Partisans, Guerillas, and Irregulars: Historical Archaeology of Asymmetric Warfare
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Partisans, Guerillas, and Irregulars: Historical Archaeology of Asymmetric Warfare
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| ISBN-13: | 9780817320201 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | University of Alabama Press |
| Publication date: | 06/25/2019 |
| Edition description: | First Edition, First Edition |
| Pages: | 272 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d) |
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CHAPTER 1
Border Warfare in Revolutionary Era West Virginia
W. STEPHEN McBRIDE AND KIM A. McBRIDE
The colonization of present-day West Virginia was fraught with conflict between Native Americans and Euro-American settlers and their enslaved African Americans for much of the middle to late eighteenth century. At the heart of this conflict was the contested ownership of land, some of which transpired as part of broader geopolitical contests, first between the nation-states of England and France (French and Indian War) and then England and the United States (American Revolution). As such, this study provides an example of asymmetric warfare between established Native American tribes and Euro-American settlers in the Greenbrier Valley, West Virginia, that began in Lord Dunmore's War of 1774, which pitted the Native Americans against the British-governed settlers of western Virginia, and continued into the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), when the British encouraged and aided Native American raids on frontier settlements. During both wars, Indians living north of the Ohio River but who laid claim to present-day West Virginia, including Shawnee, Wyandot, and western Iroquois (Mingo), launched raids into the Greenbrier Valley.
Warfare on the frontier during this time was irregular; it did not involve professional standing armies facing each other on open ground. It involved local militia and often untrained settlers, of all ages and genders, and skilled Native Americans fighting each other in the forests, in villages, in farm fields, in houses, and in forts. The settlers, as an extension of a larger nation-state, first Great Britain and later the United States, were associated with a more powerful, more populous, and more technologically advanced society than were the Native Americans. Because the settlers were living in rather isolated conditions on the frontier, however, these advantages were somewhat lessened, although they did maintain a significant population advantage over the tribal groups. Even though the Native Americans were not part of a nation-state, they often formed broad, if temporary, alliances and had the support, and supplies, including guns and ammunition, of European allies, including France in the middle eighteenth century and Great Britain in the late eighteenth century. In each case their men, while of limited numbers, were trained warriors, skilled in the arts of frontier warfare. In fact, historian Richard White has characterized this frontier warfare as a "contest of villagers," meaning that the Indians and settlers had their own "village" agenda and mode of warfare within the broader global conflicts (White 1991:367). Like most irregular or guerilla fighters, the Native Americans relied heavily on surprise and ambush, but when acting in large raiding parties they were often highly organized. In the Greenbrier Valley, in the years before and during the American Revolution, the Native Americans, seeing the growing spread of settlers as a challenge to their lands and lifestyle, were nearly always on the offensive. Accordingly, the settler militia strategy and tactics, particularly on a local level, were designed as a defensive counterinsurgency to defeat and contain the Indian raiders.
In this study, historical and archaeological investigations of skirmish and battle sites within the Greenbrier Valley, as well as broader studies and treatises on frontier warfare, offer a better understanding of the nature of the irregular frontier warfare during the revolutionary era. Particular attention is given to the strategy and tactics developed and implemented by the opposing forces. Investigations include archaeological data gathered from excavations at two forts (Arbuckle's and Donnally's) and one farmstead (James Graham's) that were at the center of Native American raids in the 1770s.
Native American Warfare
By the revolutionary era, the main Native American war parties that raided into today's West Virginia lived in Ohio and were the Shawnee, Mingo (western Iroquois), Wyandot, and, toward the end of the war, some Delaware (Calloway 2007; Downes 1968; White 1991). In 1774, the Shawnee and Mingo entered a war with Virginia, known now as Lord Dunmore's War after the Virginia governor. This war had its origin in the British-Iroquois 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, in which the Iroquois ceded much of West Virginia and Kentucky to Great Britain, including land claimed by the Shawnee or Mingo. The Shawnee and Mingo disagreed with the treaty and saw the ceding of land, and the subsequent wave of European settlement, as a direct threat. Fighting broke out in the spring of 1774 after the murder of Mingo John Logan's family by settlers near the mouth of Yellow Creek (Yellow Creek Massacre) in northern West Virginia (Downes 1968:152–173).
At the beginning of the American Revolution, most of the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes tribes were politically neutral in their relations with the colonies and the British. Only the Mingo were allied with the British and were at war with the Americans, but this did not preclude individual warriors, particularly Shawnee, from accompanying the Mingo on raids (Downes 1968:189–190; Howard 1981:14). By late 1777 the Shawnee were leaning toward an alliance with the British, and the murder of the Shawnee chief Cornstalk and three companions at Fort Randolph, Point Pleasant, West Virginia, in November 1777 pushed this to reality. The Wyandot soon declared war on the Americans as well. The non-Moravian Delaware joined the British in 1781, in contrast to the Moravian Delaware who remained neutral (Downes 1968:204–210; Howard 1981:15; White 1991:389).
All these Indian groups had a long history of woodland warfare, and all had become proficient in the use of firearms, particularly the flintlock musket, well before the revolutionary era, although bows and arrows were still utilized effectively (Thwaites and Kellogg 1912:79). Period observers distinguish two types of Native raids or warfare: small-scale, petite or private wars that usually involved 10 to 25 warriors and did not require the approval of the confederacy, tribe, or division; and larger scale, "national" or public wars that did require this approval or declaration of war by the tribe as a whole. Petite warfare was generally motivated by revenge, booty (especially horses), and captives and by the opportunity for young men to gain prestige by demonstrating their courage and fighting ability (Connelly 1964; Malone 1991:7; White 1991:407).
In contrast "national" wars followed a discussion and debate at a general council of peace chiefs and war chiefs and often included questions of extratribal alliance. If war was declared, the tribe shifted to a wartime footing, and the peace chiefs surrendered control of the tribal government to the war chiefs (Howard 1981:115–116). The motives and goals of national war varied but included obtaining revenge (on a larger scale), protecting or expanding tribal lands and resources, recapturing old tribal lands and resources, controlling trade and transportation, honoring alliances, and even, though rarely, vanquishing an enemy seen as a threat (Downes 1968:10–15; Eid 1988a:150; White 1991:407). Raiding during national wars included both small (10 to 25) and large (50 to hundreds of warriors) war parties, all acting in union for broader goals.
Period observers and historians often describe the Indians' main, or even only, strategy and tactic of warfare as "surprise and ambush" (Eid 1988b:63; Mahon 1958:260; Malone 1991:21, 24; Smith 1948 [1812]; Zeisberger 1999:104), or what white observers called "the skulking way of war" (Malone 1991). Given the relatively small size of most Native American groups and the limited number of warriors available to wage war and ensure the security of the home front, this style of warfare was eminently logical. The Indians simply could not afford larger battles that could result in high casualties.
According to former Indian captive James Smith's mentor Tecaughnelango, "the art of war consists of ambushing and surprising our enemies, and preventing them from ambushing and surprising us" (Smith 1948 [1812]:41). In his treatise on Indian warfare, Smith describes how the Indians achieved this surprise and how they behaved during battle. The raiding party would leave the village, following a feast and war dance the night before, moving in single file. Small groups would often be under the command of a captain, whereas large parties would be directed by multiple captains and a war chief. Smith emphasized that the warriors were very disciplined and would quickly act on the orders of their captains, noting that "the Indians are the best disciplined troops for wooded country in the known world" (Smith 1948 [1812]:9).
Other observers of eighteenth-century Indian warfare, such as Robert Rogers, Henry Bouquet, and David Zeisberger, also commented on the warriors' discipline and ability to perform complex maneuvers in the forest (Eid 1988b:63, 68; Malone 1991:20; Zeisberger 1999:103). The raiding party used cover and concealment with scouts on the lookout for the enemy and good ambush locations. Once near the enemy, the warriors would cease hunting for food and would spread out in "scattered order" to avoid clustering and decrease the chance of being surprised and surrounded (Smith 1948 [1812]:4, 12).
Finding a good ambush location, such as a low point on a well-traveled trail or roadway route, the warriors would wait silently and patiently for days to surprise unwary travelers (Zeisberger 1999:104). They might also try to lure the enemy into an ambush by sending out a decoy or create a moving ambush by silently enveloping the enemy, often near dawn. The objective was to launch a quick attack that did not allow the target to mobilize an effective response (Eid 1988a:159). According to Smith (1948 [1812]:4, 14), just before an engagement, the Indians would move into a half-moon or horseshoe formation, with flankers on both sides of the site where the target was or was expected to appear. Once in this formation, with the enemy partially surrounded, they would fire from behind trees and quickly charge, or withdraw, as circumstances dictated. As Eid (1988a:148) stated, "late eighteenth century Indian battlefield maneuvering revealed a sophisticated use of flanking movements proceeded from a half-moon or standing position." This formation was used successfully in many large and small battles throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries in the east and the plains (Eid 1988a and 1988b; Otterbein 2004:211–213; Secoy 1953; Sivilich, this volume, chapter 5; Smith 1948 [1812]:5–6).
Native warriors usually did not close this half-moon, leaving the enemy an escape route that would reduce the chance of a costly fight to the death, while themselves benefitting from a surprise attack. Given their demographic disadvantage to what appeared to be a never-ending flow of white settlers, the Indians always tried to keep their casualties to a minimum and generally did not initiate an attack unless their leaders were certain of victory (Smith 1948 [1812]:12). If a battle was going poorly, Indians would usually retreat rapidly. If only one section of a battle was going badly, they would withdraw from that point but return if the pressure lessened. War parties could quickly change formations from half-moons to circles, or to hollow squares or parallel enclosing lines, as circumstances warranted (Smith 1948 [1812]:4, 12).
Smaller raiding parties, and even some larger ones, would often focus on isolated farmsteads or moving parties of militia and settlers. Using surprise and ambush, near dawn or at a time when such action would not be expected, they sought to spread panic before the Americans could adequately defend themselves (Mahon 1958:259). Most Indian warriors avoided attacking substantial fortifications, but on occasion larger war parties did make forts the target of attack or siege. Again, surprise was the initial tactic with the hope of entering the fort at a weak point or catching occupants outside of and away from their defenses. If this initial surprise attack failed, they might surround and lay siege, use fire to force defenders out, enter into negotiations to encourage surrender, or simply withdraw (Downes 1968; Kellogg 1916; Mahon 1958; Rice 1970). Whereas the capture of forts through assault, or even negotiation, was common during the French and Indian War, it was rare during the Revolutionary War, as the militia and other settlers became better organized, were often in larger numbers, and were more effective in their defense.
Another Indian strategy was the use of psychological warfare, or inflicting terror or fear on their enemies. Attacks on women and children, torture and otherwise brutal treatment of prisoners, and physical mutilation of victims created a generalized fear within the settler populations (Calloway 1997, 2007; Crawford 2008). In the case of the French and Indian War period, this fear had often led to settlers' removal to safer areas to the east. Removal of settlers from the Greenbrier Valley was less common in the Lord Dunmore's War to Revolutionary War period covered in this chapter but was still a concern of the British, then colonial, government. Fear of Indian attacks still motivated settlers to build forts and otherwise try to defend themselves.
The Euro-American Frontier Defensive System
Developed first in the French and Indian War, the Euro-American frontier defensive system was refined by the onset of the American Revolution. Composed of local militia, specialized scouts or "Indian spies," and forts, the system had the central goal of protecting established settlements and outlying farmsteads. During this period, the primary resident military force was the local county militia, modeled on English precedents. All free white men aged 18 to 50, except those with occupations such as ministers, millers, and iron masters, were required to serve. Although the governor was the overall commander, a militia was organized at the county level and was led by a county lieutenant whose staff and company officers had direct command of the men. Each county had at least one regiment that was divided into companies of approximately 20 to 80 men and officers. The county lieutenant could order the militia to service for action within the county, but to take his regiments outside of the county he had to ask for volunteers, a situation that caused much frustration among offensively minded officers (Sosin 1967; Stone 1978). Beyond their military function, militia companies could be mobilized for needed road construction and maintenance and could also facilitate tax collection. This gave great power to the militia officers within their local communities.
Local militiamen garrisoned local forts, guarded settlers, and participated in more distant military expeditions (rarely). Pension applications suggest that partial or entire companies would guard a fort from anywhere from a few days to as long as six months, moving from fort to fort as needed. Militiamen also served as security for communities made up of families occupying and working on dispersed farms and, when required, pursued Indian raiding parties. According to militiaman James Gillilan, "in the summer season [we] would all turn out in a body and work each other's places by turns — whilst some were working others would be watching and guarding — to give alarm of the approach of Indians" (Gillilan 1833–1835).
The use of "Indian spies" or scouts was another crucial part of the frontier defensive strategy. During the French and Indian War, rangers and scouts as individuals and in groups functioned offensively, gathering intelligence and attacking the enemy in their camps. By the 1770s and 1780s, spies had taken on a more defensive role, roaming over the landscape looking for enemy signs and giving warnings to a citizenry otherwise engaged in their daily lives. This was especially important in the warmer months when raiding was more of a threat. Given the widely dispersed nature of frontier farms and forts and the desire/need of most settlers to stay on their farms during the warmer months, this role was critical to frontier defense. The Revolutionary War pension application of Greenbrier Valley resident and spy Michael Swope noted that "when [spies] saw signs of Indians they would fly from Fort to Fort and give the alarm so that preparations might be made for defensive operations by the people that were Forted and that those who had ventured out to work their corn might betake themselves to the Fort before the Indians would attack them" (Swope 1833–1835).
Spies commonly worked in small groups of two to three, were generally based at a fort, and usually operated near their homes in areas where they were familiar with the terrain. Period accounts describe going out on rounds of four to eight days, with a given circuit of 48 to 113 km (30 to 70 mi). Additional spies were often posted at known passes and in advance areas during times of particular danger. Pensioner John Bradshaw reported that he "watched the gaps and low places in the mountains for thirty miles, to a point where they met the spies from Burnside's Fort" (Bradshaw 1833–1835).
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Table of Contents
ContentsList of Illustrations
Preface
Introduction: An Archaeology of Asymmetric Warfare by Steven D. Smith
Chapter 1. Border Warfare in Revolutionary Era West Virginia by W. Stephen McBride and Kim A. McBride
Chapter 2. “Foot Jägers Forward!”: Johann Ewald, Petite Guerre, and the Archaeology of the Battle of Cooch’s Bridge by Wade P. Catts
Chapter 3. The Battle of Williamson’s Plantation: Huck’s Defeat and the Asymmetric Partisan War in the South Carolina Backcountry by Michael C. Scoggins and Steven D. Smith
Chapter 4. Francis Marion’s Partisan Community by Steven D. Smith
Chapter 5. KOCOA Considerations in Asymmetric Warfare: Education and Environment in the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 by Michelle Sivilich
Chapter 6. The Black Jack Battle of 1856 in Kansas: Asymmetric Warfare and Archaeological Investigations by Douglas D. Scott
Chapter 7. Jayhawkers, Bushwhackers, and Lay-Out Gangs: Archaeology and Asymmetric Warfare in the Trans-Mississippi Confederate Home Front during the American Civil War by Carl G. Drexler
Chapter 8. “Dirty Little Wars” in Northern Mexico and the American Southwest by Charles M. Haecker
Chapter 9. The Hatfield-McCoy Feud as Asymmetric Warfare: Archaeology at the Randall and Sally McCoy Homestead by Kim A. McBride
Chapter 10. A Ukrainian Insurgent Army Company Ambush of a Soviet NKVD Battalion, 1945: A Multidisciplinary Study by Adrian Mandzy
Conclusion: Reflections on the Historical Archaeology of Asymmetric Warfare by Clarence R. Geier
References Cited
Contributors
Index