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Overview
September 7, 1812, is by itself one of the most cataclysmic days in the history of war: 74,000 casualties at the Battle of Borodino. And this was well before the invention of weaspons of mass destruction like machine guns or breech-loading rifles.
In this detailed study of one of the most fascinating military campaigns in history, George Nazfiger includes a clear exposition on the power structure in Europe at the time leading up to Napoleon’s fateful decision to attempt what turned out to be impossible: the conquest of Russia. Also featured are complete orders of battle and detailed descriptions of the opposing forces.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780307538819 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Random House Publishing Group |
| Publication date: | 05/06/2009 |
| Sold by: | Random House |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 704 |
| File size: | 16 MB |
| Note: | This product may take a few minutes to download. |
Read an Excerpt
The causes of the 1812 campaign can be said to have had their roots in the military rivalry between France and Russia and the economic rivalry between France and England, but the first shots of this campaign are found in a series of decrees issued in 1806 that gave birth to what was known as the “Continental System.” England and France were fighting for the economic domination of Europe.
The term “Continental System” was coined by Napoleon to describe the system by which he intended to defeat England after his efforts to defeat the British navy on the high seas had failed. England was not a self-sufficient country and depended on both its imports of raw materials and its continental markets for its existence. Napoleon hoped that by cutting off these markets he could ruin the British economy and force the British to submit to his will. In addition, Napoleon had the second goal of forcing the Continental states into a total economic dependence on the industrial exports of France, which would give him an economical dominance to match his military dominance of Europe.
Napoleon hoped that he could pursue these goals with the cooperation and approval of his Continental allies. He spent much time condemning Britain's maritime policies, such as the exclusion of non-British products from Britain's colonies and Britain's seizure of the colonies of many of the Continental states. Napoleon postured and posed as the defender of the Continental interests against an unprincipled Britain.
The institution of the Continental System began with the British declaration that the entire coast of the Continent from Brest to the Elbe was in a state of blockade. This was instituted on 16 May 1806. In retaliation. Napoleon closed the entire north German coast of Friesland to British goods.
This situation remained unchanged until late 1806, when the Prussians were beaten by Napoleon. When Prussia ceased to be a military threat to Napoleon, he proceeded to seal off the major commercial cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck. This provided a “hermetic seal” against British goods on the Atlantic coast of Germany. He also began the process of seizing all of the British goods that were to be found in those territories. The significance of this move was great because those cities were the principal conduits by which Britain shipped her goods into Europe.
The immediate result of these orders was the seizure of massive quantities of British goods and the enrichment of Napoleon's war treasury. Napoleon's next step was the issuance of the famous Berlin Decrees on 12 November 1806. The preamble of the decree denounced the British blockade of 16 May as a violation of recognized international law. The text of the decree stated that the British Isles were, themselves, in a state of blockade, forbade all trade in British goods, ordered the arrest of all British subjects in allied states, made all British goods liable to seizure, and refused port access to any vessel coming directly from Britain or any of her colonies, or that had called on one of those ports since the issuance of the decree.
The decree applied to all of France's allies and, in theory, formed a counterblockade against British financial incursion extending from north-em Germany to Italy, excluding Portugal. Lacking a fleet, Napoleon was unable to actually enforce his blockade of Britain, so the results of this decree were felt principally by the neutrals engaged in commerce, who ran the risk of capture by French privateers.
Those Continental states that were not allies also felt pressure to comply with the decree. Napoleon's victorious armies provided a strong incentive, often stronger than the state's desire for British trade.
Napoleon's aim was to expand the economic isolation of Britain by eventually sealing off every Continental state. Napoleon knew this endeavor would result in serious economic privations for France and her allies, but he also knew that the impact would be even greater, fatal he hoped, on Britain.
Britain's only defense against this decree was to penetrate the blockade with as much commerce as possible. The first British reprisals were the Orders in Council of 7 January 1807. These orders forbade neutrals to trade between the ports of France and her allies, under pain of seizure and the confiscation of ship and cargo. This action, again, was felt primarily by the neutrals like America and Denmark. To these neutrals, these acts were more damaging than the Berlin Decree, as Britain had the navy to enforce its sanction. The impact of these orders on France was minimal.
Napoleon's seal on Continental trade was not complete. The War of the Fourth Coalition, the 1805-1807 campaigns, was terminated by the Treaty of Tilsit. It had several provisions that related to the Berlin Decree and it closed Prussian and Russian ports to Britain. After the signing of the treaty, only Austria, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and parts of Italy still traded with Britain.
Of these states, Denmark had special significance. Its geographical location at the mouth of the Baltic forced the British to act quickly. Britain offered Denmark a secret defense alliance. In return for this alliance, the Danes were to turn over their fleet to the British for safekeeping until peace was reestablished. Needless to say, the Danes refused to submit to those humiliating terms. Britain's response was to invade Denmark and seize its fleet on 5 September 1807. This action gave much credence to Napoleon's charges and resulted in the immediate conclusion of a military alliance between Denmark and France. Denmark was now in the Continental System.
As Napoleon began his plans for the invasion of Portugal, Czar Alexander of Russia declared war on Britain. Russia was unable to actively engage British forces, but chose to make military moves against Sweden, who still traded with Britain. Russia invaded and took Finland, which it had long coveted. The successful conquest of Finland left only Portugal as a major port of entry for British commerce to Europe, and Britain was faced with the need to devise other methods to penetrate the Continent.
Britain responded with a new set of Orders in Council that were to do to France's commerce what France was doing to Britain's commerce. All ports that were closed to British commerce were declared blockaded and subject to the same restrictions as if a British fleet were actually posted in their roads. All trade articles from states adhering to the Continental System or their colonies were declared lawful prizes, as were the vessels that carried them. This last move further penalized the neutral states.
However, in an effort to win over the neutrals, Britain permitted direct neutral trade between any British port and any enemy colonial port, other neutral port, or enemy colonial ports not actually blockaded by a British fleet. In addition, trade with Continental ports was permitted, but this could be done only if the neutral vessel put into a British port and paid charges that were essentially equal to the import duties into Britain, before proceeding to the enemy ports.
This system favored British products, since they did not require a reexport certificate, and especially favored sugar, coffee, and cotton carried in British bottoms. The principal thrust of this plan was to force all goods bound for the Continent through British ports.
The next move was Napoleon's. On 17 December 1807 he issued the Milan Decree. This declared that all ships that submitted to a search by the British on the high seas lost their national character, were “denationalized,” and were declared lawful prizes if captured by a French or allied privateer. The decree went on to state that every vessel that put into a British port or a British colonial port was also a lawful prize.
The Milan Decree was the logical conclusion of the economic war that was building in intensity. It was declared that there were no more neutrals and forced a declaration of alliance by all states.
As a result, many neutrals now faced economic ruin. In response, the United States of America issued the Embargo Act of 1807. This resulted in so much self-inflicted punishment that it was repealed in March 1809. The Americans replaced it with the Non-Intercourse Act, which prohibited trade only with Britain, France, and their colonies. It was repealed in 1810, and new legislation was written which stated that if either belligerent repealed its decrees against American shipping, the Americans would reinstitute the sanctions of the Non-Intercourse Act against the other belligerent.
Napoleon's concern now became how to maintain his system's airtight seal against British trade and how to bring those few states outside of the Continental System into it. His next step was to invade Portugal in 1808.
The year 1808 saw broad advances for Napoleon's Continental System. Portugal was quickly overrun and Austria was forced to break with England and join the System. The Kingdom of Tuscany was annexed, as were Corsica and Elba. In Italy, only the Papal States were outside the System. This was quickly changed by a total occupation of the Italian peninsula by the end of 1808. France also occupied the Adriatic island of Corfu, another point of entry.
Table of Contents
| Foreword | vii | |
| Introduction | xiii | |
| Chapter I | The Causes of the 1812 Campaign | 1 |
| Chapter II | The French Army: Its Organization, Training and Equipment | 13 |
| Chapter III | The Armies of France's Allies | 47 |
| Chapter IV | The Organization of the Russian Army | 69 |
| Chapter V | Supply Considerations | 83 |
| Chapter VI | Preparations for the Invasion | 93 |
| Chapter VII | The Battle Is Joined | 109 |
| Chapter VIII | The Northern and Southern Operations | 129 |
| Chapter IX | Failure at Smolensk | 173 |
| Chapter X | The March on Moscow | 197 |
| Chapter XI | Kutusov Turns to Fight | 215 |
| Chapter XII | The Turning Point--The Battle of Borodino | 233 |
| Chapter XIII | The Hollow Victory | 259 |
| Chapter XIV | The Russian Northern Offensive | 271 |
| Chapter XV | The Russian Southern Offensive | 289 |
| Chapter XVI | The Nightmare at the Berezina | 315 |
| Chapter XVII | Aftermath--The French Phoenix | 333 |
| Terrain Diagrams | ||
| Engagement at Romanov, 7 March | ||
| First Battle of Polotsk, 17 June | ||
| Engagement at Mir, 28 June | ||
| Battle of Saltanovka, 11 July | ||
| Battle of Ostrowno, 13/14 July | ||
| Battle of Jakobovo, 19 July | ||
| Battle of Loubino, 7 August | ||
| Battle of Smolensk, 7 August | ||
| Battle of Gorodetchna, 12 August | ||
| Battle of Borodino, 7 September | ||
| Battle of Trautino, 6 October | ||
| Battle of Polotsk, (second battle) 18 October | ||
| Battle at Malo-Jaroslavetz, 24 October | ||
| Battle of Smoliantsy, 1 November | ||
| Battle of Krasnoe, 5 November | ||
| Battle of Berezina, 16 November | ||
| Appendix I | Treaties | 341 |
| Appendix II | Orders of Battle 1810-1811 | 387 |
| Appendix III | Orders of Battle 1812 | 421 |
| Appendix IV | Miscellaneous Documentation | 573 |
| Bibliography | 641 | |
| Index | 651 |