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| ISBN-13: | 9789384464394 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd |
| Publication date: | 11/01/2015 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 84 |
| File size: | 461 KB |
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND TO SINO – PAK COLLABORATION
Sino – Pak relations were in a dormant state in 1947 at the time of creation of Pakistan. Pakistan was the third non-communist country and first Muslim country to recognize People's Republic of China on 4 January, 1950, after breaking its relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). The initiation of formal relations between the two countries can be traced back to May 1951, when Pakistan established diplomatic relations with China. Bilateral relations were further strengthened at the Bandung Conference in 1955, when talks between the two heads of state played an important role in promoting, understanding and paving way for friendly relations and mutual assistance between the two countries. In 1961, Pakistan furthered its relations with China when it voted in favour of China's restoration rights in the UN. Military aid from China to Pakistan began in 1966, strategic alliance was formed in 1972 and economic co-operation began in 1979. Maintaining close relations with China has been a central part of Pakistan's foreign policy. The foundation of relations between China and Pakistan took place at the behest of USA during the Cold War period. The U.S. policy at that time was to support any regime which was opposed to Soviet Union and its form of communism. At the outset, Sino-Pak relationship was based on their common security concerns. During the early stages of their relations, both the countries had to face security challenges for their survival. In 1948, Pakistan was engaged in a war against India over Kashmir and in 1950 China was drawn into the Korean War. The Soviet-Chinese union provided strength to China, but there was no international support for China. Meanwhile, Pakistan had joined the U.S. as an ally against the expansion of communism by joining Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Although this alliance provided Pakistan with economic and military aid, it was virtually abandoned in its hour of crisis during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Similarly, during the Sino- Indian conflict in 1962, India received economic and military aid from both USA and USSR. Since both China and Pakistan had fought wars with India, they had a common threat in the neighbourhood which became a strong binding factor for them. When the USSR supported India against China during the Sino-Indian border clash in 1962, Beijing realized that it should normalize relations with the USA. Pakistan played a key role in bringing United States and China to the discussion table and bridged their differences by identifying the Soviet Union as their common enemy. The 1971 Indo-USSR Treaty of Friendship posed another challenge to both Pakistan and China.
Geographical realities also brought both countries together. During the 1950s and 1960s both were considered as weak states. Geographically, both were in near proximity to their rivals. China, which harboured a historical hostility toward Japan and fell off with both India and the Soviet Union during those two decades, has adjoining borders with all three countries. Pakistan on the other hand had unfriendly neighbours-India and Afghanistan-to both its east and its west, a fact that figured prominently in Pakistan's security perspectives. Though geographical proximity and security issues led the two states to come together and without doubt United States played a key role in cementing the Sino-Pak relationship. Pakistan was driven by its paranoia about India, which brought it closer to China. In the early 1960s, Beijing was determined to obtain a hedge in South Asia against what it perceived as India's ambitions. Islamabad's support in the Sino-Indian boundary dispute endorsed China's outreach to its neighbours and China's anti-India policy provided the foundation for the Sino-Pakistani relationship to move forward.
The relationship gathered momentum in 1962, when China and India were engaged in a war over the disputed territory of Aksai Chin and the territory then known as the North East Frontier Agency. China defeated India. As a last-ditch effort, India approached USA for military support which saw it as an opportunity to gain a foothold in the region against the spread of Soviet and Chinese communism and began providing military support to India. America's other partner in the region, Pakistan, did not look favourably on Washington's support to its enemy. Pakistan had joined the SEATO as well as CENTO in 1954 as part of USA's efforts to establish a barrier around Soviet and Chinese communist powers. Pakistan even gave USA use of a top-secret air base to fly U2 reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. In return, the U.S. equipped and trained Pakistan military, which used the equipment and training to strengthen its negotiating position with India in talks over Kashmir and to prepare for a conventional war with India. Therefore for Pakistan, America's support to India in the Sino-Indian conflict was treated as a betrayal.
China took advantage of this rift to reach out to Pakistan. In the early 1960s, both the countries signed two landmark agreements and began joint construction of a major roadway, which added significant weight to their relationship. The first agreement was a bilateral trade pact signed in 1963. The second was the 1963 Sino- Pakistan Frontier Agreement, wherein China ceded more than 1,942 square kilometers to Pakistan and Pakistan on its part recognized Chinese sovereignty over 5,180 square kilometers of area in Northern Kashmir and Ladakh region. The two countries also began collaboration on a major project to build the Trans-Karakoram highway, often referred to as the Friendship Highway. This highway connects the northern areas of Pakistan to the Xinjiang province in China and its construction commenced in 1966 and is considered vital for commercial and strategic purposes.
The security dimension of the relations between the two countries surfaced and became evident during the 1965, Indo-Pak war. China was vocal in its support of Pakistan and deemed India as the aggressor. It even alerted its troops on the Indo-Tibet border to pressurize India. As a result of this, India came under pressure and acted cautiously in order to not displease the Chinese. Considering that 1965 war ended in a stalemate, one can assume that China was instrumental in boosting the morale of Pakistan during the war. Despite that there were no significant gains but every move fortified the friendship and gave Pakistan a sense of security it had always longed for. The Chinese support hailed by the Pakistanis further strengthened friendship.
The Indo – Pak war of 1971 was another occasion for China to offer immense political and diplomatic support for Islamabad. Throughout the Bangladesh crisis, Chinese press and diplomats unleashed a barrage of criticism on India. The escalation of political and diplomatic support for Pakistan was evident throughout the 1971 War. Beijing's assistance to Islamabad was kept up by a constant supply of material, verbal and moral support throughout the crisis. Some movement of Chinese troops was reported, however it did not restrict Indian military actions in East Pakistan. The move was designed to pressurize India psychologically akin to Chinese actions and possible impact during the 1965 War and earn goodwill of Pakistan. However, Pakistan's expectations of a direct Chinese involvement in East Pakistan did not materialize. Despite this, Sino- Pakistan relations did not get negatively affected and China's support was hailed by the Pakistani masses.
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it was perceived by the Chinese that it was an attempt by the Soviets to expand into South Asia. China feared that if the Soviets were able to gain control of routes to the Indian Ocean, its own lack of an early warning system and sufficient naval forces would not be able to match up with Soviet naval supremacy, and therefore China would be at the Soviet mercy from all sides. China further assumed that Moscow's new found control over Afghanistan would enable the Soviets to locate nuclear weapons just outside the Xinjiang province along the border that was shared by China and Afghanistan. China perceived that a direct military response in Afghanistan would provoke the Soviet forces along its northern border. Meanwhile, Pakistan was also in crisis. It felt that the Soviets would next march into Pakistan which was also believed by China. The mutual concern about the Soviets led China to start providing strategic and military supportto the Afghan fighters already being funded and trained by Pakistan to avoid a direct military engagement with superior Soviet forces. Chinese also gave a guarantee to Pakistan that if the Soviets invaded it, China would come to its defence. This period also saw a high rate of exchanges in the top civil and military level for consultations to gain an understanding of each other's stance on bilateral relations and global affairs. An agreement was signed for opening of Khunjerab Pass on the China-Pakistan border which facilitated opening an important transportation link between both the countries. The strengthening of Sino-Pak relations in warding off the Soviets threat signified another important Chinese motivation for befriending Pakistan as it served as a gateway for establishing relations with the Muslim world, as well as provide a route to the South West Asia, Central Asia and Indian Ocean. Pakistan has also served as China's main link with the Muslim world.
The period between 1980 and 1990 witnessed an improvement in relations between India and China. Pakistan viewed the Sino-India reconciliation as a potential impediment to its relations with China. But, despite a thaw in India-China relations, the fundamentals of China-Pakistan relationship remained strong. Chinese neutrality on anti-India issues like the case of Kashmir was visible. During the rapprochement phase, Beijing directed its efforts to disentangle itself from the India-Pakistan conflict which was regarded important in order to ensure better Sino-Indian relations. The change was visible post-1990 when China adopted a neutral position on Kashmir as opposed to its stand which advocated support for Pakistan from 1964 to 1990. However, there was no difference in their relations. During this period China assisted Pakistan in the construction of the heavy water Khushab reactor, which till date remains critical for the production of plutonium and tritium for advanced compact warheads in Pakistan. Other forms of assistance comprised projects like reprocessing, conversion, production reactors, etc. The Chinese practice of supplying Pakistan with conventional and critical technologies like missile remained unchanged throughout the reconciliation phase with India and as always, Pakistan endorsed China's stand on sensitive issues like Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong and human rights. After the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Pakistan lost its relevance to the USA. Following the withdrawal, Pakistan became a victim of US sanctions for covertly undertaking development of nuclear weapons. From there on China replaced US as Pakistan's strategic ally and Sino-Pakistan defence oriented cooperation got further entrenched. Throughout 1990s, China was responsible for filling up Pakistan's military requirements through conventional, nuclear and missile technologies.
After the disintegration of USSR, China turned its attention towards India which now became vulnerable due to the disintegration of its ally. Meanwhile, Pakistan started looking for newer avenues for the supply of military hardware after being slapped by the Pressler Amendment in October 1990. The most tempting offer was to look to China for assistance. The momentum of nuclear supplies and arms transfers gained strength in the 1990s. The construction of Chashma nuclear plant in Pakistan commenced in 1992 by the Chinese aid. Other proliferation issues included the supply of missiles and support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Two momentous events at the end of the 1990s further strengthened China's resolve to strengthen Pakistan against India. India surprised the world after it conducted a series of nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998. China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan was evident as Pakistan followed India by carrying out five nuclear tests.
During the Kargil War, China remained neutral and it was seen as a shift from its previous position. Pakistan's misadventure was drawing international condemnation and it hoped that China would be more sympathetic overtly. However, the Chinese actions on the world stage did not meet Pakistani expectations. China expressed hopes that India and Pakistan would find a solution through negotiations. China also advised Pakistan to exercise restraint. However, China made a demonstrative support for Pakistan by heightening its activities along the Sino-India border in Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese activities were also evident in Ladakh area along the LAC which coincided with the beginning of the Kargil War. The Kargil War showed that the Chinese practice of pressurizing India by its actions on the second front was still prevalent. It is believed by the analysts that Chinese involvement restricted India from going into a full blown conflict with Pakistan. China did not get directly engaged in the conflict and earned a positive global reputation for not taking sides. As compared to the earlier Indo-Pak wars, China's diplomatic support and statements containing warnings for India were missing during the Kargil conflict, thereby indicating a change in China's position on Pakistan-related issues. Suffering from the threat of fundamentalism in its own restive Xinjiang province, China's overt support to Pakistan could have increased problems at home. However, this gave an opportunity to India to improve its relations with the US.
During Operation Parakram, Pakistan urged China to ease tensions with India by influencing Russia. As always, during Operation Parakram, Chinese maintained pressure in the eastern sector which prevented any possibility of diversion of Indian troops towards Pakistan. China was also involved in adding Pakistan's military assets. It is reported that in early December 2001, China discreetly sent ships to Pakistan carrying unassembled combat aircrafts and other air force-related weapons and equipment. Chinese assistance resulted in adding several squadrons of brand new Super-7 and F-7 fighter aircraft narrowing the ratio of air forces between India and Pakistan. Also, spares and other equipment for strategic assets were delivered through the Karakoram Highway. Even though China urged Pakistan not get involved in a war and divert its attention to economic development, it affirmed that once Pakistan was invaded, China would firmly stand on its side.
World order witnessed a change after the 9/11 attacks on America. Pakistan came under immense pressure from the US to become a frontline state in the Global War on Terrorism and was compelled to delink itself from the terrorist groups. With no space to manoeuvre, Pakistan was forced to comply with the wishes of USA. USA rewarded Pakistan for its cooperation by lifting economic and military sanctions and offering it aid, which greatly benefitted Pakistan's sinking economy. Entry of US in Afghanistan was not viewed positively by the Chinese who feared that increasing American presence would loosen China's hold on the Central Asian Republics. Despite the fears, China could understand Pakistan's limitations in dealing with the US pressure. China expressed its support for Pakistan. China mediated between Washington and Islamabad asking the US to help Pakistan economically at the crucial time. In order to assure Pakistan, China moved its troops towards the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a move which was designed to reassure Pakistan of the proximity of Chinese forces.
2002 saw a change in China's internal politics. Arrival of new leadership, growing influence in international, economic and security affairs gave confidence to China. China now started speaking more of its increased assertiveness and sensitivities with regard to its core interests. Resultant was further growing of ties with Pakistan. The period witnessed strong defence cooperation. In 2004, both agreed to build a 300MW nuclear power plant at Chashma in Pakistan. The deal was signed despite international pressure and scrutiny. A motivating factor for enhanced Sino-Pakistan partnership was India's growing closeness to the US. China's rise and its potential to challenge the superpower prompted USA to strengthen its strategic ties with India as a counter balance to China in South Asia. Perceiving US friendship with India as a part of the strategy of encirclement, China revived its partnership with Pakistan. This was personified in the Sino-Pak Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations, which was signed and ratified by both sides on April 5, 2005 and January 4, 2006 respectively. Both countries vowed against joining any alliance or bloc which infringed upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side. Pakistan reiterated its one-China stance and both agreed to cooperate on terrorism. This treaty illustrates the closest China and Pakistan have come to an official alliance. However, there was a difference in perception by both the countries as Pakistan was looking towards China to defend its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The difference of emphasis on both sides demonstrated Pakistan's eagerness to openly ally with China against its enemy and Chinese reluctance to portray the understanding of an alliance. China's hesitation in forming a formal alliance with Pakistan was conspicuous. China meanwhile had started encountering Muslim fundamentalism in its Xinjiang province. Reports indicated that these secessionists used assistance provided by hard core fundamentalist groups present in North West Pakistan. This imposed a caution in China's approach towards Pakistan. Also, China felt that a formal alliance with Pakistan would undo the flexibility PRC has always enjoyed. The disinclination towards openly acknowledging its understanding with Pakistan shows how China wants to grow with increased assertiveness yet not irk other powers to a level that can be considered dangerous for its rise. In spite of these reservations the period saw the fruition of the first phase of the strategic Gwadar Port, which can be seen as an important achievement of Sino-Pakistan relations and can also be regarded as China's door way to the Middle East. The US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement which was inked in 2008 created ripples in South Asia and called for stronger Sino-Pak ties to challenge India's power backed by the US. This development was viewed very seriously by the Chinese government. China proposed a similar deal to Pakistan, which was initially refused by the US. With the announcement of the Indo-US nuclear deal, there was a growing sense of assertiveness by China. Chinese assertive attitude manifested itself in numerous issues ranging from its take on Arunachal Pradesh to its policies in Kashmir.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Sino-Pak Nexus and Implications for India"
by .
Copyright © 2015 Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), New Delhi.
Excerpted by permission of Vij Books India Pvt Ltd.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1 — Background to Sino – Pak Collaboration,
Chapter 2 — Military Collaboration,
Chapter 3 — Nuclear Collaboration,
Chapter 4 — Sino – Pak Space Collaboration,
Chapter 5 — Economic Cooperation,
Chapter 6 — Options for India to Counter China – Pakistan Nexus,
Conclusion,
References,
Index,