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Power and Change in Iran
Politics of Contention and Conciliation
By Daniel Brumberg, Farideh Farhi Indiana University Press
Copyright © 2016 Indiana University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-253-02079-6
CHAPTER 1
Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political Economy of Regime Transformation
Payam Mohseni
The contested Iranian presidential election of 2009 — which ignited the most serious challenge to the authority of the Islamic Republic since the revolution — seemed to be a turning point in Iranian politics. The violent repression of the Green Movement by the coercive forces of the state and the timely inauguration of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad to his second term in the presidency were ominous signs of a closing of the Iranian regime and a turn toward military dictatorship. The expanding role of the Islamic Revolution's Guard Corps (IRGC) in the economic and political realms, the strengthening of the Supreme Leader's power and position, and the sidelining of the reformists from the ruling elite all pointed to a fundamental change in the nature of the regime. Indeed, that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared Iran to be "morphing into" a dictatorship demonstrates the significance of this issue for both contemporary world affairs and domestic Iranian politics, presenting a bleak image of the future evolution of its political system. The specter of Iranian dictatorship thus came to loom prominently in both Western policy and academic circles alike.
The unexpected election of moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani to the presidency in June 2013, however, has brought this thesis under serious question. Despite the strength and attraction that such a view may have held earlier, these striking developments did not necessarily add up to a reworking of the logic of the political system as was commonly assumed. While there is no doubt that we were witnessing a transformation in the political order of the country, the same pieces of evidence pointing to Iranian dictatorship simultaneously presented a completely different image of the state of Iranian affairs. The ongoing shifts and changes begun with the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005 were instead internal transformations within the confines of the same system of multiple contentious power centers that had been established with the revolution. In other words, to recognize institutional modifications and shifts in power within the regime is one thing — and to argue that these institutional alterations produce a change of regime type to dictatorship is another. To avoid conflating these two seemingly similar — yet vastly different — processes, our knowledge of the precise institutional sites of transformation and the exact mechanics by which these changes have been occurring within the Iranian regime needs to be more fully developed.
This chapter explores the complexity of these processes and assesses the degree of change and continuity in the Iranian political system in light of the tumultuous events unfolding since 2009. Why have elite power relations in Iran been unsettled, and what is the impact of these factional fluctuations of power and processes of change on the institutional structure of the Iranian regime itself? It is critical to ask whether the manner by which institutional alteration occurs within the regime was conducive to the long-term monopolization of power by a single political faction. If so, has the multifactional and competitive nature of the regime been replaced by one of dictatorship, as may have appeared to be the case? Or, is the regime's system of elite conflict management and institutional restraint a durable feature that will persist in the foreseeable future?
A central issue that may illuminate these political trends is the country's shift toward economic privatization, which represents the most important case of strategic institutional change undertaken since the 1979 revolution. My analysis, accordingly, does not involve an examination of the purely economic dimension or material result of privatization per se but rather the intricate and highly contentious policy making and implementation stages that constitute its political facet. Privatization, in other words, allows me to explore the built-in regime mechanisms that produce institutional change in the country — to fully expose the impact of the institutional architecture of the Iranian political system on elite contestation. Such a study will increase our understanding of how the regime's institutions function and will delineate the manner by which the power of political factions guides and influences policy. This dynamic can be very revealing — both in terms of the sources and sites of elite contestation as well as the institutional restraints placed on elite power struggles. It will show us the contours and limits of transformation within the Iranian political system.
This analysis focuses on two levels: the regime's internal factional composition and its external institutional framework. These levels reflect Iran's political party capacity and its state institutional capacity, respectively — the two dimensions that political scientists argue must be addressed in order to assess the capability of state elites to monopolize power and construct dictatorship. Iran's factionalized political scene and high degree of regime checks and balances safeguard not only the competitive and inclusive nature of the Iranian regime but also the system's adeptness in restraining and inhibiting monopolistic drives for power by any one faction. In other words, the regime legacy of elite conflict management via multiple institutionally embedded power centers has endured, and it will likely define the parameters of Iranian politics for years to come. Moreover, my analysis of institutional change and factional contestation in the Iranian privatization program reveals that — far from being an effort to construct dictatorship — the rise of Mahmud Ahmadinejad and the theocratic hard-liners represents a systemic move for survival by the revolutionary and clerical power base of the regime that counterintuitively integrates them more fully within the multifactional order of power. The economic privatization policies and "China model" of development pushed by other regime elites — particularly former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — were viewed as existential threats that had to be resisted but yet, at the same time, adapted to. The politics of privatization thus unleashed serious challenges to the political and economic order of the country — the reverberations of which continue to this day.
The transformation we are witnessing in Iran therefore stems from a reworking of the Islamic Republic's factional architecture rather than its institutional metamorphosis to dictatorship. In a comparative perspective, unlike many Arab countries that have witnessed regime-opposition dynamics of street mobilization with the Arab Spring, the contentious politics of the 2009 Iranian elections represented a fierce intraregime elite struggle over the nature of the country's shifting economic order that spurred factional mobilization. The political uncertainty that pervades the factional scene today is thus a result of the relatively weakening power of old-guard political elites and the opening of regime gateways to the incorporation of new and rising social forces. The ensuing expansion and growth of the ruling elite circle of power will simultaneously reshape and transform the power dynamics and relationships among the country's power holders. In this fluid and competitive environment, the prospects of greater political accommodation of multiple social forces within the current regime will be more probable given a conducive international environment — a conclusion that has only been further confirmed by the election of Rouhani to office.
The Iranian Political System
Iran's Architecture of Power
Before delving into an examination of the factional struggle over economic privatization, I begin with a brief overview of the Iranian political system in order to introduce the larger theoretical framework guiding this analysis. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a quintessential hybrid regime whose institutional structure spans the blurred boundary between democracy and dictatorship. Political scientists have defined this regime category as any political system that resists classification as either a democratic or authoritarian regime by standard definitions, and it has received a diverse set of labels ranging from "illiberal democracy" and "semidemocracy" all the way to "semiauthoritarian" and "competitive authoritarian" regimes. Iran is classified as a hybrid regime because it holds popular competitive elections for both the executive and the legislature and has been witness to frequent turnover in both branches of government — a condition that is starkly absent in dictatorial regimes. At the same time, however, it is not a democracy because of the poor enforcement of individual civil liberties and the intrusive role of religious authorities who interfere in democratic processes of decision making. The Guardian Council, for example, is an Iranian body charged with vetting parliamentary laws that are deemed in violation of Islamic law and with assessing the qualifications of individuals running for political office.
Institutionally, however, Iran is particularly striking not just because it is the world's only electoral theocracy but because of the high degree of checks and balances its regime architecture provides. Its structure is characterized by many parallel institutions that accommodate multiple overlapping power centers — both institutional and factional — within the regime. It is composed, more precisely, of the three executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government rooted in Western constitutional design as well as unique political bodies including the Guardian Council, the Expediency Discernment Council of the System (Expediency Council for short), the Council of Experts, and the position of the Supreme Leader. Iran's institutional architecture contains many decision-making centers that share the responsibility of state policy formulation directly or indirectly — significantly more so than many other autocratic regimes.
These various regime bodies act as veto players, which are "individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo." In the United States, for example, the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court each represent a veto player, as they can effectively block or impede the decisions of another branch of government. Institutional checks and balances indicate the degree to which power is distributed in a political system. States with more veto players have stronger checks and balances that can prevent the monopolization of power in the hands of a single group and that impede significant institutional modifications.
Iran's complex and multifaceted regime architecture comprising many veto players thus generates a robust system of institutional checks and balances. Undertaking major institutional change in Iran is time- and cost-intensive because of the multiple channels by which policy can be blocked. A single group or faction cannot easily alter the institutional structures or even major policies of the regime. Iran's seemingly "stubborn" yet durable policy in the nuclear field and the difficulty facing Western states in negotiating with the Islamic Republic is another illustrative example of the thorny consequences posed by multiple veto players that represent different elite power centers. There is always another veto-playing institution and center of power blocking abrupt and significant regime alterations or policy U-turns. If significant change does come about — as is the case with privatization — it is a long, conflict-ridden process that includes the input and acquiescence of most if not all major political Iranian factions and institutions. The prospects of dictatorship are therefore much weaker for a regime like that in Iran.
The most important veto player, and the ultimate arbitrator, is the position of the Supreme Leader. In other words, this one veto right is more significant than all the others. The minimum requirement to partake in the political game or the "authoritarian bargain" of the Islamic Republic is to accept the legitimacy of this supreme veto player — the fundamental position of the velayat-e faqih. This veto power, however, does not mean that the Supreme Leader can single-handedly dictate all policy and actively undertake day-to-day governance. Rather, the Leader resolves elite conflict between other veto players and balances the interests of different political groups within the regime.
Such a balancing act, however, does not preordain or verify that there is a natural equilibrium of factional power within the political system. Factional power and positions constantly shift and fluctuate in the regime, with some groups becoming more ascendant than others at different times. Rather, the balancing role of the Leader means that the ultimate veto player should both prevent any one group from attaining political hegemony over government institutions for an extended period of time and ensure the meaningful incorporation of multiple voices and interests in the policy-making process of the state. Policy making, in other words, should not be a unilateral affair. To provide further explanation, we must first understand the nature of Iranian political factions and the history of electoral turnover and factional inclusion in the Islamic Republic prior to the 2009 election.
The Fluidity of Iranian Politics
In contrast to its vigorous system of checks and balances, Iran has a weak — if not nonexistent — political party system. Instead, the Iranian political landscape contains a disarray of associations, parties, and individuals loosely affiliated over ideological and socioeconomic issues in the form of factions. The absence of Iranian party capacity is an important factor inhibiting the regime's move toward dictatorship. No single political group in the country can monopolize power and order political rule. As a power ascends, other factions form alliances to upend the other's growing ambitions, while factions themselves also splinter internally and dissolve in light of the changing political issues of the day and shifting conflicts of interest. And the fate of factional struggles is even more unpredictable given the uncertainty of competitive elections and popular input. The fluid condition makes constructing a dictatorship in Iran like building a house on quicksand.
Indeed, a hegemonic political party is often the defining feature of modern dictatorial regimes, as it provides an effective and durable means of elite management with which dictators can organize their rule. It limits competitive participation in the electoral arena and streamlines decision making among a like-minded cadre of ruling officials. Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the Nazi Party in Germany, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and that of China are all examples of party rule.
With the revolution of 1979, Iran interestingly tried its hand in creating just such a ruling party, the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), to dominate the political scene like other classic dictatorships, but the attempt quickly failed. The IRP initially provided the clergy with an effective vehicle to sideline liberal and Marxist forces from the political scene and to consolidate the revolution in the form of a theocracy. The IRP, however, was disbanded without heavy popular opposition or violence in 1987, with only eight years of rule. Intraparty elite conflicts and factional bickering — with stark policy disagreements on various political, economic, and even cultural issues — resulted in constant political deadlock and forced then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to frequently intervene. In other words, the absence of a clear programmatic ideology and political platform within the party and even among the revolutionary clergy — a condition that remains true up to the present day — prevented a totalitarian ordering of power. In stark contrast to the experience of other modern revolutions, no group of Iranian elites had the power, authority, or institutional capacity to eliminate their rivals irrespective of their desire to do so.
The era of relatively open and competitive factional politics — exemplary of the hybrid nature of the regime — was consequently unleashed with the party's abolishment in 1987. Since that time, factional formations have largely taken shape according to the two most salient dimensions of Iranian politics: the theocratic-republican regime divide and the left-right economic scale. The first dimension refers to the primary source of legitimacy for the regime, particularly the institution of the Supreme Leader — the guardianship of the jurisprudent, velayat-e faqih. The theocrats argue that this type of rule and guardianship is divinely ordained. While popular sentiment and approval is important to varying degrees, ultimately the power and decision rests with God and not with the people. For the republican factions, however, the ultimate authority rests squarely with the people. If the Islamic institutions of the regime and the leadership are legitimate, they are so because of popular approval and belief in them. Republicans, as a result, aim to reform the current Islamic system from within to make it more accountable to the people.
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Excerpted from Power and Change in Iran by Daniel Brumberg, Farideh Farhi. Copyright © 2016 Indiana University Press. Excerpted by permission of Indiana University Press.
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