Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion 1572 - 1596, Volume 1 & 2
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Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion 1572 - 1596, Volume 1 & 2
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| ISBN-13: | 9781841508436 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Intellect Books |
| Publication date: | 10/01/2002 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 645 |
| Sales rank: | 746,152 |
| File size: | 664 KB |
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Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion
1572-1596
By N. M. Sutherland
Intellect Ltd
Copyright © 2002 A. M. SutherlandAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-84150-843-6
CHAPTER 1
THE ACCESSION OF HENRY IV, AUGUST 1589
I: First Steps
Following the death of Henry III, on 2 August 1589, turmoil and perturbation seized the royal camp; these emotions were mixed with anger and outrage. Who but Henry of Navarre could hope to avenge the blasphemy of regicide? Without him, furthermore, the outlook would be grim for the late king's officials and supporters. But for many, however, this was a situation to be exploited. When a meeting was held by the late king's principal servants, discordant opinions were heard. Nicolas de Harlay, seigneur de Sancy urged upon the assembled company that France was a monarchy and must have a king. The transition from one king to the next was instantaneous, and depended upon God. Unless they, who were the royalists, recognised Navarre as Henry IV, no one else would do so. Anyone who could not support Navarre should withdraw forthwith; and some did, notably the ducs de Nevers and Épernon. Among those who remained, agreement to recognise Navarre as Henry IV was only tentative and conditional. Marshal Biron (Armand de Gontaut, baron de Biron), who could have been a tower of strength, was more concerned to defend his personal interests than those of the monarchy. The comté de Périgord purchased his service but not his loyalty.From the outset, Henry was ill-served, and grudgingly, and that restricted his freedom of action. With the timely support of Sancy, however, Henry's own vigorous action may have helped to sway opinion in his favour.
The next day, 3 August 1589, Henry summoned an army council. His first – possibly primitive – instinct was to retreat beyond the Loire. The gentry in his own forces had already extended the term of their commitment in order to partake in the assault upon Paris. Deprived of that gratification, many would quit and attend to the harvest. Henry IV was to be repeatedly beset by this problem – namely that he disposed of no reliable or standing force. Jean de Chaumont, seigneur de Guitry, Navarre's envoy to Casimir in 1586, persuaded Henry of the unwisdom of abandoning recently occupied small towns in the Parisian region; and Sancy, who had just conducted the king's Swiss troops to Paris, prevailed upon them to serve his successor for three months. Henry would remain in the north, and that was a beginning.
Henry of Navarre therefore had no realistic alternative but to accept the conditions of the princes and nobles. He did not, however, permit any conditions directly harmful to the huguenots; nor is it clear who drafted the declaration of 4 August 1589. While the promulgation of this document is very well known, its significance has often been misconstrued. Some contemporaries alleged, and historians have repeated, that Henry thereby promised to abjure; he did not. Henry promised – quite explicitly – what he had already offered several times before. In the first place, the declaration recognised his accession by the use of his proper title, king of France and Navarre; his enemies persisted in styling him only 'prince de Béarn'. Henry undertook to preserve the catholic religion unchanged in all respects. Furthermore, and 'according to his previous declaration' [of 21 April 1589, when he crossed the Loire], he expressed himself ready and desirous to be instructed by a legitimate and free, general or national council, and willing to accept its conclusions. For that purpose, he would assemble [a council] within six months. Meanwhile, the religious status quo, as established by the 'traité de la trève', should obtain, until it was otherwise determined by a general peace, or by an estates-general, also to be convoked within six months. The clause relating to the convocation of some sort of council was unavoidably vague, since the nature of so problematic an assembly could not be determined. There followed undertakings about the command of cities yet to be captured, and the confirmation of state and court offices in recognition of services rendered to the late king. Finally, Henry agreed to pursue the regicides.
Reciprocally, and on the same date, the princes and nobles agreed to recognise Navarre as Henry IV, upon the terms of his declaration, and according to the fundamental laws of the kingdom. That suggests an admission that Navarre's claim to the throne was hereditary; separate and distinct from his religion, it was therefore indestructible. The League, however, had asserted the catholicity of the crown as fundamental law, and also advanced the convenient principle of election. The nobles then inserted two additional conditions: firstly that Navarre should hold an assembly of the servants of the late king, within two months, to deliberate upon, and resolve, the affairs of the kingdom. This probably related to their second condition: namely permission to send notable persons to Rome. These persons were to explain and justify the nobles' adherence to Navarre, and also to obtain from the pope that which they knew to be necessary for the good of Christendom and the service of the king and the state. Finally the nobles required that the regicides be brought to justice. Did they know that the pope had, at the least, applauded the regicide? According to Sancy, who was present, these convolutions meant that the nobles proposed to seek Papal assistance to achieve the abjuration of the king, and his blessing upon it – the word absolution was eschewed. The duc de Luxembourg was chosen to represent them in Rome; but this was not announced until 6 September 1589. He did not, apparently, leave in any great hurry. Thus, from the first days of his reign, Henry IV had agreed to representations in Rome with a view to his abjuration; that much is fact. It is impossible to say whether the king welcomed this move towards Rome, which he was in no position to make himself; neither was he in any position to prohibit it. By the time the outcome was known, his circumstances might be notably different.
If this, unique, account of Henry's accession is true, it reflects an extraordinary naivety on the part of the royalist catholics – two of whom were cardinals – and an apparent ignorance of Franco-Papal relations since the excommunication of Navarre and Condé. Perhaps the princes and nobles originally supposed that, within the two months allowed in their statement, they would receive some answer from Rome, clarifying the way ahead. Luxembourg, however, did not reach Rome until 8 January 1590. This delay, which is hard to explain, afforded the Leaguer and Spanish agents an initial advantage of time in which to advance their own cause. Perhaps on account of this delay, the demand for an assembly of notables was heard of no more; or, perhaps, it was superseded by the king's announcement, on 27 August 1589, of his intention to hold an assembly at Tours, scheduled for 31 October. Henry had, meanwhile, clarified his position in a significant speech to the seigneurs, delivered on 8 August 1589. He referred, on this occasion, to otherwise unknown 'oaths and recommendations' imposed and expressed by the dying Henry III, in the presence of the said seigneurs and for the peace of the kingdom. The principal requirement had been to maintain the liberty and freedom of exercise for the two religions, until the problems between them had been resolved by a holy, general or national council. That was how Henry III had intended to proceed – presumably after the expected recovery of Paris and defeat of the League. In other words, Navarre was reminding the nobles that the dying king had called for an interim. It was therefore not unnatural that Navarre should have claimed, and expected for himself, the same religious assurance extended to everyone else. Consequently, he now declared that he had assembled the seigneurs to affirm that he would not waver in his religion before he had been instructed by such a council as had been, and was, proposed. If this evidence is true, it may indicate an attempt by Henry III to remove the problem of Navarre's religion out of the immediate, crisis situation following his death. The same evidence could also throw light upon the contents of the two declarations of 4 August 1589. These reciprocal undertakings, together with Henry's speech of 8 August, might be seen as a provisional contract between himself and the nobles to defer the issue of his religion. That was well and good, so far as it went; indeed, it was unavoidable. But while Navarre perceived the problem in terms of a council, the instinct of the nobles was to look to Rome; in fact neither the one nor the other could provide a solution. Thus, from a position of alarming weakness, and in fluid circumstances, Henry had to struggle on, trying to sustain the religious position which he had already, repeatedly, defined.
Henry's declaration of 4 August 1589 can only be properly understood in the context of his former pronouncements made since 1583. At the risk of repetition, it is essential to realise that the declaration did not constitute an undertaking to abjure. Henry's well-publicised religious position remained unchanged, together with the specifications in the 'traité de la trève'. The only, slight, shift – albeit far more theoretical than real – might be detected in his consent to the forthcoming mission of Luxembourg to Rome. One must not suppose that, in August 1589, Henry IV could see far enough ahead to embrace the hope of Papal assistance in place of a council that was never going to happen. The future was wholly obscure; his need at that moment was to survive, and to impose his authority, from which everything else would stem. That must begin with the early recovery of Paris. Henry later complained to Duplessis about his initial difficulties. He had had to tame so many 'personnes farouches', everyone being convinced that he was out to establish his own power in order to destroy their religion. Apparently no one believed his protestations and denials. A little later he assured Duplessis and the huguenots – as he was bound to do – of his constancy in religion.
II: The Protestant King
The exceptional difficulties faced by Henry IV in August 1589 arose from the fact – already noted – that he succeeded to the throne unexpectedly, and in time of war. The murder of Henry III, at the crucial moment in his advance upon Paris, delivered the Catholic League and the Seize from destruction; it also opened up, in their own estimation and that of Spain and the Papacy, a disputed succession. Although Henry III had taken the field and was therefore at risk, the contingency of his death had not been provided for. As the crown of France was hereditary no special arrangements were necessary. Acknowledgement of the heir presumptive would, however, have been normal but, on account of the unresolved contention over Navarre's religion, this had never been done. Everyone knew that Henry III had recognised no other heir, but that was no longer the point.
It has been seen in Part I that Navarre's religion was always a matter of public concern. While he was heir presumptive, it became an exploitable factor in public life. But, being close to the king in age, he had always regarded his eventual succession as unlikely. He freely acknowledged that France was overwhelmingly catholic, and he was no missionary. He surely must have reflected – it is impossible to suppose otherwise – that he might be forced into abjuration. That could be one reason why he had so frequently called for a council. A council would provide a structure and framework by which the transition could either be avoided or else rendered proper, formal and acceptable. Meanwhile, frank declarations, and repeated demands for a council had provided a means of resisting the pressure to convert. As the protestants' 'protector', Navarre recognised particular obligations.
It was all a very different matter, however, when Henry succeeded to the throne, without any warning or preparation beyond a normal perception of danger. Now, despite the royalists' acceptance of his hereditary right, Navarre's religion was suddenly the burning issue which defined the allegiance of many catholics and relaxed the loyalty of others. But the conversion of a prince was not – as some have supposed – either a straightforward or a private matter, to do or not to do. Conversion was a process, which could neither be undertaken alone, nor without Papal participation. Henry knew what had befallen Soissons and Conti when they sought absolution. He was also aware of the fate of Henry III; and that had led to a total breach with Rome. This profoundly unhelpful severance exacerbated Henry's problems by worsening the rift between the already divided catholics; for it was not the huguenots who were tearing France apart. Inevitably, Henry's immediate concern was for survival; and that precluded impulsive decisions in adverse circumstances. Besides, his principal hope of foreign assistance – without which he could not possibly confront the hostility of Spain – lay with queen Elizabeth and other protestant princes.
Ample evidence soon emerged that Henry IV expected recognition as the legitimate sovereign that he was, before he would consider acts of grace – of which his dignified abjuration might, conceivably, be one. Henry, anyway, had no option but to proceed pragmatically. His principal objective had to be the recovery of Paris. Paris – whence Henry III had been expelled, never to return – was the stronghold of the Catholic Union and a city of strategic and symbolic importance. Given greater loyalty and better fortune than Henry in fact enjoyed, Paris might have fallen fairly quickly. The swift recovery of Paris would have altered everything, both in domestic and foreign affairs including, above all, the attitude of Sixtus V. It has already been seen how Henry's domestic and foreign enemies combined to work against him in Rome. In the event, the recovery of Paris proved to be an immensely difficult task, and one for which the indigent king was not equipped.
Obliged, therefore, to temporise as best he could, soothing fears and sustaining utterly disparate hopes, Henry necessarily sought to defer the resolution of all major issues to the conclusion of a general peace. The huguenots were temporarily provided for by the 'traité de la trève' in April 1589 – which was all that could be done in time of war. But the vexed question of a better, and permanent, protestant settlement was looming. Clearly the king would like a satisfactory dispensation to be included in a comprehensive peace, before the truce expired in April 1590. That would have relieved him of his uneasy and divisive role as huguenot 'protector'. It would also have pre-empted the huguenots' bitter and subversive opposition to the king's eventual abjuration. While events did not work out that way, Henry IV still cherished his intense aspiration – albeit increasingly remote – to accomplish a religious reunion. The conception was ultimately enshrined, as a forlorn hope, in the preamble to the edict of Nantes in 1598. Now his inescapable shift towards the late king's catholic supporters – exposing him to their deliberate catholic influence – strained his close relationship with Duplessis-Mornay. For Duplessis, who was ill at the time, his strictly Calvinist aspiration to religious reunion was enhanced, however unrealistically, by the accession of their protestant 'protector'. He hastened to offer his advice to the new king, as he always had to Navarre as huguenot leader and heir presumptive.
The catholics, Duplessis said, were alarmed. Therefore a[nother] declaration was necessary to assure them that there would be no innovations in religion; efforts would be made, by legitimate means and the advice of those best qualified, to achieve the reunion of all the king's subjects. The terms under which the protestants were to live should also be specified, and those who were dissatisfied could proceed by petition. Henry should write to all the churches and protestant towns exhorting them to behave with moderation. He should also express the desire to relieve the people [of their burden of taxation] and to call an estates-general. He should publicly deplore the outrage of regicide which brought him to the throne, and pardon within a stated time those willing to submit. Duplessis appeared in this memoir to be unaware of the breach with Rome, caused by the monitorium against Henry III; ignorance of the matter may therefore have been widespread. Consequently he proposed that the cardinal de Joyeuse and Pisani – who were no longer in Rome – should warn the pope, with thinly veiled threats, of the danger he incurred by his 'foudres et bulles' [against Navarre and Condé], recalling the [schismatic] example of England. In particular, Duplessis saw vengeance for the murder of the late king as a possible unifying factor, and in that he was not, at the time, entirely mistaken.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion by N. M. Sutherland. Copyright © 2002 A. M. Sutherland. Excerpted by permission of Intellect Ltd.
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Table of Contents
Contents
VOLUME II: THE PATH TO ROME,Chapter VIII: The Accession of Henry IV, August 1589,
Chapter IX: Henry IV and Pope Sixtus V,
Chapter X: The Importance of Paris,
Chapter XI: The Hostile Papacy, Gregory XIV,
Chapter XII: The Rouen Campaign, 1591-2,
Chapter XIII: The Problem of Conversion,
Chapter XIV: The Conversion of Henry IV,
Chapter XV: Henry IV and Rome,
Chapter XVI: The King's Absolution,
Appendix,
Bibliography,
Index,