Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The "Lutheran" Paul and His Critics

by Stephen Westerholm

Overview

Here, finally, is a much-needed review and analysis of the divergent interpretations of Paul. With a clear head and winsome sense of humor, Stephen Westerholm compares the traditional understanding of Paul to more recent readings, drawing on the writings of key figures in the debate both past and present.

Westerholm first offers a detailed portrait of the "Lutheran" Paul, including the way such theologians as Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Wesley have traditionally interpreted "justification by faith" to mean that God declares sinners "righteous" by his grace apart from "works." Westerholm then explores how Paul has fared in the twentieth century, in which "New Perspective" readings of Paul see him teaching that Gentiles need not become Jews or observe Jewish law to be God's people. The final section of the book looks anew at disputed areas of Paul's theological language and offers compelling discussion on the place of both justification by faith and Mosaic law in divine redemption.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780802848093
Publisher:	Eerdmans, William B. Publishing Company
Publication date:	12/30/2003
Pages:	508
Sales rank:	900,281
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.05(d)

About the Author

Stephen Westerholm is professor emeritus of early Christianity at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. His other books include Reading Sacred Scripture: Voices from the History of Biblical Interpretation (with Martin Westerholm), Justification Reconsidered: Rethinking a Pauline Theme, and Understanding Paul: The Early Christian Worldview of the Letter to the Romans.

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Perspectives Old and New on Paul

The "Lutheran" Paul and His Critics

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By STEPHEN WESTERHOLM

William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company

Copyright © 2004 Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
All right reserved.

Chapter One

Augustine

For Augustine "the apostle" means Paul (C. duas epp. Pel. 3.3.4), and Paul is the "great preacher of grace" (De gest. Pel. 14.35; cf. Ench. 9.32). Himself the target of an extraordinary display of divine grace, Paul proved "loud and eager above all" in its "defence" (De spir. et litt. 7.12). Against whom, Pauline scholars now muse, did grace ever need defending? Augustine affirms what they emphatically deny: against "the proud and arrogant presumers upon their own works" (7.12; cf. De pecc. mer. 1.27.43) who "unthankfully despise [God's] grace," and "trust[ing] in [their] own strength" as sufficient to "fulfil the law," seek to "establish [their] own righteousness" (Ep. 145.3; cf. 82.20; De spir. et litt. 9.15).

In all essentials Augustine appears to represent what in many recent discussions has come to be dismissed as the "Lutheran" reading of Paul. We may perhaps forgo a demonstration that he arrived at such a reading without the liability of "Reformation spectacles." It is sufficient to note that, with his eleven-century head start on Luther, his dominance of Christian thinking throughout those years, and his demonstrable impact on the Reformers themselves, Augustine has a fair claim to be history's most influential reader of Paul. That ought to secure him a hearing in the debate.

Augustine had his own spectacles, to be sure, furnished in part by his struggles with heretics. The latter, like other perversions of the good in Augustine's universe, inevitably served useful purposes: they compelled the church to "investigate [its articles of faith] more accurately, to understand them more clearly, and to proclaim them more earnestly" (De civ. Dei 16.2). His mature views on human weakness and divine grace were essentially in place long before the Pelagian conflict erupted (indeed, Augustine's Confessions proved a provocation to Pelagius; De don. pers. 20.53) (Ad Simpl. 1.2.12-13; De don. pers. 20.52; De praed. sanct. 4.8); significantly, he felt constrained to adopt them by his study of Paul, though in important respects they clashed with his own prior thinking. Yet he himself grants that the dispute with Pelagius enabled him to see things that other readers of Paul had missed (De doctr. Chr. 3.104); and certainly the radical implications of his own position were first worked out in rebutting that of his foes.

Our attention here must focus primarily on Augustine's developed stance. The tale can most simply be told as one of creation, fall, and redemption, with postscripted treatments of the law and of human dependence on divine grace. The discussion will be simplified, however, if a few fundamental Augustinian theses are spelled out from the start.

1. For Augustine all human beings possess free will inasmuch as all have their own likes and dislikes, their characteristic desires and distastes, and inasmuch as their personal inclinations steer their deliberate actions (De civ. Dei 5.10; De lib. arb. 3.3.27). At times we may be compelled to act against our will, but we can never be forced to will against our will: our will is always our own and, in that sense, "free" (3.3.33). But the pursuit of what our wills desire is a dubious path to happiness: what people want may not be (and since Adam's sin, is not by nature) what is right, good, and conducive to their own well-being (De civ. Dei 8.8; cf. De Trin. 13.8). In the end, should we even call "free" those whose misdirected desires confine them to a compulsive pursuit of goods that neither satisfy nor last, and who are cut off from their supreme good - the only good they could never lose against their will - by their own incapacity to sincerely want it (cf. Ench. 9.30)?

2. Human desire is central to Augustine's thinking in other respects as well. Though it is always better to do right than wrong (Serm. 156.14), one is not oneself right in doing what is right unless one delights in the right one chooses (De spir. et litt. 14.26). A wolf may do the right thing (from a sheep's perspective) when, frightened by the barks of dogs and shouts of shepherds, it leaves the sheep in peace. But it remains a wolf with a wolfish appetite. What the wolf needs (from a sheep's perspective) is to become a sheep (Serm. 169.8). So, too, with us. Fear of burning in hell may drive us to do the right - and better that than sinning. But we are only the people we ought to be when our actions are driven by love for the good, and we loathe sin no less than the flames of perdition (Ep. 145.4). The story of human redemption is for Augustine not simply one of sin and forgiveness, of condemnation and acquittal; it is, perhaps above all, a story of the healing of the wounded will (De spir. et litt. 30.52), the transformation of human desires so that we begin to love what we ought to love, and God above all.

3. In Augustine's universe all that exists is good, and all things, considered together, are very good (Conf. 7.12.18; 13.28.43; Ench. 3.10), but they are not all equally good. That the Eternal alone is supremely good does not rule out the inferior goodness of things temporal (cf. Conf. 4.10.15; De civ. Dei 12.4; De lib. arb. 3.15.146). Nothing could be more transitory than the words we speak; yet if in the end what we say is good, each passing word has a share in its goodness. Similarly, that which is born, lives, and passes away partakes of, because it contributes to, the goodness of all creation (Conf. 4.10.15). There is, moreover, among temporal goods themselves a hierarchy of goodness to be respected (De civ. Dei 11.16; De doctr. Chr. 1.17-18; De lib. arb. 3.5.56): sentient beings are superior to nonsentient, intelligent to nonintelligent, those capable of movement to those with no such capacity, those living to those that lack life, and so on. Yet even things (like stones) that have no life, no movement, no intelligence, and no feeling of their own are not on that account no good; they, too, have their place in the beauty and goodness of the whole. "A weeping man is better than a happy worm. And yet I could speak at great length without any falsehood in praise of the worm" (De ver. rel. 41.77; cf. De civ. Dei 11.22).

4. From these considerations emerge Augustine's characteristic definitions of virtue and vice. Virtue is appropriate ("ordinate") love: not simply loving what one ought to love, but loving most what deserves the most love and all else with a love suited to its worth. Hence the Augustinian prayer, "Order love within me" (De civ. Dei 15.22). Vice, conversely, is inappropriate ("inordinate") love of things that nonetheless are by nature good (12.8): loving more what should be loved less, and turning in the process from the God who, because of his supreme and eternal goodness, and because he is the source and sustainer of all else that is good, is alone worthy of love with all our heart, soul, and mind (Conf. 2.5.10; De doctr. Chr. 1.42-43).

i. Creation

In Augustine's view the first human beings were created with mortal, animal bodies that required nourishment from food and drink (De civ. Dei 13.1, 24; De pecc. mer. 1.2.2; 1.5.5). Adam and Eve could, however, have been sustained in their mortal condition by eating of the tree of life until they proved their faithfulness to God. They would then have been rewarded with spiritual bodies and immortal life (2.21.35; cf. De civ. Dei 13.23).

In short, they were not unable to die, but they were able not to die.

They were also not unable to sin, but they were able not to sin (De corr. et grat. 12.33).

The possibility of sin, like that of doing right, requires the existence of a will that chooses to act in accordance with its wants: behavior that we do not ourselves will can be the object of neither blame nor praise (De lib. arb. 2.18.179; De spir. et litt. 5.7; De ver. rel. 14.27). Humans were given such a will by God. Nor should the creation of the human will be decried because the will can be misused; we do not, after all, consider it evil that human beings have hands and eyes, though these, too, can be turned to ill purpose (De lib. arb. 2.18.182-85). There is good that can only be achieved by creatures with a will; hence it is good that God made such creatures.

Of course, an all-knowing God knew at the outset how humans would employ the will he gave them. Again, his goodness in creation is not in question (cf. De cat. rud. 2.18.30). For one thing, his foreknowledge of what humans would do in no way compelled them to do it (De civ. Dei 14.27; De corr. et grat. 12.37; De lib. arb. 3.4.39); on the contrary, divine foreknowledge confirms the reality of human choice, since what God foreknew was precisely that humans would choose what was wrong (De civ. Dei 5.10; De lib. arb. 3.3.28-35). Secondly, wrongdoing leads to punishment, the punishment of evil is just, and justice is a good thing. Should God leave evil unpunished, the order and goodness of his creation would be in doubt. But he won't, and they aren't (3.9.93-95; De nat. bon. 37; De ver. rel. 23.44): "the ugliness of sin is never without the beauty of punishment" (De lib. arb. 3.15.152). Thirdly, God foreknew from the beginning (if such time-bound language can be used of a Being beyond time) not simply the evil that would be wrought by his creatures, but also how divine resourcefulness would turn it to good account (De civ. Dei 11.17-18; 12.22; 14.27; 22.1; De corr. et grat. 10.27; Ench. 3.11; 26.100; 28.104).

Can God, then, be faulted for not taking steps so that humans would not misuse their will?

This is a thornier question for Augustine than we might think, since he believed that as long as humans pursue what they themselves want, their will is "free," even if their wants are determined for them. Indeed, Augustine believes (as we shall see) that a transformation of their corrupted will is God's signal gift to his saints (De grat. et lib. arb. 16.32); clearly, then, a will programmed to desire only good could have been given to Adam and Eve at their creation. Still, God is not to be blamed. He gave our forebears enough grace to be able to will and do what is right. And though this is a lesser gift than one by which they necessarily would have willed the right, even a gift of a lower order of goodness had its appropriate time and place in the unfolding divine scheme (cf. Ench. 28.105).

Moreover, it must be remembered that by divine design Adam and Eve had everything in their favor (De civ. Dei 14.15). The creation they enjoyed was still unreservedly good. Their nature, still uncorrupted, felt no hankering for sin and had neither bad habits nor perilous precedents to overcome. The command they were given was straightforward and simple. When they nonetheless sinned under so favorable conditions, they have only themselves to blame.

How, then, did they do so?

ii. The Fall

The fruit chosen by Adam and Eve was necessarily good fruit, and nourishing to eat (De pecc. mer. 2.21.35). The prohibition of something in itself good gave Adam and Eve the opportunity to exercise their will by doing right, loving the Source of all goodness more than the goods he made.

They failed, partly because they believed the lie that their happiness lay apart from God in the pursuit of lesser goods (De civ. Dei 14.4), and partly because they affected to live (14.15) in independence from God. This too is a lie, since the "dominion of the Almighty cannot be eluded" (11.13).

When conditions for doing right were ideal, the consequences of doing wrong were disastrous (14.12). Nor were the effects confined to Adam and Eve as individuals, for the good reason that Adam and Eve were not mere individuals but the forebears and prototypes of the race. Individualization came later; and, descended as we all are from the same prototypes, we all inherit a nature corrupted by their sin (13.14; De nupt. et conc. 2.5.15). Indeed, since the whole race of which we are a part was "contained" in Adam, we cannot condemn him without condemning ourselves. All of us are born with a share in his guilt. What is more, all of us no sooner reach the age of our ownmoral accountability than we add sins of our individual choosing to our share in the original sin of the species (C. duas epp. Pel. 1.3.7; De pecc. mer. 1.10.12).

Of course, the conditions under which we make our choices are not the ideal ones enjoyed by Adam and Eve. Before their fall they were able not to die; once they sinned, they began - as, once we are born, we join - the relentless race toward death (De civ. Dei 13.10; De pecc. mer. 1.16.21). Before the fall Adam and Eve were able not to sin; their nature, once fallen - and ours, once born - suffers from a hankering for sin that neither they nor we are able to conquer. Habits built up by repeated wrongdoing become compulsive (Conf. 8.5.10). Our difficulty in doing right is further compounded by our ignorance of what is right - yet another consequence of, and just punishment for, humanity's refusal to acknowledge and do the right when we had the unencumbered opportunity to do so (De lib. arb. 3.18.178). As a result, we sin at times willfully, at other times unwillingly or even unwittingly, unable to overcome the habits and liabilities of fallen human nature. But since we bear responsibility for those habits and liabilities, we are guilty for these latter sins as well (De lib. arb. 3.19.183-84; De nat. et grat. 22.24).

We cannot, of our own, do good. If at times we appear to do so, we are merely avoiding more blatant sins by succumbing to ones less apparent: baser lusts, for example, may be restrained by a love of human praise (De civ. Dei 5.13; 21.16; De nupt. et conc. 1.2.4). We act rightly, in keeping with the reality of our own dependent nature and the ordered goodness of the universe, only when our deeds are motivated by a love of God and delight in righteousness (De civ. Dei 13.5; Ench. 32.121). Of such love fallen human nature, the captive of lesser loves, proves utterly incapable (De Trin. 15.31).

Finally, in a universe that is just and good evil must be condemned. In that condemnation all human beings, the offspring of Adam and Eve, have their share (De grat. Chr. 2.29.34).

iii.

Continues...

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Table of Contents

	Preface	xi
	Whimsical Introduction	xiii
Part 1	Portraits of the "Lutheran" Paul
1.	Augustine	3
i.	Creation	6
ii.	The Fall	7
iii.	Redemption	9
iv.	The Place of the Law	13
v.	Human Dependence on Grace	16
vi.	Summary	20
2.	Martin Luther	22
3.	John Calvin	42
i.	Divine Providence and Human Responsibility	42
ii.	Adam	46
iii.	Christ	48
iv.	Abraham and Moses	49
v.	The Life of the Redeemed	56
vi.	Summary	62
4.	John Wesley	64
i.	Of Human Nature and the Covenant of Works	65
ii.	The Covenant of Grace and the Path to Faith	67
iii.	The New Birth and the Path to Sanctification	73
iv.	The Law and the Spirit	76
v.	Providence and the "Divine Decrees"	81
vi.	Summary	86
5.	A Portrait of the "Lutheran" Paul	88
Part 2	Twentieth-Century Responses to the "Lutheran" Paul
6.	Paul's "Polemical Doctrine": Wrede and Schweitzer	101
i.	William Wrede	102
ii.	Albert Schweitzer	108
7.	The Faith of Paul's Fathers: Montefiore, Schoeps, and Sanders	117
i.	Claude G. Montefiore	118
ii.	Hans Joachim Schoeps	123
iii.	E. P. Sanders	129
8.	Paul's Robust Conscience: Kummel and Stendahl	134
i.	W. G. Kummel	135
ii.	Krister Stendahl	146
9.	The "Righteousness of the Law": Bultmann, Wilckens, and Sanders	150
i.	Rudolf Bultmann	150
ii.	Ulrich Wilckens	154
iii.	E. P. Sanders	159
10.	The "Hobgoblin" of Consistency: Drane, Hubner, and Raisanen	164
i.	John W. Drane	165
ii.	Hans Hubner	167
iii.	Heikki Raisanen	170
11.	Saint Paul against the Lutherans: Wright, Dunn, and Donaldson	178
i.	N. T. Wright	179
ii.	James D. G. Dunn	183
iii.	Terence Donaldson	194
12.	"Lutheran" Responses	201
i.	C. E. B. Cranfield	201
ii.	Thomas Schreiner and Andrew Das	208
iii.	Frank Thielman	214
iv.	Mark Seifrid	219
13.	Other Perspectives	226
i.	Paul's Anthropology: Timo Laato	226
ii.	Paul's Rhetoric: Lauri Thuren and Jean-Noel Aletti	228
iii.	Paul's Apocalyptic Worldview: J. Louis Martyn	235
iv.	Paul's Theology of the Cross: Jurgen Becker	240
14.	The Quotable Anti-"Lutheran" Paul	249
i.	Judaism Preaches Grace	250
ii.	What Paul Finds Wrong with Judaism	250
iii.	What "Justification by Faith" is For, and What "Not by Works" is Against	252
Part 3	The Historical and the "Lutheran" Paul
15.	Matters of Definition, 1: "Righteousness" in Paul	261
i.	Terminology	262
ii.	Ordinary Dikaiosness	263
iii.	Extraordinary Dikaiosness	273
iv.	Divine Dikaiosness	284
v.	Dikaiosness and "the Covenant"	286
16.	Matters of Definition, 2: The "Law" in Paul	297
i.	The Meaning of "Law"	298
ii.	The Law and "Works"	300
iii.	The Law and Faith	321
iv.	The Law and Legalism	330
v.	The Law and Torah	335
17.	Matters of Definition, 3: Grace in Sanders's Judaism	341
18.	"Justification by Faith" in Paul's Thought: The Evidence in Review	352
i.	1 Thessalonians	353
ii.	1 and 2 Corinthians	361
iii.	Galatians	366
iv.	Romans	384
v.	Philippians	401
vi.	Ephesians, the Pastorals--and James?	404
19.	The Law in God's Scheme	408
20.	Grace Abounding to Sinners or Erasing Ethnic Boundaries?	440
	Bibliography	446
	Index of Authors	472
	Index of Scripture and Other Ancient Literature	476

Editorial Reviews

The Bible Today
"A thorough and very illuminating study of Pauline interpretation, with particular emphasis on the longstanding debate over whether the Pauline teaching on justification through faith alone should stand at the heart of Pauline theology."

Choice
"Wit and humor make this weighty volume an excellent source for the novice and for the seasoned scholar. Recommended."

Thomas R. Schreiner
"Stephen Westerholm's book is the ideal entrée into the discussion on Paul, the law, and justification. Only here will readers find both contemporary and historic contributions to the debate explained. Westerholm reminds us that Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Wesley must be reckoned with seriously as profound interpreters of Paul. He also provides his own incisive and insightful contribution to the biblical text, repristinating the perspective of Luther for our day. Throughout, Westerholm writes with the sparkling clarity and wit that is characteristic of all his work."

John Barclay
"This eagerly awaited volume is a gem. After years of debate about the 'new perspective,' a debate bogged down with multiple confusions, Stephen Westerholm describes and analyzes all the main viewpoints on Paul's theology of law, grace, and justification from Augustine onward. With enviable clarity, incisive observation, and shafts of humor, Westerholm reaffirms and refines the 'old perspective' while also incorporating the strong points of the new. This is the book we all have needed, both scholars and students. It will surely help us escape the impasse in our current debates."

Bruce W. Longenecker
"Since its publication in 1988, Stephen Westerholm's book Israel's Law and the Church's Faith has served as one of the best explorations of Paul's view of justification by faith. That book is now superseded by Perspectives Old and New on Paul. Westerholm here elongates the temporal parameters of his earlier work, reconstructing the views of Paul's most significant interpreters from the distant past to the turn of the twenty-first century. Against the backdrop of his fair and principled survey of scholarship, Westerholm's own examination of Paul's texts is characterized by a depth of analytical and theological perception rarely found in scholarly studies. For those with time to read only one book about Paul's view of justification by faith, this should be the book. And for those with time to read more, this is the book to start with."

Simon J. Gathercole
"Written with sparkling humor, this book is a landmark work both in its treatment of the vast scholarly literature and in its crisp exegesis of Paul himself. Perspectives Old and New on Paul is proof again, if proof were needed, that Stephen Westerholm is still head and shoulders above almost everyone else as an interpreter of Paul."

Frank Thielman
"Stephen Westerholm's most recent missive from the battlefield of Pauline studies will enliven the most dazed student and cheer the crustiest scholar. With his clear head and winsome sense of humor, Westerholm has once again produced one of the most insightful and readable studies available on the role of the Mosaic law, divine grace, and Christian faith in Pauline theology."

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