Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians

by Glenn R. Parker

Overview

Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on economic literature on the behavior of firms, Glenn Parker answers no. He argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. He draws parallels between politicians and businesses, since both stand to suffer significantly when accused of wrongdoing.


Just as business' poor behavior can cause brand names to be tarnished, prices to plummet, and future business to disappear, dishonest politicians stand to sacrifice the human capital invested in their careers, and premiums for honesty, such as electoral security and prestigious post-elective employment. Parker explores public attitudes toward the behavior of members of Congress and shows how those attitudes shape the way members conduct their professional lives. Written from the perspective of public choice, this book offers a novel approach to the question of how to keep politicians honest.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691117393
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	04/25/2004
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	192
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.30(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Glenn R. Parker is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Purdue Univeristy. He is the author of Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society.

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables ix

Acknowledgments xi

Introduction 1

Chapter 1

What is Opportunism and How Do We Control It? 15

Chapter 2

How Reputations Control Cheating in Economics and Politics 38

Chapter 3

Problems in the Market for Legislators 55

Chapter 4

Hypotheses, Measurement, and Data 71

Chapter 5

Constraining Opportunism through Self-Policing 85

Chapter 6

Reputational Capital and Job Security; or, If Trustworthy Legislators Are at a Premium, Are They Paid One? 103

Chapter 7

Weaknesses in Reputational Controls 124

Conclusion 139

Appendix 1

Most Important Characteristic for Legislator to Possess: Examples of Category Content 151

Appendix 2

Examples of Categories of Employment 153

Appendix 3

Codes for Identifying Faithful Agents 154

Appendix 4

Lifetime Judicial Appointments: 1965-1996 156

Appendix 5

Examples of Prestigious Post-Elective Employment Positions 157

Appendix 6

Electoral Defeat and Post-Elective Employment for Senators in the Analysis 158

Notes 159

References 169

Name Index 177

Subject Index 179

Editorial Reviews

"A number of important issues . . . are carefully explored in this rich and important analysis."—-Gary W. Copeland, Perspectives on Politics

From the Publisher

A number of important issues . . . are carefully explored in this rich and important analysis.

Perspectives on Politics - Gary W. Copeland

A number of important issues . . . are carefully explored in this rich and important analysis.
— Gary W. Copeland

Perspectives on Politics