Shi'i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal
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Shi'i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal
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Overview
Mara A. Leichtman offers an in-depth study of Shi'i Islam in two very different communities in Senegal: the well-established Lebanese diaspora and Senegalese "converts" from Sunni to Shi'i Islam of recent decades. Sharing a minority religious status in a predominantly Sunni Muslim country, each group is cosmopolitan in its own way. Leichtman provides new insights into the everyday lives of Shi'i Muslims in Africa and the dynamics of local and global Islam. She explores the influence of Hizbullah and Islamic reformist movements, and offers a corrective to prevailing views of Sunni-Shi'i hostility, demonstrating that religious coexistence is possible in a context such as Senegal.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780253016058 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Indiana University Press |
| Publication date: | 12/22/2021 |
| Series: | Public Cultures of the Middle East and North Africa |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 316 |
| File size: | 4 MB |
| Age Range: | 18 Years |
About the Author
Mara A. Leichtman is Associate Professor of Anthropology and Muslim Studies at Michigan State University. She is editor (with Mamadou Diouf) of New Perspectives on Islam in Senegal: Conversion, Migration, Wealth, Power, and Femininity.
Read an Excerpt
Shi'i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa
Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal
By Mara A. Leichtman
Indiana University Press
Copyright © 2015 Mara A. LeichtmanAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-253-01605-8
CHAPTER 1
French Colonial Manipulation and Lebanese Survival
Cosmopolitanism is ... not only a trope of modernity but also, and very specifically, of colonial modernity.
— Peter van der Veer, "Colonial Cosmopolitanism"
Cosmopolitanism is the Western engagement with the rest of the world and that engagement is a colonial one, which simultaneously transcends the national boundaries and is tied to them.
— Peter van der Veer, "Colonial Cosmopolitanism"
Some scholars have been skeptical of cosmopolitanism discourses invoked by the civilizing mission of imperialism (Clifford 1992; Hannerz 1990; Ong 2006). Van der Veer (2002), however, makes a strong case for examining cosmopolitanism in the colonial period (see also Kahn 2008; Kuehn 2012). As missionaries and colonial officers had a willingness to engage with the Other, van der Veer understands colonial cosmopolitanism to be a form of translation and conversion of the local into a ("provincialized") universal. Colonial modernity thus "disclaims its roots in a European past and claims a cosmopolitan openness to other civilizations. However, this is an openness to understanding with a desire to bring progress and improvement, a cosmopolitanism with a moral mission" (167). He critiques academic discussions of cosmopolitanism for lacking systematic attention to religion (although this is slowly starting to change).
This chapter will explore the French mission civilisatrice as one case study for van der Veer's model of colonial cosmopolitanism. Conklin (1997) regards civilization as a particularly French concept, invented in the eighteenth century. Republican France deemed itself civilized because the metropole learned mastery over geography, climate, and disease in order to create new internal and external markets, and overcame oppression and superstition to form a democratic and rational government before other nations. Inhabitants of the non-European world were envisioned as barbarians in need of civilizing precisely because they were perceived to have failed on these same accounts. Wilder (2005) examines French policy as colonial humanism, which enabled a cultural racism that was simultaneously universalizing and particularizing. French colonial discourses and policies — in particular approaches toward Lebanese migration and Islam in West Africa — can be analyzed as a form of translation and conversion of one conceptual framework into another that is more powerful and thus more universal. The Comaroffs (1991) have referred to this process as the colonization of consciousness. Linked to colonial cosmopolitanism is the question of autochthony, another basic principle of colonial policy, evident above all in the French politique des races.
On a more local but still cosmopolitan level, a subtheme of this chapter will consider how Lebanese in Senegal are a community defined as much by others as by self-definition. Whereas in Lebanon religion was the dominant identifier, in Senegal, race and country of origin became the community's distinguishing factors and served as the unifying characteristic of migrants. Lebanese in Senegal are conscious that their Lebaneseness is removed by geographical and generational distance from Lebanon, yet they are labeled "of Lebanon" by others. Being Lebanese is not a positive characteristic as defined by French and Senegalese administrators and businessmen. This chapter aims to further contextualize and historicize the development of Lebanese communal identity over several distinct periods in Senegal.
Van der Veer has been critical of what he interprets to be a Kantian view of universal, enlightened religion that is a source of morality and thus of cosmopolitanism, located in the interior life of the individual and not in social institutions. According to this Enlightenment view, religious people can thus be cosmopolitans if they are progressive liberals with private, and thereby secular, religious worldviews. Lebanese in Senegal have grappled with various ways of being pious cosmopolitans. Their religious traditions and practices have transformed over time and generation — not in an embracing of Western modernity and the privatization of religion, but in reaction to power politics and colonial manipulation. The following chapters examine how and why the Lebanese community has struggled to ignore sectarian tensions among Christian and Muslim denominations in Lebanon, yet maintain unique ethnic and religious identities in Senegal. I begin by exploring the impact of French colonial policy on the dissolution of Lebanese differences.
Academic scholarship on French colonialism in Africa highlights French Islamic policy and "divide and rule" strategies. The literature mentions but does not elaborate on the anti-Lebanese stance of the French (with the exception of Cruise O'Brien 1972). This chapter focuses on the period of French colonization in Senegal and chapter 2 on its aftermath. My goal is not to recount the entire history of French colonialism in West Africa (see Cohen 2003 [1980]; Conklin 1997; Cooper 1996; Crowder 1968; Harrison 1988; Robinson 2000) but to reconstruct from the works of these authors and from colonial correspondence in the Archives Nationales de la République du Sénégal a relevant account of French policy and attitudes concerning Islam in general and the Lebanese community in particular. Even before Lebanon and Senegal were nation-states, competition between secular, religious, and political forces was being negotiated in a colonial cosmopolitan context.
Lebanese or Syrian, Muslim or Christian?
There has been confusion regarding the historical origins of the Lebanese community of Senegal. Before the end of World War I, the Ottoman Province of Syria contained all of present-day Lebanon and Syria. Emigrants from this province were called "Syrians" without distinction, yet most were from Lebanon proper. After the Ottoman Empire's 1918 collapse, the former Province of Syria was divided by France in 1920 into two administrative units: Syria and Lebanon. After the French Mandate's establishment, immigrants became technically and legally Lebanese; nonetheless, the names Syriens and Libano-Syriens continued to be used in French West Africa as late as the 1950s in administrative reports and newspapers (Boumedouha 1987; van der Laan 1975). The community today identifies itself and is referred to by Senegalese exclusively as "Lebanese."
Although French colonial documents commonly referred to Africa's Levantine population collectively as "Libano-Syriens," they did, at times, distinguish between the two groups. I acknowledge that drawing too many conclusions from a limited selection of documents is problematic. However, additional evidence for this historical period is lacking. The archival data (with its colonial biases) presents the first generation of Lebanese migrants to Senegal as having arrived with the same sectarian differences that were prevalent in Lebanon. It is significant that such confessional differences continued to be recognized by the first generation in these early years, as well as enforced by French colonial officials. It is therefore worth quoting at length from a 1945 French report describing the "situation of Libano-Syriens."
A distinction is made between Lebanese and Syrians, and between Christians and Muslims. Lebanese are generally Francophiles. The Libano-Syrien population consists of approximately 2,200 individuals ... Three organizations exist: Comité Libanais de Dakar (Dakar Lebanese Committee), Comité Corporatif Libanais (Lebanese Corporations Committee), Comité d'Adhésion et de Bienfaisance (Social Services/Civic Committee). Rivaling and competing with one another, they illustrate the obvious division of the Libano-Syrien community. ...
Lebanese do not like to be called Syrian, and most often refer to the French legacy in Lebanon. On the whole, they remain true to their origins and are extremely happy that Lebanon and Syria have become two distinct sovereign States. ...
They are proud that Lebanon became independent but consider French protection a compelling necessity. They dislike and fear Syrians, from whom they are separated by a different culture and by Islam. They are afraid of being dominated by them. ...
Christians, including Orthodox, are Francophiles. The memory of distant crusades is still vivid in Lebanon. In contrast to Christian fears of an Arab government, Muslims are advocating pan-Arabism and what it represents. Their opinion toward France is therefore not very favorable. ... With the independence of Syria and Lebanon, the hope of the youth is to be more highly regarded and not considered European. ...
In short, "Christian" means attachment to France and "Muslim" detachment from France. With regard to their personal status, Christians are mainly afraid of being considered nonnationals. While both communities agree on the opening of a Lebanese consulate in Dakar, headed by a non-French West African Lebanese consul, Christians favor a Christian consul, Muslims a Muslim, Lebanese a Lebanese, and Syrians a Syrian. ...
To conclude, we must remember what distinguishes Lebanese from Syrians: Past, Culture, Religion. (Diégane Sene's Archive Collection/ANS:1945)
This report provides insight into French colonial views of Libano-Syrien communities in Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF). For French administrators, religion and national origin were indicative of political preferences, and were of utmost importance in a period of world wars, European competition for colonial expansion, and struggles to hold on to colonies despite protests by the colonized. French colonial documents in Senegal's National Archives suggest that the first generation of Lebanese immigrants was religiously divided. Archival evidence stresses that the first generation of Lebanese Maronites in Senegal endeavored to maintain sectarian distinctions in order to gain preferential treatment from the French, the custom for Maronites at that time in Lebanon (Salibi 1988). For example, the French noted in colonial correspondence regarding Lebanese Christians in Senegal:
Their [Lebanese Christian] arguments are always the same: they say that they are not Syrians, that Maronites belong to France, that Lebanon had better not get involved in an alliance in which it will represent an insignificant minority before a mass of Muslims who pose a threat to it.
They take up their old "clichés": the Crusades, their friendship for France, the schools created by the French, the religion that they have protected in Lebanon. (ANS 21G8(1):31 Mai 1945)
When asked, Lebanese Christians focus on the difference of religions and affirm their will to distance themselves from Syrians and Muslims whose sectarianism and extortions they fear. They attribute to the aforementioned the complete responsibility for a matter in which they claim to have no part. (ANS 21G8(1):18 Juin 1945)
Furthermore, French colonial archives describe how the first generation of Lebanese migrants to Senegal differentiated between Maronite and Orthodox Christians. This distinction can be understood in the context of colonial competition between French and British in West Africa, in particular in Senegambia. Whereas the French established Roman Catholic missions in Senegal, envisioning Catholicism as an instrument for spreading French influence culturally and politically, Protestant missionaries came to British-controlled Gambia. The French noted regarding Lebanese Christians:
One of them was saying these past days that Maronites have been even more clearly won over by France than Orthodox Christians, who would have a more marked penchant for the English. In any case, Orthodox Christians here have had to entirely hide their sentiments since their actions would not give rise to this interpretation. ...
In summary, Lebanese Christians whose rites are closest to those of the Roman Church seem to use their religion to prove that they are not our enemies, while others speak less often, and all appear to want to attribute complete responsibility to Syrians, whom they are not. (ANS 21G8(1):31 Mai 1945)
These quotes imply that the same ties between European colonial powers and different religious confessions in Lebanon also held true in another continent and colonial situation. However, although the French had a marked penchant for Maronites, and distrusted Arab Muslims whom they saw as a threat, they did not cater to Lebanese Christians in Senegal as they had in Lebanon.
This is highlighted in an interesting story recounted in this same document. A young woman by the family name of Nasrallah wanted to marry a man by the name of Saba Némé. The couple approached the French priest, Father Février, of Ziguinchor in the south of Senegal to perform the service. The priest (described as sectarian and intransigent) refused because the couple was Orthodox, and without the permission of the pope, the Catholic Church could not perform ceremonies for non-Catholics. The solution was a blow to the French. A British pastor from Bathurst "accepted without the slightest hesitation to marry these young people." The ceremony took place in Ziguinchor. The French colonial officer who penned the document critiqued: "I do not know if the difference which exists between Protestantism and Orthodoxy is less important than that between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and if it was easier for the English to marry these young people. In any event, Lebanese here praised this Pastor extensively and manifested the fear that Orthodox of Ziguinchor would not have a proper religious burial if they should die" (ANS 21G8(1):31 Mai 1945).
This story illustrates how the French distinguished between Catholics and Orthodox and exploited Lebanese sectarian differences in colonial rivalries in West Africa. Whereas Maronites stressed Catholicism as a unifying factor with the French, Orthodox were comfortable with either a Catholic priest or a Protestant pastor performing religious rites in the absence of a representative of the Orthodox Church. It is significant that confessional differences continued to be recognized by the first generation in these early years. In 1953 the French counted 45 percent Muslims among the Libano-Syrien community with a Christian (Roman Catholic or Maronite) majority. Yet at other times the archives refer to this "primarily Muslim" community. Despite an occasional report about divisions in the community, in practice French administrators did not distinguish Muslim from Christian or Lebanese from Syrian, and in anti-Lebanese campaigns accused all Libano-Syriens of various crimes outlined below. They often thought of the entire community as Muslim, despite its significant Christian population, which corresponded to French fears of "Arab Islam" contaminating African Islam noir. In order to understand this anxiety we must take a step back in history.
Origins of French Colonialism in West Africa
French presence in West Africa began in 1637 with the establishment of trading posts in Saint-Louis at the mouth of River Senegal. Over the next two hundred years French competed with Dutch, English, and Portuguese in the trade of slaves, gold, gum, and animal hides. It was not until the early nineteenth century that French influence expanded into Senegal's interior with Louis Faidherbe's 1854 appointment as governor of Senegal. Robinson (2000:43) calls Faidherbe the "founder" or "father" of Senegal. His name appeared on schools and streets and his statue faced the governor-general's residence (later the presidency) in Dakar until the 1970s. Faidherbe began to change the image of the European from "master of water" to "master of land" (61), and the conquest of Senegal, in its present form, was completed by the mid-1890s.
(Continues...)
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Table of Contents
Preface: Islam and Politics
Acknowledgments
Note on Transliteration
Introduction: Locating Cosmopolitan Shi'i Islamic Movements in Senegal
Part I. The Making of a Lebanese Community in Senegal
Introduction to Part I.
1. French Colonial Manipulation and Lebanese Survival
2. Senegalese Independence and the Question of Belonging
3. Shi'i Islam Comes to Town: A Biography of Shaykh al-Zayn
4. Bringing Lebanese "Back" to Shi'i Islam
Part II. Senegalese Conversion to Shi'i Islam
5. The Vernacularization of Shi'i Islam: Competition and Conflict
6. Migrating from One's Parents' Traditions: Narrating Conversion Experiences
Interlude: 'Umar: Converting to an "Intellectual Islam"
7. The Creation of a Senegalese Shi'i Islam
Coda: On Shi'i Islam, Anthropology, and Cosmopolitanism
Glossary
Notes
References
What People are Saying About This
"Takes the bold step of considering Lebanese and African Shi'a in Senegal together in the same volume, and refusing to admit the intellectual segregation of different racial communities in the same country by giving in to the temptation to write two separate, shorter books. . . . A significant contribution."
Takes the bold step of considering Lebanese and African Shi'a in Senegal together in the same volume, and refusing to admit the intellectual segregation of different racial communities in the same country by giving in to the temptation to write two separate, shorter books. . . . A significant contribution.
Takes the bold step of considering Lebanese and African Shi'a in Senegal together in the same volume, and refusing to admit the intellectual segregation of different racial communities in the same country by giving in to the temptation to write two separate, shorter books. . . . A significant contribution.