The New York Times Book Review - James Ryerson
In his finely written, compactly argued book On Human Nature, [Scruton] sets out to defend human uniquenesswithout denying that "human beings are animals, governed by the laws of biology." His contention is that human beings are animals but also "persons," by which he means "free, self-conscious, rational agents, obedient to reason and bound by the moral law." Personhood, in this view, is not some extra thing to be placed supernaturally atop our organism selves. But neither is it something reducible to our biology. Rather, Scruton argues, our animal nature and our personhood are two distinct, contrasting aspects of us. One or the other comes into focus depending on what sort of questions we ask about ourselves. Science has much to say about one aspect, but not about the other.
The Economist
"On Human Nature is a tour de force of a rare kind. In clear, elegant prose it makes large claims in metaphysics, morals and, by implication, politics."
From the Publisher
One of Blackwell’s Best of Non-Fiction 2017
Library Journal
02/15/2017
Scruton's (The Soul of the World) latest book is a collection of four short essays, three of which are revised from Charles E. Test memorial lectures presented at Princeton University. Although engaging, these essays are written for academics and can be somewhat bewildering and intractable to wider audiences. Scruton begins the first chapter by claiming that we are essentially physical, biological animals, but he ultimately rejects this view, concluding that we are embodied, incarnate persons, where persons are emergent entities that are irreducible to the sum of their parts. What differentiates persons from other emergent entities, he says, is that they laugh, judge other persons morally responsible, see themselves as moral agents persisting through time, and are free. Scruton's claim that personhood is irreducible to biological organisms allows him to sidestep the debate concerning whether freedom is compatible with determinism; causal determinism might be true of the physical world but not necessarily the emergent world—that is, so long as reductionism is not true of personhood. This is a novel yet precarious way to avoid questions of freedom and its apparent inconsistency with the scientific assumption of determinism. VERDICT Recommended for all academic libraries.—William Simkulet, Cleveland State Univ., OH