Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond
Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the “best of both worlds.” In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system—especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly—can modify the incentives created by the electoral system.  

The findings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.
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Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond
Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the “best of both worlds.” In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system—especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly—can modify the incentives created by the electoral system.  

The findings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.
69.95 In Stock
Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond

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Overview

Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the “best of both worlds.” In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system—especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly—can modify the incentives created by the electoral system.  

The findings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780472119738
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
Publication date: 04/11/2016
Series: New Comparative Politics
Pages: 336
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.20(d)

About the Author

Nathan F. Batto is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, and a jointly appointed Assistant Research Fellow at the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.
Chi Huang is a University Chair Professor of Political Science and Research Fellow of the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan.
Alexander C. Tan is Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand.
Gary W. Cox is William Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations ix

Introduction: Legislature-Centric and Executive-Centric Theories of Party Systems and Faction Systems Nathan F. Batto Gary W. Cox 1

Part I The Consequences of MMM On Political Coordination in Taiwan and Japan

1 The Consequences of MMM on Party Systems Chi Huang Ming-Feng Kuo Hans Stockton 25

2 The Consequences of Constitutional Systems on Party Systems Jih-wen Lin 52

3 LDP Factions under SNTV and MMM Yoshiaki Kobayashi Hiroki Tsukiyama 73

4 Executive Competition, Electoral Rules, and Faction Systems in Taiwan Nathan F. Batto Hsin-ta Huang 102

5 Innovations in Candidate Selection Methods Eric Chen-hua Yu Kaori Shaji Nathan F. Batto 135

6 Post Allocation, List Nominations, and Preelectoral Coalitions under MMM Kuniaki Nemoto Chia-hung Tsai 165

7 Split-Ticket Voting under MAIM T. Y. Wang Chang-chih Lin Yi-ching Hsiao 194

Part II Coordination in Mixed-Member Systems in Comparative Perspective

8 Thailand and tire Philippines under MMM Allen Hicken 229

9 Political Consequences of New Zealand's MMP System in Comparative Perspective Matthew S. Shugart Alexander C. Tan 247

10 Presidents and Blank Votes in the Bolivian and Russian Mixed-Member Systems Nathan F. Batto Henry A. Kim Natalia Matukhno 278

Conclusions: Mixed-Member Systems Embedded within Constitutional Systems Chi Huang 300

Contributors 311

Index 317

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