"No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar": Sherman's Carolinas Campaign from Fayetteville to Averasboro, March 1865
248
"No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar": Sherman's Carolinas Campaign from Fayetteville to Averasboro, March 1865
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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781611216639 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Savas Beatie |
| Publication date: | 01/15/2025 |
| Pages: | 248 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x (d) |
About the Author
Colonel (Ret) Wade Sokolosky is a graduate of East Carolina University and a 25-year veteran of the U.S. Army. Wade is the co-author (with Mark A. Smith) of “No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar”: Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign from Fayetteville to Averasboro, and the author of Final Roll Call: Confederate Losses during the Carolinas Campaign.
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CHAPTER 1
"Where other people live we can, even if they have to starve or move away."
— Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman
The Carolinas Campaign Begins
Major General William T. Sherman's Carolinas Campaign spanned the final months of the Civil War, when the Confederacy faced a dire military situation. In Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was fighting desperately to defend the Confederate capital of Richmond and the vital rail junction at Petersburg. In December 1864, Gen. John B. Hood's Army of Tennessee was shattered at Nashville by Union Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas's Army of the Cumberland, leaving it a shell of its former self. More recently, Sherman had presented the captured Atlantic seaboard city of Savannah, Georgia, to President Abraham Lincoln as a "Christmas gift."
The fall of Savannah was a tremendous blow to Southern morale, but it was Sherman's drive to the coast from Atlanta that had proved more damaging to the Confederacy's economic war effort. Sherman's march had sliced through the Confederate heartland and disrupted the flow of vital logistical resources that Georgia provided to the Southern cause.
Sherman was already in deep discussion with the Union army's commander-in-chief, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, as to his next move. Grant's first thought was to transfer Sherman's army north to Virginia to join him in confronting Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Grant wrote, "I had no idea originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North Carolina."
Grant, too, was concerned about the weather. The winter of 1864 had been one of the rainiest in memory. Grant knew that torrential rains had rendered most roads impassable and that the terrible weather would cause Sherman's army much trouble when attempting to maneuver.
Sherman had other ideas. "Sherman realized that by marching his army through the Carolinas," commented historian Mark L. Bradley, "he would inevitably cut Lee's supply lines to the Deep South and induce hundreds — if not thousands — of Lee's troops from that region to desert." His march through Georgia had demonstrated the devastating effect an army could have on an enemy's transportation and supply networks. If Sherman marched his army through the Carolinas, it would eviscerate what little remained of the Confederacy.
This argument convinced Grant, and on December 27, 1864, he instructed his trusted lieutenant to "make your preparations to start on your expedition without delay." Grant directed Sherman to "break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can."
Such an undertaking was fraught with risk, but Grant had confidence in Sherman's abilities as a military commander. This confidence stemmed from their close personal relationship, forged through several of the war's most successful campaigns earlier in the war. Sherman served under Grant in some of the most significant clashes of the Western Theater, including Shiloh, the drives on Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, and emerged from these battles as a trusted subordinate who demonstrated the skills needed to conduct independent operations. Grant's confidence was then fully vindicated by Sherman's independent leadership in the Atlanta campaign, followed by the March to the Sea.
Success had not always come easy to Sherman. Following his graduation from West Point in 1840, he served 13 uneventful years in the army before resigning his commission to pursue civilian job opportunities. For the next six years, he tried his hand, unsuccessfully, at banking and law. In 1859, with the help of two former Army comrades, Braxton Bragg and Pierre G. T. Beauregard, Sherman secured a position as the superintendent of the Louisiana State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy (the forerunner of LSU). From this time in Louisiana plus his military tours in South Carolina and Florida earlier in his military career, the Ohio-born Sherman came to know, like, and understand Southerners. His insight into the southern psyche would serve him well in the coming campaigns.
Following Louisiana's secession in January 1861, Sherman resigned his superintendent position and returned to Federal service, accepting a commission as colonel of the 13th U.S. Infantry Regiment. His tenure with the regiment proved short-lived, and he soon found himself in command of a volunteer brigade at the July 1861 battle of Bull Run. His brigade was one of the few to hold steady during that unfolding Union fiasco. Thereafter, Sherman was transferred to the Western Theater, where he eventually came to serve under Grant. Over two years of hard-won Union victories, coupled with a few sharp tactical reverses, the two generals emerged as the Union's most successful command partnership.
Following Grant's overwhelming victory at Chattanooga in November 1863, Congress reinstated the rank of lieutenant general, previously held only by George Washington, and the quiet Grant was promoted to that rank as commander of all Federal armies. President Lincoln summoned him to Washington, where Grant designed a grand strategy that was ultimately to win the war for the Union. The new general-in-chief intended to exert constant, unremitting pressure on the limited resources of the Confederacy by campaigning on all fronts simultaneously, thereby preventing the Confederates from shifting forces to offset their numerical inferiority. Grant would maintain his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, leaving Sherman to command all Union forces in the Western Theater.
Sherman proved up to the challenge. From Chattanooga to Savannah, his ability to wage war became more and more evident. With the capture of Atlanta on September 2, 1864, Sherman's reputation and popularity soared. More importantly, the love and admiration of the men who served under him grew steadfast. His subsequent march across Georgia to the coast, foregoing a supply line while living his army off the land, proved to be a devastating psychological blow to the Confederacy.
As he prepared to move north from the coast of Georgia through the Carolinas, Sherman set forth two key strategic goals, both of which would have serious consequences for Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. First, a march through the Carolinas would break the back of the Confederate logistics system, depriving the Confederacy of its ability to sustain Lee's army. Second, Sherman's imposition of "hard war" would have a serious effect on the morale of those Carolinians serving in the Army of Northern Virginia. Some units nearly dissolved overnight as anxious men deserted in hopes of reaching their families and homes that lay in the path of Sherman's army.
In designing his expedition through the Carolinas, Sherman drew upon invaluable experience gained during the March to the Sea. He would cut loose from his army's latest logistical base at Savannah and subsist his army off the land as it moved. His concept for supplying his army was simple: "Where other people live we can, even if they have to starve or move away." As his army drove north, eviscerating the Carolinas, Sherman planned to link up with other Union forces, which would advance inland from the coast. These forces would merge at Goldsboro, a key railroad junction in the Tar Heel State. The combined armies would then be linked to the Union-occupied coast by rail.
In January of 1865, Grant ordered an expedition against the Confederate bastion at Fort Fisher to support his trusted lieutenant's planned movement into North Carolina. Located at the mouth of the Cape Fear River, Fort Fisher protected Confederate blockade-runners attempting to penetrate the Union naval cordon and reach the critical port city of Wilmington. The defenders of Fort Fisher had already held out against a Federal amphibious force in December 1864, ineptly led by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler. This time Grant chose Bvt. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry's Provisional Corps to make the expedition against Fort Fisher. Terry's command consisted of elements from his former XXIV Corps and units from the XXV Corps. Rear Admiral David D. Porter's North Atlantic Squadron, stationed offshore, would support Terry's expedition. If Terry could reduce Fort Fisher and close the Confederacy's last major seaport at Wilmington, Sherman would have a safe haven on the coast halfway between Petersburg and Savannah should he require one. More importantly, occupying Wilmington would enable Sherman to move reinforcements and supplies via the Cape Fear River as far north as Fayetteville. The river port town of Fayetteville thus became an intermediate objective for Sherman's invasion of North Carolina.
In addition to force and logistics, Sherman's plan also employed deception. When he invaded the Palmetto State, Sherman planned to feint simultaneously toward Augusta, Georgia, and Charleston, South Carolina. In so doing, he would compel the Confederate high command — which included his old friends Pierre G. T. Beauregard and Braxton Bragg — to divide their already outnumbered forces to defend both cities. After he reached the interior of South Carolina, Sherman would turn his columns toward Columbia, the state capital, and, after its capture he would continue north. Upon departing South Carolina, and uniting with the forces from the coast, Sherman's next objective would either be Raleigh, the Tar Heel state capital, or the important railroad town of Weldon. He would then be within a week's march of Grant's forces at Petersburg. Sherman wanted his army to be able to cooperate with Grant's final push in Virginia in the spring.
Sherman executed a combination of land- and sea-based movements designed to concentrate both wings of his army and his cavalry at strategic points on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River. During the March to the Sea, his army had moved as two separate wings, an arrangement that had worked well. Sherman intended to retain this organizational scheme for the Carolinas Campaign.
Deployment by "wings" permitted a field commander to divide a large force into two separate columns, both focused on a single objective. The wings facilitated movement by relieving congestion along routes of march and, in the case of large armies such as Sherman's, expanded the ability to forage over a wider area. The parallel wings formation required ample terrain to maneuver, which is why both the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia had discontinued use of the formation early in the conflict. Another problem that would concern Sherman later in the Carolinas Campaign was the fact that a wings formation is vulnerable to a concentrated enemy. Therefore, it was imperative that the wings remain within a mutually supportive distance in the event that one of them made contact with a large enemy force.
In order to make certain that neither wing would outpace the other, Sherman imposed control measures on his commanders. Each wing commander adhered to a strict movement table that was adjusted daily based upon that commander's reported progress. In this fashion, Sherman retained close control of his wings and ensured ease of concentration of his army if necessary.
Use of the wing formation required excellent communications, a highly trained army, and competent leaders. Interestingly, all of Sherman's major subordinates were rejects from the Army of the Potomac. The Right Wing, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, consisted of the XV and XVII corps, while the Left Wing, commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, consisted of the XIV and XX corps. The cavalry, led by Bvt. Maj. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick, operated independently under Sherman's direct guidance. All told, Sherman had a combined force of over 60,000 campaign-hardened veterans "burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance" upon South Carolina, which they blamed for bringing about the hated Rebellion.
During the early weeks of January, the army's subordinate commanders made their designated movements under the most difficult conditions. Shortages of supplies and transportation assets, combined with poor weather, delayed Sherman's departure from Savannah. January's winter rains had flooded most of the low-country regions, raising the water levels of rivers and local tributaries, creating natural obstacles that either slowed or halted the troops altogether. The terrible weather conditions, and the havoc they wreaked on his logistics, delayed Sherman's departure by several weeks.
Due to the delays Sherman encountered at Savannah, Terry captured Fort Fisher on January 15, 1865, prior to the main army's departure. Terry's success pleased Sherman, who understood its value to his logistical plans. "The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on my campaign," he wrote to Grant, "and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its intrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point of security on the seaboard." Sherman's ability to resupply his army either by wagon or rail from the coast or by utilizing the Cape Fear River increased his confidence and expanded the possibilities for his coming campaign in North Carolina.
After the veritable destruction of John Bell Hood's army at Nashville, Grant had transferred Schofield's XXIII Corps to the North Carolina coast from Tennessee, to support the upcoming operation to capture Wilmington. By appointing Schofield as overall commander for the Wilmington expedition, Grant intended to both reinforce Terry's upcoming assault on Wilmington and support Sherman's movement into North Carolina. Elements of Schofield's corps reinforced Terry at Wilmington, while other elements reinforced the Union garrison occupying New Bern farther up the coast. The combination of Schofield's operations and Sherman's advance through the Carolinas would complicate the defensive options available to the Confederate forces operating in North Carolina.
As his subordinate commanders prepared for the campaign, Sherman focused on the logistical problem of supporting a large army operating far from a major supply depot. He expected his army to reach Goldsboro by early March, where he hoped to refit his formations before marching northward into Virginia. However, he would have to establish a logistical infrastructure in eastern North Carolina capable of supporting the flow and buildup of supplies and war materiel at Goldsboro. In early January, the limited infrastructure available in the coastal towns of New Bern and Morehead City hindered any large-scale buildup. Accordingly, Sherman placed a high priority on the planning and execution of the crucial supply aspect of the forthcoming operation. He deemed logistics so critical to the success of his upcoming campaign that he ordered his chief quartermaster, Bvt. Brig. Gen. Langdon Easton, and his chief of commissary, Col. Amos Beckwith, to travel up the coast and provide the necessary supervision for the massive supply buildup in North Carolina.
Sherman also recognized the strategic importance of New Bern as a rail link to Goldsboro. The Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad, partially controlled by the Federals since Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's 1862 New Bern expedition, required significant repair and upgrading before large quantities of men and materiel could be moved inland to support Sherman's army. At the start of the Carolinas Campaign, this railroad connected the seaport at Morehead City to the outskirts of New Bern. Realizing the necessity of this rail line, Sherman directed Col. W. W. Wright, Chief Engineer of Military Railroads, to supervise repairs from New Bern to Goldsboro.
On February 1, with most of his infantry divisions and Kilpatrick's cavalry across the Savannah River, Sherman ordered his commanders to initiate the campaign the following day. Despite all the difficulties posed by weather and logistics, Sherman's grand army was once again on the move. As he had done during the March to the Sea, Sherman sent Slocum's and Howard's wings off on simultaneous movements that deceived the Confederates as to his real objective. The two wings moved along a front measuring roughly 40 miles across, creating the illusion that Sherman was simultaneously threatening Augusta and Charleston.
General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, commander of the Military Division of the West, was responsible for organizing an effective Confederate response to Sherman's drive north. Under him were the forces of Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee, commander of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, elements of Lt. Gen. General Stephen D. Lee's corps from the Army of Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry corps, and the Georgia state militia, commanded by Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith. Confederate manpower had become severely depleted, however, and at the outset of the campaign Beauregard faced a determined enemy of over 60,000 men with but 15,000 of his own.
On February 2, Beauregard convened a council of war near Augusta, Georgia, to evaluate his options. The council discussed the possibility of concentrating their forces at Branchville, South Carolina, where they might muster enough force to pose a reasonable threat to Sherman. Beauregard, however, had high hopes for an upcoming peace conference in Virginia, and he therefore believed that he should defend the cities of Augusta and Charleston rather than venture forth to give battle. His decision to divide his forces instead of concentrating them, observed historian Mark L. Bradley, "played directly into Sherman's hands, and the Federal advance through South Carolina was virtually unopposed."
(Continues…)
Excerpted from ""No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar""
by .
Copyright © 2017 Mark A. Smith and Wade Sokolosky.
Excerpted by permission of Savas Beatie LLC.
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Table of Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments xiii
Foreword to the Savas Beatie Edition Mark L. Bradley xviii
Chapter 1 The Carolinas Campaign Begins 1
Chapter 2 Sherman Enters North Carolina 21
Chapter 3 Fayetteville Experiences the Hard Hand of War 47
Chapter 4 On to Goldsboro through Averasboro 62
Chapter 5 Hardee's Defense-in-Depth 88
Chapter 6 Sherman's Assault on the Third Line 120
Chapter 7 A Critical Analysis of the Actions from Fayetteville to Averasboro 133
Appendix A Driving Tour From Fayetteville to Averasboro 147
Appendix B Order of Battle at Averasboro, March 15-16, 1865 167
Appendix C Sherman's Logistic Concept for the Carolines Campaign 175
Appendix D Averasboro Field Hospitals 191
Appendix E Janie Smith's Letter 203
Appendix F The Lost Gunners Quadrant 209
Appendix G Ensign William H. Hanks Letter 212
Bibliography 214
Index 223