Neighborhood Organization and Interest-Group Processes

by David J. O'Brien

Overview

Since the end of the civil rights era in the sixties it has become increasingly clear that social and political conflicts cannot be resolved entirely at the national level. Struggles between residents of poor neighborhoods and local interest groups or public authorities present some of our most explosive domestic political problems today. This study seeks insight into these problems through an analysis of efforts during the sixties to organize the poor to pursue their interests in local decision-making processes.

David J. O'Brien holds that both organizers and scholarly observers of the grass-roots movement have failed to understand properly the process by which interest groups are formed. Arguing that the demise of neighborhood organization cannot be attributed to supposedly unique social, psychological, or cultural characteristics of the poor, he develops an analytical framework that emphasizes the strategic role of incentives and organizational resource problems. This framework helps explain not only the failure of organizers in the sixties to grasp the problems of interest group formation, but also the assumptions that prevented them from identifying the source of their frustration. The author assesses the different approaches that have been taken to neighborhood organization, and outlines a model for future efforts.

Originally published in 1976.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691613482
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	03/08/2015
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #1792
Pages:	278
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.70(d)

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Neighborhood Organization and Interest-Group Processes

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By David J. O'Brien

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1975 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-09363-5

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CHAPTER 1

Incentives and Individual Support for Collective Action

Here the problem of inducing the poor to support neighborhood organizations is analytically defined. Because the residents of a poor neighborhood have a latent or potential basis of common interest, the problem of persuading them to support collective efforts is analytically similar to the problem which faces other aggregates with latent common interests, such as workers or members of a profession. All of these aggregates must cope with the problem of devising a way to induce individuals to pay for the "costs" of collective action. Even in unions, which are controlled by an oligarchy, workers must pay their dues and must support a strike when it is called or the union will not persist as a collective bargaining agent. Similarly, professional associations must persuade their members to pay dues in order to support collective lobbying efforts. My contention is that the neighborhood organization faces a similar problem in that it must convince the poor to pay for the costs, such as time, money, and effort, of the collective benefits which the organization can bring them.

Why are neighborhood organizations, by and large, unable to induce the support of the poor when other aggregates such as workers and professionals have succeeded in organizing for collective efforts? I argue that the fundamental reason for the failure of neighborhood-organization efforts lies not in any peculiar social-psychological or cultural characteristics of the poor but rather in the inability of these organizations to solve a problem which all interest groups must solve. This problem, as defined in Mancur Olson's (1965) public goods theory of interest groups, is that individuals in a large aggregate will not voluntarily pay for the costs of collective goods even if they are all rational men and are aware that they will receive individual benefits from these goods. In order to persuade individuals to pay for collective goods, an interest group must either provide a device with which members can coerce themselves into paying for the costs of the goods or provide, in addition to the collective goods, some kind of selective individual benefit.

The public goods approach to neighborhood organization differs from the more conventional sociological approach, which views social organization as a necessary precondition for interest-group organization. It is my view, however, that political and social organization can develop simultaneously in previously disorganized areas, such as urban slums, if individuals receive incentives to support such organization.

The Neighborhood as a Latent Interest Group

Can the neighborhood be considered a latent or potential basis of common interests for its residents in the same sense that a class can be considered to be a latent basis of common interest for its members? In speaking of a latent basis of common interest I am using the same analytical approach which Weber employed in his classic discussion of class. According to Weber, we can speak of individuals having an objective basis of common interest if we can find an objective principle which places these individuals, as an aggregate, in a conflict of interests vis-a-vis another aggregate of individuals and if this objective basis of common interest exists whether or not individuals are conscious of their common interests and whether or not they do anything about these interests (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 180–195).

Thus, classes are defined in terms of their positions in the marketplace; workers and owners occupy opposing class-positions in the labor market; buyers and sellers occupy opposing class-positions in the commodity market; and creditors and debtors occupy opposing class-positions in the credit market (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 180–195; Wiley, 1967a).

The principle which defines the latent common interests of neighborhood residents is found in the nature of public service-delivery systems in the United States. A host of public services, including schools, parks, garbage collection, and police protection, are delivered to neighborhoods. Since the quality and quantity of these services varies considerably from one neighborhood to another, the nature of the public services that an individual receives is dependent in large measure on which neighborhood he lives in. Since all individuals within a particular neighborhood are similarly affected by the quantity and quality of services the neighborhood receives, they have a latent or potential basis of common interest. This does not mean that residents of a neighborhood are necessarily aware of their common interests and/or that they will see collective action as a reasonable course of action, but it is safe to say that if the quality and quantity of services in a neighborhood are improved all of the residents will benefit.

Most important, the relationship between the neighborhood and service-delivery systems provides a latent basis of conflict between (1) the neighborhood and the public bureaucracies which deliver services to them, and between (2) the neighborhood and other neighborhoods within the city.

The potential basis of conflict between the neighborhood and the public bureaucracies which deliver services to it arises from the fact that on the one hand neighborhood residents have a latent basis of common interest in improving the quality of services they receive, but on the other hand, because of their organizational maintenance needs, public bureaucracies have an interest in keeping those services to a minimum. Given the fiscal crises in which most cities presently find themselves, there is simply not enough money to provide adequate services in all neighborhoods. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect that these public bureaucracies will try, if possible, to "skimp" on a particular neighborhood's services.

The inherent conflict between public bureaucracies and neighborhoods explains why poor neighborhoods seem to be so slighted by the bureaucracies. Until recently, at least, poor neighborhoods were the most politically impotent in the city and therefore were most likely to be slighted when the public agency had to choose where to distribute its services. Undoubtedly, some officials in public agencies discriminate against poor neighborhoods because they feel the poor deserve it, or because the poor are black or Latin, but the more basic reason for the conflict between the neighborhood and public bureaucracies seems to lie in the organizational maintenance needs of the bureaucracies. For example, civil rights groups are probably justified in their claim that police departments engage in far more brutality or just plain harassment in poor black neighborhoods than they do in more affluent neighborhoods, but the fact is that police departments are continually pressured by property owners and the middleclass public to use more efficient methods to enforce "law and order." Because the poor live in high crime-rate areas, they are more likely than those who live in more affluent neighborhoods to be adversely effected by efficient, but often illegal, methods such as "stop and frisk" or the dragnet (Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 1968).

The relationship between neighborhoods and public service-delivery systems also means that different neighborhoods within the city must compete with one another to get more public services. As I have mentioned, there is usually an inadequate amount of money or personnel in any service area and, thus, some neighborhoods can be expected to get more than others. This point is extremely important to keep in mind when considering the political activity of the poor. There has been much confusion about the organization of the poor because we have often failed to realize that service-delivery systems often provide a potential basis for conflict between poor neighborhoods.

To clarify the issue we can make a distinction between three kinds of public services which affect the lives of the poor: (1) welfare services such as ADC which have a similar effect on poor people regardless of where they live in the city; (2) welfare services such as child-care centers and "demonstration projects" which can vary considerably from one poor neighborhood to another; and (3) public services such as schools, parks, garbage collection, and police protection which everyone in the city receives but which can vary considerably from one neighborhood to another.

There is conflict between the poor and public bureaucracies with respect to all three kinds of issues, but the nature of the conflict varies from one kind of issue to another. If we are considering the first kind of public-service issue, the poor, as an aggregate within the city, have a latent basis of common interest. The quality and quantity of ADC services, for example, affects the poor irrespective of where they live. However, the second and third kind of public services are delivered to neighborhoods and, therefore, the aggregate of poor persons within a particular poor neighborhood have a latent basis of common interest and these issues can provide a basis for conflict between different poor neighborhoods. If the issue is where to put a demonstration child-care center or where to improve garbage collection, for example, there is a strong objective basis of conflict between different neighborhoods because limited resources demand that some neighborhoods get more than others. Thus, while the first kind of issue has the potential to unite the poor politically around their common condition of poverty, the second and third kinds of issues have the potential to hamper efforts to create city-wide organizations of poor people. In addition, divisiveness is exacerbated when a city's poor population is separated by different ethnic and/or racial neighborhoods, each vying for better public services for "its own."

Essentially, then, the residents within an individual poor neighborhood do have a latent basis of common interest and thus an objective reason for developing an interest-group organization. Unlike many other aggregates in similar circumstances, however, poor neighborhoods remain disorganized and without political power. They frequently organize around a specific issue, such as urban renewal or police brutality, but these efforts normally dissipate once the issue is resolved (Turner, 1968). Therefore, the next question we must deal with is, why is it so hard to mobilize poor neighborhoods for sustained collective efforts?

Why Don't Poor Neighborhoods Organize?

Before considering the specific problem of organizing poor neighborhoods it will be helpful to examine whether or not the structural conditions of our society today are conducive to the development of interest groups in general. Most scholars agree that historically a large number of aggregates with common interests have managed to form interest groups to help them pursue those interests. The transformation of the disorganized immigrant masses into political interest groups (Banfield and Wilson, 1963 : 38–44, 50–51; Fuchs, 1968; Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Handlin, 1951: 201–226) and the government's role in developing countervailing power for disadvantaged groups (Galbraith, 1956: 135–153) are among the most impressive examples of the ways that interest groups have emerged in our society to meet the needs of various aggregates. Yet, during the past few decades a number of writers have questioned whether we are seeing the end of interest-group politics because we are developing into a mass society (Fromm, 1941; Nisbet, 1962; Mills, 1956) and/or are being ruled by a power elite (Mills, 1956).

Empirical data show that, despite urbanization and bureaucratization of national life, we have not approached a mass society. Axelrod (1956) and Greer (1956) found that individuals are not as isolated in an urban milieu as the mass-society writers suggest and that a substantial portion of urban dwellers have regular intimate interaction with others, especially kin. Glazer and Moynihan (1963) show that ethnic subcultures and associations still provide a meaningful basis of identification for New Yorkers, and Herberg (1960) argues that when ethnicity is no longer a relevant basis of identification it is often replaced by religion. In addition, empirical studies show that ethnic identification is manifested in voting behavior and party identification (Dahl, 1961: 34–35, 44–50; Banfield and Wilson, 1963: 229–230; Wolfinger, 1965), and even has an effect on types of city government (Gordon, 1968). Similarly, empirical studies show that religious identification (Lenski, 1963), racial identification (Olsen, 1970), and regional and class identification (Lipset, 1960) are all reflected in organized political activity.

I am not suggesting, of course, that there has not been any centralization of power in the United States during the past few decades, nor am I dismissing Mills' (1956) claims about the post-World War II ascendency of the military, the defense industry, and the executive branch of government. Nevertheless, I find the evidence does support the contention that structural conditions in our society still permit the growth of a host of interest groups which manage to exert influence in national and local affairs. Consequently, we will have to seek other explanations for the inability of poor neighborhoods to organize. One such explanation is derived from pluralist interest-group theory.

Pluralist Interest-Group Theory

The basic thesis of pluralist interest-group theory (Commons, 1959; Bentley, 1949; Truman, 1958) is that interest groups will emerge in a pluralist society when individuals have a need for them. Central to the pluralisms argument is the notion that men are rational and self-interested. The pluralist contends that when an aggregate of rational self-interested men realize that they have interests in common and that they will all benefit from collective action, an organized interest group will develop.

The pluralist assumes that the resources for interest-group development are available to everyone in our society, although most of the time most people do not use these resources. Dahl notes that:

Most of the time, as we have already seen, most citizens use their resources for purposes other than gaining influence over government decisions. There is a great gap between their actual influence and their potential influence. Their political resources are, so to speak, slack in the system. In some circumstances these resources might be converted from non-political to political purposes; if so, the gap between the actual influence of the average citizen and his potential influence would narrow.

The existence of a great deal of political slack seems to be a characteristic of pluralistic political systems and the liberal societies in which these systems operate. In liberal societies, politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life. Even when citizens use their resources to gain influence, ordinarily they do not seek to influence officials or politicians but family members, friends, associates, employees, customers, business firms, and other persons engaged in non-governmental activities. A complete study of the ways in which people use their resources to influence others would require a total examination of social life. Government, in the sense used here, is only a fragment of social life [1961: 305],

However, the pluralist states that when a man's personal interests are threatened he will use his resources for political purposes. When a large aggregate of men are similarly affected by personal suffering or dislocation, the pluralist expects that an interest group will arise to fill their needs. According to the pluralisms thesis, therefore, we would expect to find the highest rate of associational development during periods of great personal suffering and dislocation. Mancur Olson points out, however, that the history of labor-union development in the United States and Great Britain does not follow this principle. It was not during the years of greatest dislocation and economic hardship that unions formed, but rather during periods when the conditions facing workers began to improve somewhat (1965: 123). I am not suggesting, of course, that "suffering" is unrelated to interest-group formation, but simply noting that it is not a sufficient condition to account for the development of viable collective organizations.

(Continues...)

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Table of Contents

• Frontmatter, pg. i
• Contents, pg. vii
• Preface, pg. ix
• Introduction, pg. 1
• CHAPTER ONE. Incentives and Individual Support for Collective Action, pg. 7
• CHAPTER TWO. Resource Needs and Environmental Problems, pg. 43
• CHAPTER THREE. Community Development, pg. 64
• CHAPTER FOUR. Social Action-Protest Strategies, pg. 93
• CHAPTER FIVE. Community Action Programs, pg. 130
• CHAPTER SIX. Variations in Development in Local Community Action Programs, pg. 153
• CHAPTER SEVEN. The Future of Neighborhood Organization, pg. 175
• References, pg. 223
• Index, pg. 249