Managing Command and Control in the Persian Gulf War

by Thomas C. Hone, Mark D. Mandeles, Sanford S. Terry

Overview

During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780275952617
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date:	09/24/1996
Series:	Contributions in Women's Studies; 156
Pages:	192
Product dimensions:	6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.50(d)
Lexile:	1540L (what's this?)

About the Author

MARK D. MANDELES is President of the J. de Bloch Group.

THOMAS C. HONE is a member of the faculty of the George C. Marshall Center.

SANFORD S. TERRY is Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations
Introduction
The Black Hole and Its Impact in Desert Shield
The TACC and GAT in Desert Storm
Bomb Damage Assessment and Command and Control of the Air Campaign
Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner as the First Joint Force Air Component Commander
Conclusion
Appendix: "Black Hole" Strategic Air Campaign Planners
Notes on Sources
Index