Salutary Neglect: Colonial Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle
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Salutary Neglect: Colonial Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle
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Overview
Originally published in 1972.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780691646749 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 04/19/2016 |
| Series: | Princeton Legacy Library , #1444 |
| Pages: | 394 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.10(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.10(d) |
Read an Excerpt
Salutary Neglect
Colonial Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle
By James A. Henretta
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1972 Princeton University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-05196-3
CHAPTER 1
The Structure and Politics of Colonial Administration 1721-1730
IN APRIL, 1724, Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Duke of Newcastle, became Secretary of State for the southern department of the English government. The appointment of a thirty-year-old man of dubious abilities to such a position of power and prestige elicited considerable surprise and adverse comment at the time. What followed was even more unusual. For most men the secretaryship was the reward of a lifetime of political endeavor; for Newcastle it was only a long apprenticeship for even higher offices of state. The Duke administered the southern office for twenty-four years. In a ministerial reshuffle of 1748, he moved to the more prestigious northern department. Then, on the death of his younger brother, Henry Pelham, in 1754, Newcastle became the First Lord of the Treasury and the leading minister in the government. From this time until his death in 1767 the Duke was one of the most important men in English public life.
Newcastle's long tenure as Secretary of State placed the management of American affairs in his hands for nearly a quarter of a century. This was an exceptional period of service. In the years between 1696 and 1724 there had been thirteen southern secretaries; in the twenty years following the Duke's departure in 1748 there were to be nine more. A generation of colonial Englishmen was to grow to maturity while this remarkably durable politician served as chief colonial administrator. That the connection between the plantations and the mother country was less firm at the end of his career than at the beginning demands explanation: twenty-four years was more than enough time to achieve both political dominance over the colonial bureaucracy at home and administrative control over the officials and settlers in America.
In many respects the domestic and imperial situation was conducive to such an initiative. The extension of bureaucratic supervision over all areas of national life was the postulate upon which the mercantile system was founded. And, in an administrative organization based on personal patronage, Newcastle's control of the power of appointment gave him the ability, over a long period of time, to determine the composition of the expanding imperial bureaucracy. Constructive effort during this era of peace and of relative political stability might drastically have altered the history of the years that followed.
That few significant changes were forthcoming during this quarter of a century was the result of a number of factors. There was a positive antipathy to political and administrative reform in England during the first half of the eighteenth century. Moreover, the power of a single official to effect even a marginal change in the system of colonial administration which had evolved since the restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 was severely circumscribed by bureaucratic inertia and traditional policies. Finally, the character and abilities of the new Secretary of State did not inspire much confidence. Two years after the Duke's appointment, the imperial ambassador to the Court of St. James's reported to the Habsburg Emperor that "it is known to everybody that Newcastle is nothing but a figure of Secretary of State, being obliged to conform himself in everything to Lord Townshend, who is proprié autor et anima negotiorum."
I
Newcastle's subordinate position within the ministry headed by Lord Townshend and his brother-in-law, Robert Walpole, was the result of both his tender age and his political background. The eldest son of Sir Thomas Pelham, Sussex landholder, Member of Parliament, and sometime junior Lord of the Treasury, Pelham-Holles was the first member of his family to aspire to national political power. This was not surprising, for the Duke's title, as well as the bulk of his fortune, came from his maternal ancestors. From his mother's brother, John, Duke of Newcastle, and Lord Privy Seal from 1705 until 1711, Pelham-Holles inherited estates in ten counties with a yearly rent role of nearly £15,000, a strong political interest in Nottinghamshire, and complete control of two pocket boroughs in Yorkshire. When combined with the legacy from his own father, this princely inheritance provided the young aristocrat with an annual income of £20,000 and some influence over the election of ten members of Parliament.
The timing of these considerable bequests was as important as their size. Born in July, 1693, Pelham-Holles was still a very young man when his uncle died in 1711, and his father passed away a year later. Denied the personal guidance of the men whose ambitions he shared and whose political and financial resources placed him in a position to realize them, the young heir was slow to develop their balanced judgment and political acumen. "I am going out of your dependence," the essayist Richard Steele wrote to Pelham-Holles in 1713,
and will tell you with the freedom of an indifferent man that it is impossible for anyone who thinks, or has any public spirit, not to tremble at seeing his country in the present circumstances in the hands of so daring a genius as yours.
The impulsiveness and immaturity which Steele perceived in his patron were in fact the distinguishing characteristics of Pelham-Holles' behavior during the first years of his political life. In August, 1714, the young aristocrat obtained his majority and assumed his seat in the House of Lords as the Earl of Clare. Once in Parliament, he entered into a close relationship with the Whig politicians who were maneuvering to secure the peaceful accession of George I. Clare contributed substantially to this endeavor, spending thousands of pounds in the Hanoverian cause. This vast expenditure won considerable prominence at Court for the fledgling politician; by August, 1715, the new King had named him Duke of Newcastle-on-Tyne. However impressive this success, it was purchased at a very high price. In the following year Newcastle encountered the first of a long series of financial crises which were to punctuate his career at regular intervals and to influence profoundly his personal life and his political activities.
The initial collapse of Newcastle's credit was resolved by marriage and by a long-cherished position in the ministry. Indeed, the two were intimately related. The Duke's marriage to Harriet Godolphin in 1717 brought with it a dowry of £20,000, an appointment as Lord Chamberlain at a salary of £1,200 per annum, and a seat on the Privy Council. This substantial political advancement was the work of his wife's grandfather, the aging Duke of Marlborough, who intervened on Newcastle's behalf with Lord Sunderland, his son-in-law and the Lord Privy Seal. At one stroke Newcastle had secured temporary financial security, a position of considerable status, and what turned out to be a long and happy marriage. There was only one drawback to these fortunate developments. When his younger brother Henry Pelham followed Lord Townshend and Robert Walpole into opposition following a schism among the Whigs in 1717, Newcastle found himself bound by the strong ties of marriage and money to the weak ministry headed by Sunderland and Stanhope.
Consigned by his financial extravagance and his inner craving for the trappings of office to service in a declining administration, Newcastle sought to make the best of his new position. As Lord Chamberlain from 1717 to 1724, the Duke mobilized support for the ministry through the careful distribution of patronage. The appointment of two of his relatives, Thomas Pelham and Thomas Fane, the sixth Earl of Westmoreland, to the Board of Trade during these years represented some return on his massive financial investment in the Hanoverian cause. But most of the nominations made by the young aristocrat were not rewards to personal supporters but direct bribes to win votes for the government interest in Parliament. At this early stage in his career Newcastle did not have an independent political interest. His power in borough elections derived primarily from his national position and from the ministerial patronage at his command. Only in later years would this relationship be reversed and then only to a limited extent.
The circumscribed character of Newcastle's political influence was well appreciated by Stanhope and Sunderland. A "List of Members" who were dedicated supporters of the administration in the House of Commons clearly indicated the Duke's subordinate role. Only 4 of a total of 126 "placemen" or "men of business" owed their election to the budding politician. Some of the other members whose elections were managed by the Lord Chamberlain might vote with the ministry on most occasions, but they did not constitute the backbone of the administration forces in the parliament. The Duke's help was valuable in forming a government majority in the Commons, but it was by no means indispensable.
Indeed, Newcastle's promotion to Secretary of State in 1724 proceeded as much from financial weakness as political strength and was part of a larger transformation in the composition of the ministry. In 1720 Townshend and Walpole rejoined the government as Lord President of the Privy Council and Paymaster of the Forces. Then, during the political crisis produced by the failure of the South Sea Company, the brothers-in-law sought to achieve a dominant position within the administration. By the spring of 1721 Townshend had become Secretary of State for the northern department, and Walpole had succeeded the disgraced Sutherland as First Lord of the Treasury. This initial consolidation of power was followed, in January, 1723, by an attempt to undermine the position of Lord Carteret, the Secretary of State for the southern department and the last member of the Sunderland faction still holding major office. Within six months the new leaders of the ministry had won the appointment of Horace Walpole as Ambassador to Paris, the most important capital in the southern department. "Putting so near a relation of ours over Schaub's head at a court where the whole scene of affairs centers in Carteret's province," Townshend confided to his brother-in-law, "is publication to the world of the superiority of our credit." The confidence of the northern secretary was not misplaced. By early 1724 the King had been brought to acquiesce in the ouster of Carteret and his dispatch to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant. There Walpole hoped his longtime rival would fall into further disgrace in the controversy engendered by the flagrant manipulation of Irish currency by public officials in England.
In fixing upon Newcastle as Carteret's successor, Walpole and Townshend were not swayed primarily by the Duke's electoral influence. It was not that considerable; in any event, it was already at the disposal of the ministry because of Newcastle's relationship with Henry Pelham and, more important, because of the Duke's continued dependence upon his government salary. For the second time in his short political career Newcastle was on the verge of bankruptcy and was seeking additional support from the government. In conjunction with an extravagant life-style and an extensive housebuilding spree, the Duke's electoral expenses in the Whig cause had bitten deeply into his huge income and had encumbered his estates with expensive mortgages. The improvident aristocrat had no choice but to switch his allegiance to the new ministry and to hope for financial salvation through ministerial largesse.
Yet more than charity to a hard-pressed supporter was involved in Newcastle's appointment as Secretary of State for the southern department. Walpole and Townshend were acutely aware of their precarious control over the new ministry and hesitated to bring a man of ability, such as William Pulteney, into the government. Newcastle appeared to be a perfect choice; not only was the Duke young and inexperienced but also his perilous financial position would deter him from any hasty adventures. After the protracted struggle to remove the Sunderland Whigs, the senior ministers were anxious to have a submissive colleague. Initially, this arrangement was satisfactory to Newcastle as well. Shortly before receiving the seals of office, the Duke confided to Horace Walpole that
nothing but my dependence upon the friendship and great ability of my Lord Townshend at home and the information and advice that I shall receive from you abroad could have induced me to undertake an office which at present must be so difficult to me. ... I shall in everything act in concert with My Ld. Townshend.
II
Newcastle's acknowledged dependence upon Townshend and the Walpoles severely limited his authority over the management of colonial affairs. Indeed, during his first six years in the southern department Newcastle was able to secure American posts for only two of his friends and supporters. With the assistance of Nathaniel Gould and Hum Morice, two London merchant-bankers, he won the appointment of Alexander Henderson as Attorney-General of Jamaica in 1727. Subsequently, he arranged for the nomination of Alexander Forbes, a loyal supporter of his political interest in Sussex, to the Provost Marshal's office in the same colony. But this was the extent of his influence over the disposition of important offices. The Duke urged Lieutenant-Governor Dummer to enlist William Woodside as a captain in the militia of Massachusetts Bayj recommended a clerk of the Earl of Lincoln for employment in Barbados j sanctioned a land grant in Pennsylvania for former Governor William Keith ·, and wrote the Governor of Barbados on behalf of a near relation of a gentleman with "a very great Interest in Monmouthshire." Yet these were minor matters 5 they represented the appurtenances of authority rather than the real thing. The southern secretary possessed the seals of office and the formal status they accorded. What he lacked was the effective power that constituted the core of the position.
This fact was all appreciated by aspirants to American offices. Most applications for colonial posts were sent to the northern secretary rather than to Newcastle. In November, 1725, for example, the Earl of Warwick apprised Townshend of a complaint being entered against one of the governors in the West Indies. Warwick took the opportunity to remind the minister "of the encouragement your Lordsp was pleased to give me to Expect your Interest and Assistance in obtaining either the Government of Jamaica, Barbados or the Leeward Islands, which should first happen to become vacant." In 1725 and again in 1728, John Lloyd petitioned Townshend for preferment in South Carolina. And when a group of "London merchants trading to Bermuda" complained of the "Oppressive Methods" of Governor Hope, they courted the favor of Townshend rather than his junior colleague. Even political cranks appreciated the hierarchy of authority within the ministry. In 1727, "A.D." of Maryland warned the senior secretary of a Roman Catholic plot in that colony.
The few petitions for colonial preferment that were addressed to the southern secretary during this period were mostly for the sake of bureaucratic formality. "I hope I have been recommended in as full a manner as almost can be desir'd, to both his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, & Sir Robert Walpole," Woodes Rogers wrote to Newcastle's secretary with regard to the governorship of the Bahama Islandsj "[I] ... have often had Sr. Robt & my Lord Townshend promise that I would be employ'd ... And when Samuel Vetch petitioned the Duke in 1725 for the government of New England, he was careful to point out that he had "the honour to be particularly known ... to my Lord president, Lord Townshend and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. ..." Newcastle might hope to supervise the governor once he was appointed, but it was the brothers-in-law at the head of the ministry who made the initial nominations to these lucrative positions. The pattern of solicitation for American positions reflected in microcosm the relative levels of power and influence in English political life.
Sensitivity to the informal gradations of status and authority within the administration was especially acute among those with a first-hand acquaintance with the colonial bureaucracy. Townshend's initiative in ordering the Board of Trade to prepare its comprehensive report of 1721 had established once and for all the northern secretary's concern with American affairs. As a result, matters of policy as well as of patronage found their way to his desk. In 1724, a group of London shipwrights unsuccessfully petitioned Townshend for legislation to prohibit the construction of ships in New England. Two years later, Martin Bladen of the Board of Trade directed his memorandum on the state of the colonies to the senior secretary rather than to Newcastle, a procedure that was repeated by Sir William Keith in 1728. Indeed, by this time much of the ordinary administrative business of the colonies was being handled by Townshend's office.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Salutary Neglect by James A. Henretta. Copyright © 1972 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
- Frontmatter, pg. i
- Preface, pg. vii
- Contents, pg. xi
- List of Abbreviations, pg. 2
- CHAPTER I. The Structure and Politics of Colonial Administration, 1721-1730, pg. 3
- CHAPTER 2. The Movement for Reform, pg. 60
- CHAPTER 3. The Beginning of the Newcastle Era, pg. 107
- CHAPTER 4. The Great Struggle for Power, 1737-1741, pg. 166
- CHAPTER 5. The Rewards of Victory, pg. 220
- CHAPTER 6. The Consolidation of Power, 1742-1754, pg. 272
- CHAPTER 7. The Legacy of the Past, pg. 319
- Bibliography, pg. 351
- Index, pg. 365