Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
Preparing for the comeback
In the spring of 1943 the third phase in the Pacific war was just about to open. The first had seen Japan, triumphant everywhere, conquer the whole of South-East Asia and the western Pacific. The second had seen her attempt to extend this control still further, in the direction of Australia and Hawaii, and to be defeated decisively at the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal and Papua. Due to the loss of four fleet carriers at Midway, two battleships and many smaller naval craft at Guadalcanal, and of hundreds of aircraft and crews in all four campaigns, it was clear that Japan would be mainly on the defensive in this third phase; indeed, operational orders to the Japanese commanders in the south-west Pacific stressed that they were 'to retain all positions in the Solomons and New Guinea'. For the first time in the war in the East, the Allies had the initiative, if they could use it. But this is hardly to say that the end was in sight for Japan. In fact, going on the defensive in early 1943 was only to assume the policy which had been originally advocated before the Imperial Navy's optimism had tempted it to go further, against Midway and the Solomons. This policy — stoutly defending a strongly-fortified ring of island bases and throwing back all American attacks until Washington finally agreed to negotiate a peace that would recognise the essential parts of Japan's conquests — was now to be put to the test.
Whatever route (or routes) the Allies chose for their comeback seemed to promise a host of military difficulties. Japan, by her early conquests, had surrounded herself with concentric rings of defence which would slow down any offensive and allow her, exploiting her internal lines of communication, to rush reinforcements to the threatened area. On the map the possibilities seemed many, but most of them could be quickly discounted. An offensive from Russia was excluded by Stalin's blank refusal to wage war in Asia until Germany had been defeated. An attack from China was also ruled out, after much discussion, because of supply difficulties and the general unreliability of the Chinese. The North Pacific route, geographically the most direct from the United States, suffered from a lack of bases and was constantly subjected to storms and fogs. A return route through South-East Asia was a possibility but could hardly be contemplated since the British troops and equipment were totally inadequate for this task, and there was little prospect of any large-scale reinforcement; in any case, a campaign to seize Burma, Sumatra, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies might take years and would still leave the Allies many thousands of miles from Tokyo. With all these possibilities so patently unsuitable or impossible, there remained only a counteroffensive across the vast expanses of the Pacific itself.
Such a route had long been regarded as the most likely for another reason — the fact that from the time the possibility of a comeback was first discussed, it had been obvious that the United States would play the decisive role. Still far from settled, however, was the question of whether this American-led thrust would be along a New Guinea-Philippines axis, or along a Central Pacific axis, driving straight through the various island groups of Micronesia. Both routes had their advocates.
General MacArthur, C-in-C South-West Pacific, led the call for the New Guinea jump-off. This was, he claimed, the more logical not only because it was already under way through the Guadalcanal and Papua campaigns, but also because such a route would place the Allies most quickly in the position to cut Japan's recently-acquired southern empire from the homeland, thereby halting her war production. MacArthur passionately held that the United States had a moral duty to reconquer the Philippines as quickly as possible — indeed, this often seems to have been more important to him than invading Japan — and the way to Manila would be clear once New Guinea had fallen. The alternative route did not appear to offer any vital strategic objective and would be a most dangerous operation, exposing invasion forces to attacks from a cluster of sea and airbases which the Japanese had constructed in the mandated islands. Finally, to leave the enemy forces holding New Guinea and the Solomons would alarm America's allies, Australia and New Zealand.
On the other hand, the US navy could see much value in a Central Pacific thrust. First of all, it would enable it to employ its rapidly-growing numbers of fast carriers much more effectively than in the crowded waters of the Solomons and the Bismarcks. It rejected the notion that this route would be any more dangerous, pointing out the very important development of the carrier task forces — which had the striking power to isolate and dominate an island group, and to protect the invasion convoys — and of the floating fleet supply system — which removed the need for the carriers to return to port at frequent intervals. Moreover, to leave untouched the Japanese forces in the mandates would be to expose the proposed New GuineaPhilippines line of communications to powerful flank attacks. In any case, a Central Pacific thrust would probably reach the Philippines and cut Japan's links to the south faster than a step-by-step battle up the Solomons-Bismarcks-New Guinea ladder, which, being predictable, gave the enemy the chance to prepare for the next assault and would involve heavy fighting. And secretly, of course, the US navy disliked the prospect of placing their precious carriers under MacArthur's control while he in turn did not want the South-West Pacific Command to be a subsidiary theatre, nor the army to be employed solely for 'mopping up' operations.
The solution ultimately decided upon — mainly at the Trident Conference at Washington in May 1943 — was to advance along both routes, for this would keep the Japanese uncertain of where the real thrust would be, it would disperse the enemy's forces, and it would prevent any flank attacks or reinforcement from the mandates to Rabaul — or vice-versa. In any case, both routes would end off the Philippines. Technically, it was a defeat for MacArthur's monopolising tendencies; strategically, it was to prove to be a very wise decision indeed. On the other hand, such a vast two-pronged offensive needed enormous preparation and for some months a comparative stalemate existed in the Pacific war while units were being trained, bases and airfields constructed, landing-craft and shipping obtained, new warships worked up and final plans laid. It was during this 'stalemate' that the United States recovered the western Aleutians.
Although the impracticality of major operations in this area was obvious to all who knew it, both sides were extremely sensitive to enemy advances there. The Japanese seizure of the islands of Kiska and Attu during the Midway operation provoked alarm in the United States and caused the government to plan for an early counter offensive. Bombing raids on the Japanese-held islands were followed up by a naval bombardment of Kiska on 7th August 1942; by the occupation of Adak (210 miles east of Kiska) on 30th August, where an airbase was constructed to assist a further advance; and by the taking of Amchitka (ninety miles east of Kiska) on 12th January 1943. The next obvious step, the seizure of Kiska itself, was avoided by the American commanders, Rear-Admiral Kinkaid and Major-General De Witt, since a greater part of their naval and air forces had been diverted to the crucial Guadalcanal battles. Instead, they decided to take Attu, which lay even further west, after a naval bombardment on 18th February had revealed its lack of defences.
An American squadron, consisting of the cruisers Salt Lake City and Richmond together with four destroyers and commanded by Rear-Admiral McMorris, was sent to blockade Attu in the following month but on 26th March it encountered a more powerful enemy force of four cruisers and four destroyers, which was escorting three transports carrying reinforcements for the island's garrison. This group, under Vice-Admiral Hosogaya, opened fire as the American vessels approached, thus beginning the grandiosely-entitled 'Battle of the Komandorski Islands'. For three and a half hours the opposing forces fired and manoeuvred at long range until the Japanese broke off the action. No ships on either side were sunk but as the transports were forced to return it could be claimed as a minor American victory. Six weeks later, on 11th May, a force under the overall command of Rear-Admiral Rockwell landed on Attu, assisted by fog and supported by an offshore bombardment group which included three battleships. For two weeks the 2,600-strong garrison held out against the 11,000 troops of the 7th US Infantry Division, although steadily forced back into the mountains. On 29th May, however, after twenty-four hours' fierce fighting when the remaining Japanese suicidally charged the American positions, the defenders were almost totally wiped out; only twenty-eight became prisoners while the invaders lost 600 men.
This capture of Attu was the first example of 'leap-frogging' by the Americans in the Pacific war. The effectiveness of this tactic soon became apparent, for, with an American airbase swiftly built on Attu, the Japanese garrison at Kiska was virtually cut off and subjected to frequent naval bombardments and air strikes. As Imperial General Headquarters did not wish to fight a major campaign in the Aleutians, it was decided to abandon the island and on 28th July, a force of cruisers and destroyers evacuated the 5,183 troops within fifty-five minutes under cover of the usual mists and fogs. Quite unaware of this development, the Americans continued to bombard Kiska in the weeks following; and on the night of 15th August some 34,400 troops (including 5,400 Canadians) landed to spend a fruitless five days searching for the enemy before it was realised that he had left. The Aleutians had thus been cleared, but this was scarcely surprising since the Americans allotted 100,000 troops, a large naval task force and the Eleventh Army Air Force to the North Pacific area, the greater part of which could have been more usefully employed elsewhere.
In both the South-West Pacific and Pacific Ocean Commands, for example, MacArthur and Nimitz were begging for further reinforcements before their own offensives began. Yet, although neither was to be fully satisfied, their respective strengths were being built up steadily as the United States economy came onto a full war footing. MacArthur had seven divisions (three of them Australian) under him, with two more American divisions to be sent and eight Australian divisions in training; under Halsey's South Pacific Command (responsible to Nimitz) there were four Army, two Marine and one New Zealand divisions, with a further one to come by the end of the year. In the air, MacArthur controlled about 1,000 planes, while Halsey could call upon 700 army plus 1,100 navy and Marine aircraft. The naval forces fluctuated, for while an amphibious fleet with escorts was being built up for both campaigns, many of the warships were on short-term loan from Nimitz's vast seaborne force at Pearl Harbor. At this time, Halsey had six battleships and two carriers under his command.
Although the overall strategy of mounting a strong counteroffensive in the New Guinea-Solomons region had been agreed upon, command differences and the exact course of the operations remained to be sorted out. The former was complicated by the fact that the Solomons group itself separated the South-West and South Pacific Commands. On the other hand, this also forced the two campaign leaders and their own superiors to cooperate more closely than might otherwise have been the case, for there was little sense in squabbling among themselves whilst fighting an enemy as formidable as the Japanese. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore swiftly agreed that MacArthur would have strategic control of the whole New Guinea-Solomons region but Halsey would possess tactical control in the Solomons while all the warships from Pearl Harbor operating in these waters would remain under Nimitz's command.
The strategic objective of operation 'Cartwheel' (originally called 'Watch-tower') was to break the Bismarcks barrier and to seize the great Japanese base at Rabaul. Here again, the Allies could approach along two main axes, those of the New Guinea coast and the Solomons chain, with alternating attacks which would keep the enemy bemused and bewildered. Within eight months, so it was hoped, they would be poised to take Rabaul itself. The first step was to be undertaken by Halsey's forces, which would occupy the Russell Islands to develop an advanced air and naval base there. Then MacArthur's forces would strike, taking Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands in the Trobriand group as an airbase and a staging post between the two theatres. Following these preliminary moves, Halsey would thrust into the New Georgia Islands to seize the important Munda airstrip there, while South-West Pacific Command would make a big push to clear the Japanese from their New Guinea strongpoints of Lae, Salamaua, Finschhafen and Madang. By that time, South Pacific forces would have hopped to the Shortland Islands and then to southern Bougainville. The penultimate moves of both drives would be the neutralisation of Buka by Halsey's Command and the seizure of Cape Gloucester on New Britain itself by MacArthur's. Surprise, speed and timing would be essential factors, but both commanders were famous for their vigour and forcefulness.
The Japanese, too, were collecting their forces and re-examining their strategy in the months following the disastrous Guadalcanal campaign. After a long and costly period of alternating priority in the south-west Pacific between New Guinea and the Solomons, it had been decided to split those theatres fully in two, with the Eighteenth Army charged with the defence of the former and the Seventeenth Army with the latter, both coming under the control of Eighth Area Army (General Imamura) at Rabaul. Nevertheless, the army still tended to give preference to the New Guinea campaign, since it regarded that large island as an essential buffer for the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines; whereas the navy, with equal logic, wished to give priority to the Solomons-Bismarcks area, as victory there would open the great Japanese naval base at Truk in the Carolines to American air attack. Since the army had the upper hand at Imperial General Headquarters, however, a directive of 25th March, 1943, stated that priority should be given to New Guinea. In fact, the navy assumed primary responsibility for the defence of the Solomons and the army did the same for New Guinea, it being agreed that the general defence line should run from Lae on the New Guinea coast to Isabel and New Georgia in the Solomons. What was certain was that each theatre would be fiercely defended.
On the other hand, the Japanese forces were already greatly inferior to those possessed by the Allies. There were three divisions (55,000 men) in New Guinea and two divisions, one brigade and other units (25,000 men) in the Solomons; the 6th and 7th Air Divisions, respectively attached to each command, could only field 170 aircraft while the 11th Naval Air Fleet could provide a further 240, such had been the losses in the Guadalcanal campaign; the naval forces comprised only cruisers and destroyers, although heavier vessels could be called up swiftly from Truk. It was true that within six months the area could be reinforced by as much as ten to fifteen divisions, over 850 aircraft and the whole of the Japanese navy, and that a holding operation was therefore quite feasible — but to be a success this would require not only tenacity but also flexibility of mind and an ability to obtain those reinforcements as soon as they were needed. Whatever happened, it seemed that Japan had already lost aerial supremacy in this region: yet that was recognised by all as being the decisive element in the Pacific war.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Pacific Victory"
by .
Copyright © 2014 Paul Kennedy.
Excerpted by permission of RosettaBooks.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
