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Overview
Sepoys and Sowars of the Indian Army were involved in military actions in Macedonia and the Egyptian Western Desert, and from West Africa to China. The enemies were varied Germans, Bulgarians, Turks, enemy African Askari and Arab irregular troops, Mesopotamian insurgents, Somali, Senussi, Baluchi and Persian tribesmen, and Russian Bolsheviks who used Austrian and Hungarian former prisoners of war in their forces. But the regiments operating in these far-flung outposts of European Empires did not falter, and every campaign that they were involved in was successfully concluded or drawn to a close for political reasons.
This book highlights the lesser known campaigns undertook by the Indian Army of undivided India. It is hoped that it will generate a strong sense of pride in the battlefield achievements of a generation of warriors who all volunteered to serve, wherever in the world that service took them.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9789386457240 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Vij Books India |
| Publication date: | 10/03/2017 |
| Pages: | 344 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.10(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.10(d) |
About the Author
The high point of his military life was in the early 1970s when he commanded a rifle company of Baluch soldiers, also serving on contract, in the Dhofar Campaign that was being waged in the south of the Sultanate of Oman. That experience aroused a keen interest in the history of the Indian Army that served under British rule.
He writes for several military journals and has recently co-authored a book that describes the impact on and the military activities of the Naga tribe of north-eastern India during the 1944 Battle of Kohima.
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
An Assessment of the Situation on the Roof of the World
As an ICS officer of the Political Department, Arthur Hopkinson spent most of his career in the North-West Frontier Province, East and West Kathiawar States and Baluchistan. In 1944, he took over as Political Officer (PO) for Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. He continued in this post till India's Independence and, like his colleague Hugh Richardson, he was asked by the Government of India to continue 'till Indian officers are able to take the frontiers' mantle.
On August 1, 1948, while visiting Yatung in the Chumbi Valley adjacent to Sikkim, the seasoned officer writes a secret 'review' of the situation in Tibet between August 1945 and August 1948 from his camp office.
We shall quote from this note addressed to Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in Delhi.
Hopkinson writes that in August 1945, there was a vacancy in the Mission at Lhasa. As a result, he had to visit the Tibetan capital as "two abnormal difficulties necessitated an immediate visit".
The first issue, the vacancy in Lhasa, was due to the fact that during World War II, Hugh Richardson, the ICS officer who served in Tibet from 1936 to 1940, had been transferred to Western India (today's Pakistan). After Basil Gould and his party left Lhasa in February 1937, Richardson had remained behind as the first Head of the British Mission in Lhasa. He would return to Lhasa to resume his job only in 1946.
The other difficulty mentioned by Hopkinson was a trade boycott, enforced since several months by the Tibetan government. Hopkinson records that it was announced by the Tibetan Government in a truculent letter. 'Another outstandingly truculent' letter denounced the British trying to reassert their legitimacy over what Hopkinson calls, the Assam Tribal area (i.e. the McMahon Line area).
According to the British officer, both communications imputed breach of treaty and indicated an unfriendly Tibetan attitude.
He however admits that for the McMahon Line area "the Tibetans are justified only to the extent that we slept over the boundary provisions of the Simla Convention for nearly thirty years and no Tibetan, however highly placed, will ever undertake the onus of publicly acknowledging Indian ownership of territory hitherto regarded by them as Tibetan."
Hopkinson comments that "the most we can hope for at present is tacit acquiescence."
The PO is also keen to get a 'tacit acquiescence' of the 1914 Simla Convention: "[It] was the objective of my talks with leading individuals at Lhasa and ultimately, of the memorandum presented in January 1946; we insisted on the validity of the Treaty Line inviting them to specify what alterations (if any) they wanted in that line."
As we shall see, the Tibetans were not very forthcoming to take such an important decision during the Minority of the Dalai Lama.
Hopkinson's two-month stay in Lhasa bore its fruits and "backed by steady onward pressure and firmness on the Assam side we succeeded in securing this objective of tacit acquiescence."
This is not exactly true, as during the next two years the issue would continued to haunt the relations between India and Tibet. But "thanks to official steadiness and tact, Tibetan opposition became increasingly negligible," writes the PO, who admits, "While in Lhasa the matter was never again seriously raised for nearly two years, when circumstances attending the Transfer of Power seemed to give the Tibetans another opportunity of once more raising this old favourite."
However, in 1948, "the new effort does not appear prima facie to be very convincing."
The Ban of Cotton Cloth
The second issue to be negotiated was the Tibetan Government's ban on import from India of all goods which were earlier subjected to export control, particularly cotton cloth.
Hopkinson terms the ban as "stupid, due to ignorance or misunderstanding, played upon by the self-interest of one wealthy and powerful individual, Pangda Tshang"; the PO adds: "The stoppage involves loss and hardship to numerous Tibetan traders ("It is likehaving a grand meal put in front of you, and not being allowed to touch it", one of them said) as well as to some Indians, and produced interruption, bitterness and friction in the day-to-day relations."
The issue was twice referred to the Tibetan National Assembly with Pangda Tshang trying to oppose, but finally the ban was removed on November 15, 1945. The revocation became effective in January 1946.
Hopkinson concludes "in spite of occasional obstruction and difficulties (always traceable to Pangda Tshang), it worked well and with remarkable smoothness."
The PO is unhappy that during war-time, the Tibetan government is inclined to attribute the trade difficulties "to the perversity of the Government of India ... and the Political Officer in particular." A senior Tibetan Cabinet minister once sarcastically asked: "Do European hens lay fewer eggs during the War?"
The British were aware of the importance of business to regulate bilateral relations. During his visit in 1935, Sir Basil Gould had promised to do everything to facilitate bilateral trade. Hopkinson affirms: "we have deliberately set out to demonstrate to Tibetans the economic and commercial advantages of the connection with India, in order that, when changes should come, the economic and commercial bonds should hold firm, preserving the Indian connection intact against all other stress and strains."
The PO notes that "India delivers the goods, – goods that no one else can deliver, – cloth, sugar, kerosene, iron, copper, etc."
He has a point.
Poor communications with Tibet
The Tibetan accusations against the PO are not really fair. Hopkinson says: "the Political Officer has deliberately devoted himself (and his staff) to the treadmill of procurement and supply, including, not least, transportation."
The latter is a major issue: "We have, properly speaking, no road link with India; for our truck road is interrupted by a bridge (the Rambi bridge) which vehicles [cannot cross] – its renovation has been annually postponed since 1943; while the sole rail communication, the D.H. [Darjeeling Hill] small gauge railway between Giellekhola and Siliguri, long ago ceased to be able to cope with the traffic."
Further the communication links are often cut during several months at the time of the monsoon: "These local visible difficulties the Tibetans readily understand. But they are less appreciative of the difficulties resulting from more remote and less tangible cause, – shortages of goods, shortages of transport, losses on rail, the complications of railway priorities and (more recently) of import licences, exchange control and the like."
The Chinese, when they marched into Tibet, would take decisive actions on a war-footing. They immediately started building roads (including the Qinghai-Tibet and the Sichuan-Tibet highways inaugurated in 1954) as well as the Aksai Chin road (through Indian territory) which would be completed in July 1957.
Hopkinson mentions additional Indian difficulties, the disorganisation resulting from strikes (e.g. Tatas' strike, the Calcutta Post strike, the Post Office strike) and from losses in transit and in one case "improper official requisition of goods en route."
He also notes wholesale pilfering en route and a double customs and import/export regime "with all the scope that this gives to petty officialdom, allegedly only too ready to treat trade as a crime or a milch-cow."
Hopkinson feels that all the trade restrictions should be abolished: "The traders whom I have been meeting on the road in Tibet talk of trade being strangled."
Despite all these difficulties and complaints, trade is thriving; for example the wool figures for 1947-48 were highest in the last 3 years: "Wool for export is now at a premium."
"But there is another side to the medal", writes Hopkinson: "It is common knowledge that every Tibetan is at heart a trader: the commercial instinct is no creation of ours."
The PO comments that during the War and immediately after, "the facilities for easy and cheap procurement provided by the control system, the high prices offered by China and later by Nepal accelerated the tempo and created a get-rich-quick atmosphere that tended to debauch and demoralize Tibetans (not all Tibetans) of all classes."
The British officer admits that a Tibetan "who, on account of his supposed position or supposed political usefulness past or future, secured from the Political Officer an allotment of 100 maunds (3732.42 Kg; one maund being equal to 37.32 Kg) of cloth, could immediately without a hand's-turn convert that allotment into Rs.20,000/- cash down," adding "the local moralist (quite rightly) deplored it, but simultaneously, sinking scruples, applied to the Political Officer on behalf of his own particular friends."
The rat race for money by a certain class of Tibetans considerably weakened the State after India's Independence. But the PO could not be held responsible for the state of affairs, even though the habit to offer 'incentives' to Tibetan officials 'in a position to help' was certainly not healthy.
To add to the difficulties, the "influx of philistines, tourists pouring along the trade route," made things worse.
It had a demoralizing effect and "someone who would never have dreamt of doing so before, now stick out the hand and use the word 'buckshish', a word previously unknown."
The largesse of the PO's Office was certainly not helping to make Tibet a responsible State.
The PO mentions some other serious issues such as trafficking of women from Tibet to Calcutta. He also notes that a "person who returns to Tibet after a period of absence is struck by the deterioration in taste and production. Much of the stuff that Tibetans proudly bring back nowadays from China is appalling. But their own productions e.g. in the way of carpets have equally deteriorated." Hopkinson attributes this to the 'synthetic days' and the fact that even bad quality stuff 'commands a good price'.
And this was before the 'Made in China' days.
The Good Side of Old Tibet
Despite these 'difficulties', Tibetan manners were outstanding, he says. There is little crime even among 'the large collection of Tibetan muleteers at Kalimpong': "Muleteers are nowhere Saints, but a collection of Tibetan mulemen at Kalimpong would compare well with a corresponding collection of say, Powindas at Jamrud."
Hopkinson compares the Tibetans to the Pathans of the NorthWest Frontiers: "without being showy or swash-bucklers like the Pathans, they are just as virile and muscular. ... They are not prepared to stand nonsense, but without being aggressive, offensive or vindictive. They have knives and they like a gamble, but they do not, like Pathans, conclude their gambling parties with a stab in the belly."
He concludes: "Tibetans are above all friendly and cheerful. ... They sing invariably at their work, the labourer, the mason, the ploughman, in all the field operations, the lonely shepherd-boy on some wind-swept mountain-side and all sing tunefully."
The PO recalls a park where he camped near Shigatse: "It was like a musical-box in the early morning, as people passed by singing: even the criminals tightly shackled and let loose to beg their food, supporting themselves with sticks shuffled along the road, singing at the top of their voices."
It continues till the night, "all the camp-followers slid about in the cold and muddy lake that marked the site of our camp, wet to the waist, all spontaneously singing."
Hopkinson cites the great saint and poet Milarepa: "One of the favourite Tibetan saints is always portrayed, seated, in a thin cotton garment, his hand to his ear and his mouth wide open, singing lustily."
This too shows a certain 'natural kindliness cum commonsense' of the Tibetans, believes Hopkinson: "Instead of applying the whip to his horse's rump, the Tibetan horseman, when he wants to accelerate, displays it to the horse's eye, and the horse, brought up in Tibet, accelerates."
This can be considered a great compliment from the British.
Good Manners Endangered?
As he prepared to return to his native island, the British civil servant however notices some signs that Tibetan good manners are getting endangered "as a result partly of the increased contacts with philistines from without, partly of the increased commercialism and partly",he feared, also because of the so-called European education.
Hopkinson mentions the story of the English school which was opened in Tibet, before he took over from Basil Gould in Gangtok in 1944. It was the second time in twenty years that a school was opened at Tibetan behest. The first was in Gyantse, this time it was in Lhasa. Both times it had been "almost immediately closed in deference, it was said, to conservative prejudice against such a disturbing element."
Ironically one of the Tibetans responsible for the closure was a high official who had sent his son to a European school in Darjeeling. Later the same official sent another of his kids to India for schooling.
Hopkinson writes that the direct consequence of the closure of the Lhasa school is that "a spate of Tibetan children (to the tune of thirty or more)"were sent to European schools at Darjeeling or Kalimpong.
According to the PO, most Tibetans did not realise that it was 'a far more disruptive step'. He says: "These institutions, Belgian Jesuit or American, are founded on the underlying idea of racial, religious or cultural superiority, on the supposed superiority of the Vatican or Salt Lake City to the Potala, of store-suits to chubas, of forks to chop-sticks."
Hopkinson rightly notes that these institutions "set out, with the kindliest of motives, ultimately to denationalise them. It cannot be good for children to be kept away from their own homes, religion and culture for four years or more, forced into foreign clothes, taught (by their fellows rather than their masters) to despise their own country, until (as has actually happened) a boy tries to disown that he is a Tibetan."
How true it was! How many Tibetans (or Indians) realise this today?
It is courageous for an officer of the British Empire to write this in an official report.
Tibet's Immense Popularity
At the time of Indian Independence, another problem is the "spate of people wanting to visit the interior of Tibet. English, French, Canadian, Australian, American, Mexican, Greek, Danish, Italian, Malay; not to mention the direct approaches, of which we do not always hear, received in the Dalai Lama's fan-mail."
Hopkinson says that an important lady diplomat in Delhi told him: "Of course, I'm going: it is good for them".
But he remarks that "the Tibetans take a different view".
The Problem of the Minority
A far more serious issue is that "no individual in Lhasa is willing to undertake responsibility or take a lead, and (as the Chinese representative complained to my predecessor) it is difficult to find where plenary power lies."
Hopkinson realised this when he first visited Lhasa in 1945 to discuss the McMahon Line with the Tibetan authorities. Three years later, he notes: "Doubtless as the result of a long minority regime, Tibet has for several years had a Government weak and for the most part ineffective, ignorant and perplexed amid the changes and chances of this wicked world, composed for the most part of individuals interested in their own personal profit, but at the same time patriotically anxious to preserve Tibet's special status: apt to seek defence in procrastination, in temporisation and obscurity of language."
Ultimately this cost Tibet its independence.
Hopkinson cites the 'notorious Reting affair of 1947', but also 'the Sera Med conspiracy of 1944' and 'the conspiracy of Rapga, for some years established in Kalimpong as a paid a Chinese Agent.
Hopkinson mentions: "[after] Tibetan pursuit party had erroneously liquidated the wrong man, the Sera Med Abbot made his way to China", so did Rapga, who was given all the incriminating documents at the time of his deportation," thereby depriving the Tibetan Government of much interesting information."
These 'conspiracies' would later be used by China.
Rapga was financed by the Guomindang; he believed that China meant progress, while British India was the opposite. The symbol of his Party was a crossed sickle and Khukri.
Hopkinson writes: "In spite of Chinese favour – a regular stipend, a long interview with the Generalissimo, the patronage of Mr. TL Shen, [and] a Chinese title, Rapga seems to have been a stupid and inefficient agent, thanks, it has been suggested, to opium."
All this is very sad indeed.
Hopkinson also mentions the demand by the Tibetan Government for a broadcasting service in Tibetan and "efforts were made to this end, but never got beyond the experimental stage."
The PO then suggests that it is "not worth pursuing unless at least (which has not been the case) the Tibetan Government are willing actively to co-operate by deputing suitable personnel."
The PO is however impressed by The Melong, the first Tibetan language newspaper published from Kalimpong by Tharchin Babu, a missionary originally from Kinnaur. He believes that: "help and encouragement [from the Indian Government] is desirable. ... Now promoted from a broken-down litho-machine to a regular printing press, this paper has progressed greatly, not without effort applied from without. It has proved its popularity and usefulness, which further effort and patience will develop greater potential usefulness; not the least, it discourages hostile journalistic efforts like that planned by Rapga."
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation"
by .
Copyright © 2017 United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.
Excerpted by permission of Vij Books India Pvt Ltd.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Table of Contents
Introduction1. Military Operations in Aden during 1914 and 1915
2. Military Operations on the North-West Frontier and in Baluchistan – October 1914 – March 1917
3. The Actions at Shimber Berris, Somaliland, November 1914 to February 1915 Indian Sepoys fighting with the Somaliland Camel Corps
4. The 36th Sikhs at the fall of Tsingtao, China October to November 1914
5. The Suez Canal 1914-15
6. The Hong Kong-Singapore Mountain Battery in Egypt, Sinai and Palestine 1915 – 1918
7. The East Persia Cordon and the Sarhad Operations, 1915 – 1917
8. Indian Military Transport units in Macedonia 1916 – 1918
9. The 25th Cavalry (Frontier Force) in German and Portugese East Africa– September 1917 – February 1918
10. Operations in Transcaspia 1918 – 1919 Sowars, Sepoys and Guides fight the Bolsheviks
11. Fighting The Tangistanis Bushire, Persia, July – September 1915
12. The Gurkha Action at Tor, Sinai The 2/7th Gurkhas in action on 12th February 1915
13. Atonement: The 5th Light Infantry in German Kamerun August 1915 to February 1916
14. The 5th Light Infantry in East Africa March 1916 – January 1918
15. Lake Victoria, German East Africa, 6th December 1915
16. The 15th Ludhiana Sikhs and the Senussi The Egyptian Western Desert, November 1915 to February 1916
17. The 40th Pathans in action in East Africa January 1916 to February 1918
18. Indian Army Units in Action, March to mid-June 1916
19. Kisangire and Kisiju – Operations north of the Rufiji River Delta, German East Africa October and November 1916
20. The 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery (Frontier Force) in East Africa – December 1916 to December 1918
21. Indian Army Battalions in the Battle of Ramadi, Mesopotamia, 27-29 September 1917; Gurkhas, Garhwalis and Punjabis in action
22. The 30th Punjabis at Tandamuti Hill and Nakadi Ridge, East Africa – February – October 1917
23. The Kuki Rising 1917-1919 Insurrection in north-eastern India and Burma The Indian Labour Corps in the Great War and the Kuki tribe
24. Fighting the Marris and the Khetrans The Duki Column of the Marri Field Force, Baluchistan. February to April 1918
25. Indian Army units in Dunsterforce North-West Persia in 1918
26. Reforming and Redeploying The 120th Rajputana Infantry in southern Persia and Seistan 1918 – 1920
27. Death on a Dark Desert Night Scinde Horse sowars and Sikh Pioneers fighting to the death in the Manchester Column disaster. Hilla, Mesopotamia, July 1920
Bibliography
Maps
Chapter Location Map
East Africa Map
Middle East Map