Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France

by John D. Huber

Overview

Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. Professor Huber investigates the decision by French elites to include in the Constitution legislative procedures intended to "rationalize" the policy-making role of parliament and analyzes the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability, and political accountability. Through its use of theories developed in the American politics literature, the study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and the shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521562911
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	08/28/1996
Series:	Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	230
Product dimensions:	5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.67(d)

Table of Contents

Introduction; 1. Parliamentary government in the Fifth Republic; 2. Choosing institutions; 3. Restrictive procedures and policy conflict; 4. Restrictive procedures and bargaining among parties; 5. The confidence vote procedure and electoral politics; 6. Electoral politics, procedural choice, and the French budget; 7. Institutional arrangements, political parties, and parliamentary democracy.

Editorial Reviews

"Huber's analysis of confidence votes in parliamentary democracies is important and original....his award-winning book will greatly influence future scholarship on European legislative institutions." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly

"Students (at least in the upper levels) and specialists will profit from its lucid style and original thesis." Robert Ladrech, Perspectives on Political Science

"Clearly and accessibly written for specialists in legislative behavior." W.R. Smith, Choice

"...admirable testimony to the power of neo-institutional rational choice models to clarify central procedures in parliamentary systems. John Huber's Rationalizing Parliament is an intriguing study of the effects of institutional change on democratic governance." Kaare Strøm, Legislative Studies Quarterly

From the Publisher