Operation Bagration, 23 June-29 August 1944: The Rout Of The German Forces In Belorussia

by Richard Harrison (Translator)

Overview

The Rout of the German-Fascist Troops in Belorussia in 1944 covers the Red Army's Belorussian strategic operation: the linchpin of the 10 major Soviet offensive efforts launched that year to clear the country of the invader. During the course of this operation, the German position along the western strategic direction was destroyed and the stage was set for an advance into Poland and Germany. The success of this operation also set the stage for the Red Army's subsequent advance into the Baltic and South-Eastern Europe. Like most works generated by the General Staff, the Belorussian study divides the operation into two parts: preparation and conduct. The first deals with the massive efforts by the First Baltic and the First, Second and Third Belorussian Fronts to accumulate the men and materiel to break through the German defenses in the swampy and forested terrain of Belorussia. This section contains valuable information on the overall correlation of forces, equipment and troops' densities along the breakthrough sectors and Soviet plans for supplying the offensive, as well as detailed information regarding the employment of the various combat arms. The second part deals with the actual conduct of the several front operations that comprised the overall effort. This section covers the initial breakthrough battles and the encirclement of the Vitebsk and Bobruisk garrisons, followed by the capture of Minsk and the encirclement of sizeable German forces east of the city. The narrative then continues with the follow-on operations to cut off German forces in the Baltic States and to seize crossings over the Vistula River in Eastern Poland. Compiled and written by professional staff officers, this study provides a detailed look at the conduct of one of the major operations of the Second World War. This latest work, along with other studies in this series, offers another insight into the Red Army's conduct of the war at the operational-strategic level.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781912174553
Publisher:	Helion and Company
Publication date:	12/22/2016
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	534
File size:	11 MB
Note:	This product may take a few minutes to download.

About the Author

Richard W. Harrison earned his undergraduate and master’s degrees from Georgetown University, where he specialized in Russian area studies. He later earned his doctorate in War Studies from King’s College London. He also was an exchange student in the former Soviet Union and spent several years living and working in post-communist Russia. Harrison has worked for the US Department of Defense as an investigator in Russia, dealing with cases involving POWs and MIAs. He has also taught Russian history and military history at the college and university level, most recently at the US Military Academy at West Point.Harrison is the author of two books dealing with the Red Army’s theoretical development during the interwar period: The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904- 1940 (2001), and Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson (2010). He is also the translator and editor of The Battle of Moscow 1941-1942: The Red Army’s Defensive Operations and Counter-Offensive Along the Moscow Strategic Direction (2015). He is currently working on a history of the Red Army’s high commands during World War II and afterwards. Dr. Harrison lives with his family near Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Table of Contents

Contents vii

List of Maps ix

List of Tables x

Preface to the English-Language Edition xiv

Volume I The Preparation for the Belorussian Operation of 1944 15

Preface to the Russian edition 17

Introduction 19

Part 1 The Military-Political Situation by the Summer of 1944, the Plan for the Belorussian Operation and the Stavka of the Supreme High Command's Measures for Preparing the Operation 23

1 The Situation at the Beginning of the Belorussian Operation of 1944 25

2 The Plan of the Belorussian Operation and Measures by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command for its Preparation 48

Conclusions to Part 1 59

Part 2 Operational Preparation at the Front Level 63

3 Decisions of the Front and Army Commanders 65

4 The Planning of the Front and Army Operations 107

5 Planning the Employment of Artillery, Armored Forces and Aviation I 116

6 Operational Support 155

7 Engineering Support 162

8 Party-Political Support 170

9 Materiel and Medical Support 181

10 The Organization of Control and Communications 194

11 Operational Preparation of the Command and Staffs, The Combat Training of the Troops 203

12 Regroupings, Concern ration of the Troops and Occupying the Jumping-off Positions 206

Conclusions to Part 2 221

Supplement: An Operational-Tactical Description of the Terrain Covered by the Belorussian Operation 1944 232

Volume 2 The Conduct of the Belorussian Offensive Operation of 1944 237

Preface to the Russian Edition 238

Part 1 The Operations First Stage (23 June-4 July, 1944) The Defeat of the Main Forces of Army Group Center and the Creation of Conditions for the Development of the Offensive 239

1 A Brief Review of Military Operations during the First Stage of the Multi-Front Belorussian Offensive Operation of 1944 241

2 The First Baltic Front's Vitebsk-Polotsk Offensive Operation (23 June-4 July 1944) 249

3 The Third Belorussian Front's Vitebsk-Minsk Offensive Operation (23 June-4 July 1944) 261

4 The Second Belorussian Fronts Mogilev-Minsk Offensive Operation (23 June-13 July 1944) 289

5 The First Belorussian Front's Bobruisk-Slutsk Offensive Operation (24 June-4 July 1944) 306

Part 2 The Second Stage of the Belorussian Operation (5 July-2 August, 1944 The Development of the Offensive, the Defeat of the Enemy's Arriving Reserves and the Soviet Forces' Arrival at the Borders of East Prussia 341

6 A Brief Review of Military Operations during the Second Stage of the Multi-Front Belorussian Operation of 1944 343

7 Tire First Baltic Front's Dvinsk-Siauliai Offensive Operation (5-31 July 1944) 356

8 The Third Belorussian Front's Vilnius-Kaunas Offensive Operation (5-31 July 1944) 370

9 The Second Belorussian Front's Bialystok Offensive Operation (5-31 July 1944) 388

10 The First Belorussian Front's Baranovichi-Slonisn Offensive Operation (5-16 July 1944) 396

11 The First Belorussian Front's Brest- Siedlce Offensive Operation (17 July-2 August 1944) 416

12 A Brief Review of Military Operations in August 1944 459

Conclusions on the Conduct of the Belorussian Operation 470

Results and Conclusions of the Belorussian Operation of 1944 475

Supplement 518

Index 520

Editorial Reviews

"...those interested in understanding some of the intricacies associated with the planning and implementation of one of the most successful Red Army operations in the Second World War will find this volume quite useful. Specifically the details the author(s) go into when describing initial preparations, tactics utilized by units in the beginning of the offensive, the continuous attempts to adapt to the ever-changing situation as the offensive took shape and commanders soon realized that initial expectations were surpassed by the victories achieved in the field, etc., make for compelling reading."

WWII and other Book Reviews

… the details the author(s) go into when describing initial preparations, tactics utilized by units in the beginning of the offensive, the continuous attempts to adapt to the ever-changing situation as the offensive took shape and commanders soon realized that initial expectations were surpassed by the victories achieved in the field, etc., make for compelling reading…

Kunikov’s Reviews

… the details the author(s) go into when describing initial preparations, tactics utilized by units in the beginning of the offensive, the continuous attempts to adapt to the ever-changing situation as the offensive took shape and commanders soon realized that initial expectations were surpassed by the victories achieved in the field, etc., make for compelling reading…

Kunikov’s Reviews

… the details the author(s) go into when describing initial preparations, tactics utilized by units in the beginning of the offensive, the continuous attempts to adapt to the ever-changing situation as the offensive took shape and commanders soon realized that initial expectations were surpassed by the victories achieved in the field, etc., make for compelling reading…

Kunikov Reviews