Game Theory and Economic Analysis: A Quiet Revolution in Economics / Edition 1

by Christian Schmidt

Overview

This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributions include such themes as:
*the connections between Von Neumann's mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to him today
*the strategic use of information by game players
*the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players
*cooperative games and their place within the literature of games plus new developments in non-cooperative games
*possible applications for game theory in industrial and financial economics differential qualitative games and entry dissuasion.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780415259873
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	06/20/2002
Series:	Routledge Advances in Game Theory , #1
Pages:	204
Product dimensions:	6.12(w) x 9.19(h) x (d)
Lexile:	1510L (what's this?)

About the Author

Christian Schmidt is Professor at the University of Paris-Dauphine. He has recently published La théorie des jeux: essai d’interprétation (PUF, 2001).

Table of Contents

Introduction PART I Historical insight 1 Von Neumann and Morgenstern in historical perspective 2 Rupture versus continuity in game theory: Nash versus Von Neumann and Morgenstern PART II Theoretical content 3 Bluff and reputation 4 An appraisal of cooperative game theory 5 The coalition concept in game theory 6 Do Von Neumann and Morgenstern have heterodox followers? 7 From specularity to temporality in game theory PART III Applications 8 Collective choice mechanisms and individual incentives 9 Team models as a framework to analyze coordination problems within the firm