State, Anarchy, Collective Decisions: Some Applications of Game Theory to Political Economy

by A. Coram

Overview

State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions provides an introduction to the applications of game theory to a series of questions that are fundamental in political economy. These questions include: Why do we need states? What might happen without protection for life and property? How might tribes or criminal gangs behave in struggles over material possessions? Would people tell the truth if asked what they wanted?

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780333779323
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan UK
Publication date:	05/04/2001
Edition description:	2001
Pages:	176
Product dimensions:	5.51(w) x 8.50(h) x 0.03(d)
Lexile:	1310L (what's this?)

About the Author

ALEX CORAM is currently an associate professor at the University of Western Australia. Among the subjects on which he has published are international capital transfers, predictability in history, luck, and stability and voting. He has published in such journals as the British Journal of Political Science, Social Science Quarterly, Political Studies and Economic Letters.

Table of Contents

Preface Acknowledgements State, Anarchy and Game Theory Security in the Hobbesian State of Nature and Related Non-cooperative Games Security and Material Possessions in the Lockean State of Nature: Non-cooperative Games Material Production and Property Rules with Stealing Production and Guarding : Non-cooperative Games Problems of Reputation and Markets for Protection: Non-cooperative Game Theory Evolutionary Stable Strategies Collective Decisions and the Core: Cooperative Games Welfare and the Strategies of Preference Revelation Voting Rules and Strategic Manipulation Index

Editorial Reviews

Coram (political science, U. of Western Australia) provides social scientists with an introduction to some of the applications of strategic choice, or game, theory, applying it to a set of questions relating to the foundations of political-economic systems, including aspects of collective decision-making. Chapters address the desirability of enforcing collective decisions, whether enforcement is necessary, whether markets could emerge without a state to enforce rules, the notion of spontaneous evolution and evolutionary stable strategies, criteria that might be used to make collective decisions, and problems of collective decision-making and welfare maximization. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

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