was a growing sense of dependency on the west, underscoring many East Germans' suspicions that they were merely bystanders in the unification process. As this episode suggests, some of the most difficult challenges of German integration and postcommunist democratization are psychocultural–within the realm of values, attitudes, identity, and behaviors. For East Germans in 1989–1990, the apparent wish to enjoy the freedoms and affluence of the West Germans did not necessarily mean that people also desired the freedom to fail, to feel humiliation, or to experience insecurity. Moreover, expressions of national solidarity did not necessarily indicate a desire to forget everything about the previous forty years or to trade in a system of beliefs and behaviors for a completely new one. Even if some individuals desired such an exchange of values, behaviors, and identity, how readily could they cast off the socialization and "identity" nurtured by the GDR regime? All communist regimes attempted to imbue their citizens with certain system values and a sense of loyalty, as indeed do all regimes. Certainly, the creation of the "New Soviet Man" or the "Socialist personality" was a primary goal of communist elites. Owing to the origins of the East German state in postwar division, the GDR regime went to great lengths to separate and differentiate East Germans from their West German counterparts. In 1961, the regime erected the Berlin Wall to keep its people in and West Germans out. A policy of Abgrenzung (demarcation) from the FRG followed, which continually indoctrinated East Germans with the notion that West Germany was decadent and imperialist, and that the GDR was the better alternative to the FRG. Although there were certainly people in the GDR who disbelieved some or all of the regime's claims about the FRG, at least one well-known study demonstrates that two separate national identities began to emerge.
In the euphoria of 1989, however, the cold war antagonisms and cultural differences between the two Germanies were temporarily forgotten. The prospect of Unification offered a way to quickly overcome the political and economic differences between East and West Germans. As former West German chancellor Willy Brandt put it, what "belonged together" could now "grow together." Then chancellor Kohl envisioned one big "blossoming landscape" of prosperity and peace. Moreover, crowds of demonstrators in East German cities began to shout "Germany–united fatherland" and "We are one Volk," suggesting the appreciation for a common bond and fate that had been long denied them by postwar division. Expressions of national feeling may not be enough to sustain the arduous process of system transformation. There is plenty of evidence in other postcommunist settings that attests to the distance between national feeling and democratic tolerance. This gap is best represented by leaders such as Vladimír Meciar in Slovakia, Radovan Karadzic in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, and Istvan Czurka in Hungary, to name a few. An affinity for national symbols or a sense of national identity does not guarantee the development of feelings of loyalty to a political system or identification with system norms.
As the public opinion data presented in the introduction suggests, it would seem that national feeling is not inevitable or consistent, as the sense of belonging to the German nation has reportedly declined among eastern Germans since unification. For Germans, moreover, the issue of national identity has been a sensitive one. Some argue that shared domestic norms and shared pride in the democratic institutions of the FRG (such as the constitution, the Basic Law) are preferable bases for German identity and unity. To what extent then have democratic norms and behaviors become the common bond of East and West Germans? Put somewhat differently, to what degree has the subjective dimension of democratization paralleled or followed the process of institutional harmonization? These questions turn our attention to democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy develops along two dimensions: in terms of general support for democracy, also called "abstract" or "diffuse" support, and in terms of support for the particular system, for example, the FRG democracy, otherwise known as "specific" support. Ideally, citizens believe that the particular system to which they belong is the best possible system. This suggests a high degree of system support, or legitimacy. In the eastern German case, the question of specific support is particularly significant, since here (and only here) the new system has been brought unchanged from the outside (that is, has been placed onto the society rather than coming from within the society) and implemented, in part, by elites from the west. As a result, there was no possibility for experimentation or for a gradual evolution of the system and little chance to imprint the system with indigenous ideas and tastes. Elsewhere in the former communist bloc, societies and their leaders have chosen their institutions in a more endogenously determined and gradual manner. This allowed for experimentation with different combinations of democratic and capitalist structures, modified to fit local tastes and preferences.
In this context, eastern Germans are faced with adapting their own/old political culture to the new democratic institutions. The impact on culturalization in eastern Germany is not yet satisfactorily known. With the introduction of the new system have come a host of new uncertainties, the intensification of feelings of displacement, and even the loss of identity. It is true that these uncertainties also confront citizens of other postcommunist countries. However, in other cases, citizens are all equally new to, and unfamiliar with, the new order: there are no "new" and "old" citizens with more or less experience with democracy. The institutions, such as political parties, electoral laws, or legal system have evolved more organically in other postcommunist societies, according to historical experiences and societal cleavages. In eastern Germany, the political party system (with the exception of the former communist party, the PDS) was transplanted from the outside, from the FRG. Moreover, the pressure postcommunist societies feel to catch up to the prosperous West is qualitatively different for east Germans. They became "the West" overnight. Along with their new democratic credentials, however, east Germans are confronted with 63 million new fellow citizens, new ways of doing things, new standards by which to judge their past (both communist and precommunist/fascist), and even a new discourse. In unified Germany, east Germans are only one-fifth of the total population (sixteen million out of eighty million). They are neue Bundesbürger–new citizens. As later chapters of this book suggest, they face some of the same adjustment pressures as immigrants in Germany. At issue is the integration of eastern Germans into a new state, a new political system, and a new culture.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from From East Germans to Germans? by Jennifer A. Yoder. Copyright © 1999 Duke University Press. Excerpted by permission of Duke University Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
List of Tables,Acknowledgments,
Introduction,
1 Elite Building After Communism,
2 Political Culture and Leadership Under Communism: GDR Socialization,
3 East German Leadership in the Revolutionary Year 1989-1990: Elite Circulation,
4 The Transition to Democracy in East Germany: Transplant and Elite Replacement,
5 Developing FRG Politicians: Horizontal Integration,
6 Elites and the Masses in Postcommunist Germany: Vertical Integration,
7 Transplanting Democracy: The Consequences for Elite Building and Integration,
Appendix A: The Interview Study,
Appendix B: Political Parties Before and After German Unification,
Appendix C: Civic Groups in the GDR in 1989,
Notes,
Bibliography,
Index,