Resurgent Russia, researched and written by six residents and internationally experienced officers at the US Army War College, analyzes the current threat of Russian acts of war—both conventional military attacks and unconventional cyber warfare or political attacks—against the United Stated and NATO. The officers detail how the America can use its international military resources and political influence to both prepare for and deter aggression ordered by Vladimir Putin, making it clear that such an attack would be unsuccessful and therefore keeping the peace. This study provides a clear assessment of how the United States and its allies must utilize their political and military power to deter Russian aggression and maintain the hierarchy of power in today’s world.
Resurgent Russia, researched and written by six residents and internationally experienced officers at the US Army War College, analyzes the current threat of Russian acts of war—both conventional military attacks and unconventional cyber warfare or political attacks—against the United Stated and NATO. The officers detail how the America can use its international military resources and political influence to both prepare for and deter aggression ordered by Vladimir Putin, making it clear that such an attack would be unsuccessful and therefore keeping the peace. This study provides a clear assessment of how the United States and its allies must utilize their political and military power to deter Russian aggression and maintain the hierarchy of power in today’s world.
Resurgent Russia: An Operational Approach to Deterrence
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Overview
Resurgent Russia, researched and written by six residents and internationally experienced officers at the US Army War College, analyzes the current threat of Russian acts of war—both conventional military attacks and unconventional cyber warfare or political attacks—against the United Stated and NATO. The officers detail how the America can use its international military resources and political influence to both prepare for and deter aggression ordered by Vladimir Putin, making it clear that such an attack would be unsuccessful and therefore keeping the peace. This study provides a clear assessment of how the United States and its allies must utilize their political and military power to deter Russian aggression and maintain the hierarchy of power in today’s world.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781510726222 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Skyhorse |
| Publication date: | 11/21/2017 |
| Sold by: | SIMON & SCHUSTER |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 208 |
| File size: | 2 MB |
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel R. Reed Anderson is currently a member of the U.S. Army War College resident class of 2016, upon completion of which he will serve as the Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia.
Lieutenant Colonel Antonio M. Paz is currently a member of the U.S. Army War College resident class of 2016. He has served in command positions on multiple tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Europe.
Lieutenant Colonel Kyle A. Reed has led operations in Atlantic Resolve, U.S. reassurance to the NATO Alliance and the Baltic Nations, and Fearless Guardian, a U.S. training mission in support of Ukraine military forces to increase the defense capabilities of their Nation.
Lieutenant Colonel John T. Vaughan is an assault amphibious vehicle officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. Upon graduation from the U.S. Army War College, he will assume duties as deputy G-3, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, in Manama, Bahrain.
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA'S AIMS THROUGH THE LENS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN, HISTORY AND CULTURE
Over the past century, U.S. relations with Russia have evolved from ally to enemy to strategic partner to competitor. Relations between Russia and the United States today are strained in light of Russia's actions in Ukraine as well as each actor's diverging interests. One question persists as the West tries to understand Russia. What motivates Russian President Vladimir Putin's foreign policy approach toward the United States and Eastern Europe and how can the United States influence Russia's foreign policy? The ability of the United States to understand Russia has been challenging and difficult in the past. Moreover, the political landscape and national interests of the Russian Federation have drastically changed since the breakup of the Soviet Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement, the Global War on Terror, and the current Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) conflict in Syria.
The United States consistently misunderstands Russia's aims due to differences between U.S. and Russian political, social, and strategic culture. A common fallacy in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia is the belief that Russians think, behave, and make decisions like U.S. citizens. American policymakers are confused when Russian policymakers make decisions that are ambiguous and diverge from U.S. ideals and policy aims. Attempting to employ "mirror imaging" as a way of influencing Russian foreign policy is dangerous and has yielded little benefit. The reset policy of 2009 validates the cognitive trap of mirror imaging specifically with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010. New START sought to mutually reduce nuclear arms and launchers between the United States and Russia. Applying the principle of mirror imaging, if Russia thought like the United States, then both parties would likely agree to diminish their nuclear arsenals equally as part of the compromise. Conversely, since Russia thinks differently than the United States and more so in the mindset of a zero-sum game, New START required cuts to the U.S. nuclear arsenal while not reducing that of Russia.
Sun Tzu professes that one must know oneself and the enemy. If one knows neither then one is always in peril. To understand the Russian mindset and influence it, one must be intimately familiar with the context of history, Russian/Soviet culture, and how these factors influence the Russian executive decision-making process. For example, the Russian desires to protect its homeland and a general distrust of outsiders have been unusually strong influences on Russian foreign policy. Careful examination of Russia's national interests as well as the previous decisions of Russian leadership to meet those ends can assist U.S. policymakers in developing successful strategies and policies to deal with the Russian Federation in the coming century.
In attempting to understand what has motivated and incentivized previous and current Russian leaders, this chapter argues that Russia's foreign policy toward the West is driven chiefly by four overarching concepts: the psychological background of President Putin and the evolution of his thought process; the desire for Russian domestic control of the population through a centralized government; a general, enduring distrust of the West; and protection of the Russian homeland through an outside "buffer zone." After specifying the nature of these concepts, this chapter will then assess the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools most likely to influence Russia's foreign policy approach.
PUTIN: SHAPED BY CULTURE, HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE
The actions of President Putin illustrate decision-making trends of his foreign policy as well as his interactions with the United States and Europe. He has been called a tsar, an autocrat, and above all else a protector of the Russian Federation. Putin's psychological background was shaped early in his career through Western interaction. Putin was the former head of Russian Federal Security Service, Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), a successor of the Committee for State Security Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti KGB), and also a self-proclaimed Chekist (from the abbreviation for Extraordinary Commision, ChK) who spent a considerable amount of time outside of the Soviet Union in 1985-1990 in East Germany. Chekists view themselves as top leaders in Russia who orchestrate the political and economic well-being of the state. Time spent out of Moscow proper gave Putin a more holistic approach to Russia's place in the international order. He has a strong sense of national pride and order from his KGB background, but his posting outside of Russia has given him a unique perception of Europe and the West. From this peripheral position, Putin gained an acute awareness of the widening economic, technological, and strategic gaps between Russia and the West. Putin saw this widening gap as a potential domestic threat. If the Russian population were exposed to a better way of life through economic and technological advances, then surely an uprising inside Russia would ensue. This exposure may have shaped his views that the Russian population should be insulated from the West and strictly controlled to ensure Russia's preservation and status quo. Further, Putin's desire to control the Russian population stems from his sense of preserving the state and keeping the system intact. This feeling of control and preserving the homeland was also evident in the way that Putin handled the conflicts in Dagestan and Chechnya in the late 1990s. Fearing the collapse of the Russian state, Putin moved Russian forces into Chechnya to keep Chechnya under Russian control. Should Chechnya gain independence, Putin feared it would only keep expanding and seize additional territories.
Moving on from the FSB, Putin was appointed as Prime Minister in 1999. In 1999, President Boris Yeltsin stepped down and Putin became acting president. Putin came into the presidency in an era of instability and crisis. During Yeltsin's tenure as president, Russia was in a period of decline. Russia struggled to define itself in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russian agricultural and industrial production was half of its previous output, and death rates increased as birth rates declined. Russia's political leadership lacked stability, strength, and continuity. Economically, Russia was trending downward. This was evident in several areas such as the country's search for a post-Soviet identity and purpose, ineffective governance, and rampant corruption.
Putin represented a much-needed return to stability and competence in governance and foreign policy, which was a stark contrast to Yeltsin's mismanagement of foreign policy and string of domestic policy failures. Yeltsin's presidency was plagued by failure to enact reforms in several key areas ranging from military and security reforms to energy sector and social entitlements. To the Russian people, Putin represented a return to an idealized world of stability and order. Putin moved away from Yeltsin's ad-hoc management style and used his influence to return a significant amount of power back to the executive branch. Putin's pragmatic leadership style has centered on one of centralized control and consistency.
Because of Putin's strong hand and institution of centralized government or a vertikal vlasti, he continues to enjoy popular Russian support. Vertikal vlasti is the single line of power that emerges from the executive branch of the Russian president down to federal and provincial levels of government. Additionally, a vertikal vlasti reduces the system of checks and balances on the executive by the legislative and judicial branches of government. Use of the single line of power has enabled Putin to advance his agenda, reduce opposition to his policies and maintain control of the Russian population, as well as maintain control of the strategic narrative in his foreign policy actions, a point that Chapter 5 will further explore.
The enduring theme in Putin's first term as president was that of a savior. The Russian population saw him as restoring order to governance, and establishing national identity and international rapport. The West saw him as a competent and amenable person. Putin's rhetoric at this time was European leaning — he espoused that Russia was a European nation and was receptive to discussions on European security and economic integration. Putin's initial aims were twofold — a calculated approach to restore Russian stability to government and a strategic approach to restore Russia's former status in the international order. Putin has often been compared to Louis XIV and his mantra regarding France, "L'état c'est moi" ("I am the State"). Putin was seen domestically as a leader who was reviving Russia, but some questioned whether his policies would change under his successor.
Dmitry Medvedev was Putin's protégé and handpicked successor in 2008, much as Putin was chosen by Yeltsin. Similar to the Yeltsin years, prime ministers have been appointed and presidential successors are chosen prior to any democratic election. Because of this, there typically has not been a significant change in Russian governance from president to president since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that Russian policy will change dramatically whenever Putin leaves the political stage, which is a key assumption in developing long-term policies and strategies toward Russia.
Additionally, studies of previous "democratic" processes in Russia illustrate a far different type of democracy than what is typically observed in the West. In Russia, democracy is more illiberal and managed. The system of government is more autocratic with elements of democracy. Democratic institutions such as free and fair elections and freedom of speech are "managed" in Russia to "maintain order." The term hybrid regime is often used to describe the Russian Government with a combination of authoritarian and diminished democratic elements. The opposition to the incumbent rarely prevails, because it is difficult to mobilize enough support to wage a campaign in the extremely limited political space that the government makes available to "opposition" forces.
In the case of Dmitry Medvedev's presidency, there were very few deviations from Putin's previous security policies. In his policy "National Security Strategy until 2020," Medvedev stated that Russia should emphasize multi-polarity in a U.S.-dominated unipolar system, openness to diplomacy (even with the West), protection of Russians wherever they may live, and the assumption that Russia has privileged interests in the near abroad. Medvedev's presidency was receptive to diplomacy with the West, yet it was also tempered with caution and distrust.
In essence, Medvedev's foreign and security policy did not vastly differ from that of Putin. Furthermore, Putin remained in the Russian Government as prime minister to monitor and mentor his successor. Medvedev's presidency and security policies were remarkably consistent with the Putin years. Overall, Medvedev was criticized for an inability to gain control of his security administration's apparatus during the tenure of his presidency. He did not wield the same power and control inside of the vertikal vlasti as Putin. This became clear during the 2008 Georgia-South Ossetia crisis when no Russian executive decisions were made until Prime Minister Putin returned from the Olympic Games in Beijing.
Although not as effective as Putin, Medvedev did set the conditions in his security strategy for the international community to perceive Russia as a country that had persevered and overcome its domestic issues, was recovering economically and should be a peer amongst other world powers. Above all else, both Putin and Medvedev shared another common goal, to remain in power and to see Russian aims realized. Both leaders saw the need to maintain and preserve a veneer of legitimate governance that the Russian people could rely upon at any cost. The Western version of a legitimate government implies a system that elects its leaders through competitive elections, the presence of civil society, and an adherence to "rule of law." Both Medvedev and Putin encouraged legitimacy with the ultimate goal to stay in power, but their actions run counter to a truly Western legitimate democratic government. Elections in Russia have never been truly competitive, free, or fair, and Russian control of the media continues.
Each leader viewed the loss of control domestically as a loss of international respect. Both Putin and Medvedev believed that the appearance of a legitimate government must be maintained both at home and in the near abroad in order to quell the threat of a democratic uprising in Moscow. Neither Putin nor Medvedev wanted another color revolution happening in Moscow as they had in Kiev, Tbilisi, or Bishkek. According to the 2009 Russian security strategy and analysis by Dr. Hans-Henning Schroder, a professor at the University of Bremen, "an 'orange scenario' — a development resembling that in Ukraine in 2004/2005 — is just as unacceptable to the Medvedev Administration as it was to Putin at the time." Emerging color revolutions in Russia's near abroad have increased Putin's distrust of Western democracy, which he associates with a loss of order and control.
RUSSIAN DOMESTIC CONTROL IS STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT
The Kremlin believes that a loss of internal control gives the perception of weakness and diminishes Russia's international stature. Maintaining control of the population has been a cornerstone of Soviet and Russian governance. It has been a common thread from Yuri Andropov's tenure as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1983 to President Putin's three presidential terms. Soviet and Russian leaders have consistently believed that opposition and dissidence leads to violent uprising, a loss of control and weakening of the state. Putin maintains domestic control through the implementation of the vertikal vlasti, media control, and targeted violence to suppress dissidents. Recalling the Yeltsin years of the Russian presidency where disorder, economic collapse, and corruption abounded, Putin in his first term, implemented measures to reign in provincial leaders and other branches of government to restore order.
Under the Putin Administration, control remains an integral part of his leadership style. Additionally, Putin has heavily influenced the State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, by eliminating the voting process for individual candidates. Voters can only vote via party lists for political parties, rather than individual candidates. The Duma has discretion to appoint party leaders arbitrarily. More importantly, international institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) consider elections in Russia unfair. The OSCE found fault on four counts with Russia's 2007 parliamentary elections and viewed these elections as neither free nor fair.
Putin has also compromised independence of the judicial branch, subordinating it to the elites' perception of state interests. Putin's Russia can be summarized and graded on its level of freedom compared to other countries by its Freedom House rankings. Freedom House, a non-profit organization dedicated to spreading freedom and democracy ranks Russia as a "6" in political rights and civil liberties, with "1" representing the most free and "7" the least free. Furthermore, Putin has taken great measures to retain control, reduce democratic processes, and suppress the opposition in Russia.
Moreover, under Putin, there have been several cases of targeted violence to control the opposition. Specific examples include the murders of Anna Politkovskaya, an outspoken journalist and political rights activist in 2006, and Boris Nemtsov, leader of the opposition in 2015. Both were outspoken in their opposition of President Putin and their murders speak volumes of the Russian population's willingness to accept silence and cooperate. Anne Applebaum, Pulitzer Prize-winning author and noted journalist on communism, ascertains that because of Putin's strong beliefs for the good of the state and desire for control, dissidents must be "carefully controlled through legal pressure, public propaganda and if necessary targeted violence." Putin has a long-standing distrust of the dissidents and has suppressed them effectively though media control and the fear effect through targeted violence. Furthermore, Putin is threatened by the rhetoric of Western democracy and views it as a catalyst to incite revolution from domestic Russians.
(Continues…)
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Table of Contents
Foreword Malcolm W. Nance xi
Foreword xv
About the Authors xvii
Summary xxiii
Methodolgy xxix
Introduction xxxi
1 Understanding Russia's Aims Through the Lens of Vladimir Putin, History and Culture 1
2 Deterrence Strategies in an Increasingly Complex European Security Environment 39
3 The Time-Distance Challenge of U.S.-Based Forces 81
4 Theater Security Cooperation in Europe: Key to Conventional Deterrence 117
5 The Information Environment: A Critical Element Often Neglected 143
6 Conclusions and Recommendations 163