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![Human Nature and Conduct](http://img.images-bn.com/static/redesign/srcs/images/grey-box.png?v11.9.4)
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Overview
"Give a dog a bad name and hang him." Human nature has been the dog of professional moralists, and consequences accord with the proverb. Man's nature has been regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour looks, sometimes with enthusiasm for its possibilities but only when these were placed in contrast with its actualities. It has appeared to be so evilly disposed that the business of morality was to prune and curb it; it would be thought better of if it could be replaced by something else. It has been supposed that morality would be quite superfluous were it not for the inherent weakness, bordering on depravity, of human nature. Some writers with a more genial conception have attributed the current blackening to theologians who have thought to honor the divine by disparaging the human. Theologians have doubtless taken a gloomier view of man than have pagans and secularists. But this explanation doesn't take us far. For after all these theologians are themselves human, and they would have been without influence if the human audience had not somehow responded to them.
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9781548303990 |
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Publisher: | CreateSpace Publishing |
Publication date: | 07/04/2017 |
Pages: | 216 |
Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.46(d) |
About the Author
Murray G. Murphey is Professor of American Civilization at the University of Pennsylvania.
Jo Ann Boydston is Director of the Center for Dewey Studies at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.
Patricia Baysinger, textual editor of this volume, is a member of the Dewey Center staff.
Jo Ann Boydston is Director of the Center for Dewey Studies at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.
Patricia Baysinger, textual editor of this volume, is a member of the Dewey Center staff.
Table of Contents
Introduction | 1 | |
Contempt for human nature | ||
Pathology of goodness | ||
Freedom | ||
Value of science | ||
Part 1 | The Place of Habit in Conduct | |
Section I | Habits as Social Functions | 14 |
Habits as functions and arts | ||
Social complicity | ||
Subject factor | ||
Section II | Habits and Will | 24 |
Active means | ||
Ideas of ends | ||
Means and ends | ||
Nature of character | ||
Section III | Character and Conduct | 43 |
Good will and consequences | ||
Virtues and natural goods | ||
Objective and subjective morals | ||
Section IV | Custom and Habit | 58 |
Human psychology is social | ||
Habit as conservative | ||
Mind and body | ||
Section V | Custom and Morality | 75 |
Customs as standards | ||
Authority of standards | ||
Class conflicts | ||
Section VI | Habit and Social Psychology | 84 |
Isolation of individuality | ||
Newer movements | ||
Part 2 | The Place of Impulse in Conduct | |
Section I | Impulses and Change of Habits | 89 |
Present interest in instincts | ||
Impulses as re-organizing | ||
Section II | Plasticity of Impulse | 95 |
Impulse and education | ||
Uprush of impulse | ||
Fixed codes | ||
Section III | Changing Human Nature | 106 |
Habits the inert factor | ||
Modification of impulses | ||
War a social function | ||
Economic regimes as social products | ||
Nature of motives | ||
Section IV | Impulse and Conflict of Habits | 125 |
Possibility of social betterment | ||
Conservatism | ||
Section V | Classification of Instincts | 131 |
False simplifications | ||
"self-love" | ||
Will to power | ||
Acquisitive and creative | ||
Section VI | No Separate Instincts | 149 |
Uniqueness of acts | ||
Possibilities of operation | ||
Necessity of play and art | ||
Rebelliousness | ||
Section VII | Impulse and Thought | 169 |
Part 3 | The Place of Intelligence in Conduct | |
Section I | Habit and Intelligence | 172 |
Habits and intellect | ||
Mind, habit and impulse | ||
Section II | The Psychology of Thinking | 181 |
The trinity of intellect | ||
Conscience and its alleged separate subject-matter | ||
Section III | The Nature of Deliberation | 189 |
Deliberation as imaginative rehearsal | ||
Preference and choice | ||
Strife of reason and passion | ||
Nature of reason | ||
Section IV | Deliberation and Calculation | 199 |
Error in utilitarian theory | ||
Place of the pleasant | ||
Hedonistic calculus | ||
Deliberation and prediction | ||
Section V | The Uniqueness of Good | 210 |
Fallacy of a single good | ||
Applied to utilitarianism | ||
Profit and personality | ||
Means and ends | ||
Section VI | The Nature of Aims | 223 |
Theory of final ends | ||
Aims as directive means | ||
Ends as justifying means | ||
Meaning well as an aim | ||
Wishes and aims | ||
Section VII | The Nature of Principles | 238 |
Desire for certainty | ||
Morals and probabilities | ||
Importance of generalizations | ||
Section VIII | Desire and Intelligence | 248 |
Object and consequence of desire | ||
Desire and quiescence | ||
Self-deception in desire | ||
Desire needs intelligence | ||
Nature of idealism | ||
Living in the ideal | ||
Section IX | The Present and Future | 265 |
Subordination of activity to result | ||
Control of future | ||
Production and consummation | ||
Idealism and distant goals | ||
Part 4 | Conclusion | |
Section I | The Good of Activity | 278 |
Better and worse | ||
Morality a process | ||
Evolution and progress | ||
Optimism | ||
Epicureanism | ||
Making others happy | ||
Section II | Morals are Human | 295 |
Humane morals | ||
Natural law and morals | ||
Place of science | ||
Section III | What is Freedom? | 303 |
Elements in freedom | ||
Capacity in action | ||
Novel possibilities | ||
Force of desire | ||
Section IV | Morality is Social | 314 |
Conscience and responsibility | ||
Social pressure and opportunity | ||
Exaggeration of blame | ||
Importance of social psychology | ||
Category of right | ||
The community as religious symbol | ||
Index | 333 |
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