The Strategy Process / Edition 4|Hardcover

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780130479136
Publisher:	Prentice Hall
Publication date:	08/02/2002
Edition description:	4TH
Pages:	1000
Product dimensions:	8.36(w) x 10.30(h) x 1.52(d)

About the Author

Henry Mintzberg is Cleghorn Professor of Management Studies at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. His research has dealt with issues of general management and organizations, focusing on the nature of managerial work, forms of organizing, and the strategy formation process. Currently, he is completing a book about Developing Managers, not MBAs, and a pamphlet entitled Getting Past Smith and Marx . . . Towards a Balanced Society. He is also promoting the development of a family of masters programs for practicing managers. His own teaching activities focus on ad hoc seminars for managers and work with doctoral students.

He received his doctorate and master of science degrees from the M.LT. Sloan School of Management and his mechanical engineering degree from McGill, working in between in operational research for the Canadian National Railways. He has recently been named an Officer of the Order of Canada and of l'Ordre Nationale du Quebec and holds honorary degrees from thirteen universities. He also served as President of the Strategic Management Society from 1988 to 1991, and is an elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada (the first from a management faculty), the Academy of Management, and the International Academy of Management. He was named Distinguished Scholar for the year 2000 by the Academy of Management.

Joseph Lampel is Professor of Strategy at City University Business School, London. He received his doctorate in Strategic Management from McGill University in 1990, and was awarded Best Dissertation Award from the Administrative Science Association of Canada. Following his graduate studies Professor Lampel taught for seven years at the Stern School of Business, New York University. He subsequently moved to the United Kingdom where her held positions at University of St. Andrews and the University of Nottingham. Professor Lampel is the coauthor of The Strategy Safari with Henry Mintzberg and Bruce Ahalstrand. He has published extensively on strategy in management journals, and his articles have also appeared in the Financial Times and Fortune Magazine.

James Brian Quinn. Professor Quinn is a recognized authority in the fields of strategic planning, management of technological change, entrepreneurial innovation, and management of intellect and technology in the services sector. He has received both the Academy of Management's prestigious Outstanding Educator Award and its Book of the Year award (for Intelligent Enterprise).

Sumantra Ghoshal is Professor of Strategic and International Management at the London Business School. He also serves as the Founding Dean of the Indian School of Business in Hyderabad, of which LBS is a partner, and as a member of The Committee of Overseers of the Harvard Business School. Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, a book he coauthored with Christopher Bartlett, has been listed in the Financial Times as one of the 50 most influential management books and has been translated into nine languages. The Differentiated Network: Organizing the Multinational Corporation for Value Creation, a book he coauthored with Nitin Nohria, won the George Terry Book Award in 1997. The Individualized Corporation, coauthored with Christopher Bartlett, won the Igor Ansoff Award in 1997, and has been translated into seven languages. His last book, Managing Radical Change, won the Management Book of the Year award in India. With doctoral degrees from both the MIT School of Management and the Harvard Business School, Sumantra serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals and has been nominated to the Fellowships at the Academy of Management, the Academy of International Business, and the World Economic Forum.

Read an Excerpt

In our first edition, we set out to produce a different kind of textbook in the field of strategy, or general management:

We tried to provide the reader with a richness of theory, a richness of practice, and a strong basis for linkage between the two. We rejected the strictly case study approach, which leaves theory out altogether, or soft-pedals it, and thereby denies the accumulated benefits of many years of careful research and thought about management processes. We also rejected an alternate approach that forces on readers a highly rationalistic model of how the strategy process should function. We collaborated on this book because we believe that in this complex world of organizations a range of concepts is needed to cut through and illuminate particular aspects of that complexity.

There is no "one best way" to create strategy, nor is there "one best form" of organization. Quite different forms work well in particular contexts. We believe that exploring a fuller variety systematically will create a deeper and more useful appreciation of the strategy process. In this revised edition, we remain loyal to these beliefs and objectives, while making major changes in the readings and cases. We kept some of the classic readings, but there are many new ones.

A host of new cases provide rich vehicles for discussing the value and limits of new management approaches and the dimensions of new management issues. There is a conscious balance among small, medium, and large-scale companies. They are entrepreneurial, innovative, rapidly growing, or slowly maturing; and they run the gamut from consumer goods to high technology. We have made an effort to select cases fromnew areas of the economy, such as microelectronics, digital technology, software, personal computers, as well as areas that have been around for a while but are increasingly important, including media, entertainment, pharmaceuticals, and management consulting. Companies such as Sony, Acer, LVMH, Kami Corporation, S.A. Chupa Chups, and National Bicycle Industrial Company represent some of the most exciting experiments in products and services, and management itself, today. We have also set out to offer the most international set of cases available. Glance down the fist of cases included in this book and you realize how widely we have covered the globe.

This text, unlike most others, is therefore eclectic. Presenting published articles and portions of other books in their original form, rather than filtered through our minds and pens, is one way to reinforce this variety. Each author has his or her ideas and his or her own best way of expressing them (ourselves included!). Summarized by us, these readings would lose a good deal of their richness.

We do not apologize for contradictions among the ideas of leading thinkers. The world is full of contradictions. The real danger lies in using pat solutions to a nuanced reality, not in opening perspectives up to different interpretations. The effective strategist is one who can live with contradictions, learn to appreciate their causes and effects, and reconcile them sufficiently for effective action. The readings have, nonetheless, been ordered by chapter to suggest some ways in which reconciliation can be considered. Our own chapter introductions are also intended to assist in this task and to help place the readings in perspective. ON THEORY

A word on theory is in order. We do not consider theory a dirty word, nor do we apologize for making it a major component of this book. To some people, to be theoretical is to be detached and impractical. But a bright social scientist once said, "There is nothing so practical as a good theory." And every successful doctor, engineer, and physicist would have to agree: They would be unable to practice their modern work without theories. Theories are useful because they shortcut the need to store masses of data. It is easier to remember a simple framework about some phenomenon than it is to consider every small detail you ever observed. In a sense theories are a bit like cataloging systems in libraries: The world would be impossibly confusing without them. They enable you to store and conveniently access your own experiences as well as those of others.

One can, however, suffer not just from an absence of theories but also from being dominated by them without realizing it. To paraphrase the words of John Maynard Keynes, most "practical men" are the slaves of some defunct theory. Whether we realize it or not, our behavior is guided by the systems of ideas that we have internalized over the years. Much can be learned by bringing these out in the open, examining them more carefully, and comparing them with alternative ways to view the world—including ones based on systematic study (that is, research). One of our prime intentions in this book is to expose the limitations of conventional theories and to offer alternate explanations that can be superior guides for understanding and taking action in specific contexts. PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY VERSUS DESCRIPTIVE THEORY

Unlike many textbooks in this field, this one tries to explain the world as it is rather than as someone thinks it is supposed to be. Although there has sometimes been a tendency to disdain such descriptive theories, prescriptive (or normative) ones have often been the problem, rather than the solution, in the field of management. There is no one best way in management; no prescription works for all organizations. Even when a prescription seems effective in some context, it requires a sophisticated understanding of exactly what that context is and how it functions. In other words, one cannot decide reliably what should be done in a system as complicated as a contemporary organization without a genuine understanding of how that organization really works. In engineering, no student ever questions having to learn physics, in medicine, having to learn anatomy. Imagine an engineering student's hand shooting up in physics class: "Listen, prof, it's fine to tell us how the atom does work. But what we really want to know is how the atom should work." Why should a management student's similar demand in the realm of strategy or structure be considered any more appropriate? How can people manage complex systems they do not understand?

Nevertheless, we have not ignored prescriptive theory when it appears useful. A number of prescriptive techniques (industry analysis, experience curves, and so on) are discussed. But these are associated both with other readings and with cases that will help you understand the context and limitations of their usefulness. Both readings and cases offer opportunities to pursue the full complexity of strategic situations. You will find a wide range of issues and perspectives addressed. One of our main goals is to integrate a variety of views, rather than allow strategy to be fragmented into just "human issues" and "economics issues." The text and cases provide a basis for treating the full complexity of strategic management. ON SOURCES

How were the readings selected and edited? Some textbooks boast about how new all their readings are. We make no such claim; indeed we would like to make a different boast; many of our readings have been around quite a while, long enough to mature, like fine wine. Our criterion for inclusion was not the newness of the article so much as the quality of its insight—that is, its ability to explain some aspect of the strategy process better than any other article. Time does not age the really good articles. Quite the opposite—it distinguishes their quality. So look here for classics from the 1950s still fully relevant alongside the latest thinking in this new millennium.

We are, of course, not biased toward old articles—just toward good ones. Hence, the materials in this book range from the classics to some published just before our final selection was made (as well as a few hitherto unpublished pieces). You will find articles from the most serious academic journals, the best practitioner magazines, books, and some very obscure sources. The best can sometimes be found in strange places.

We have tried to include many shorter readings rather than fewer longer ones, and we have tried to present as wide a variety of good ideas as possible while maintaining clarity. To do so we often had to cut within readings. We have, in fact, put a great deal of effort into the cutting in order to extract the key messages of each reading in as brief, concise, and clear a manner as possible. Unfortunately, our cutting sometimes forced us to eliminate interesting examples and side issues. (In the readings, as well as some of the case materials from published sources, dots . . . signify portions that have been deleted from the original, while square brackets signify our own insertions of minor clarifications into the original text). We apologize to you, the reader, as well as to the authors, for having done this, but hope that the overall result has rendered these changes worthwhile.

We have also included a number of our own works. Perhaps we are biased, having less objective standards by which to judge what we have written. But we have messages to convey, too, and our own writings do examine the basic themes that we feel are important in policy and strategy courses today. ON CASES

A major danger of studying the strategy process—probably the most enticing subject in the management curriculum, and at the pinnacle of organizational processes—is that students and professors can become detached from the basics of the enterprise. The "Don't bore me with the operating details; I'm here to tackle the really big issues?" syndrome has been the death of many strategy courses (not to mention managerial practices!). Effective strategy processes always come down to specifics. For this reason, cases are the most convenient way to introduce practice into the classroom, to cap a wide variety of experiences, and to involve students actively in analysis and decision making.

Cases are the pedagogical approach of choice when it comes to studying strategy, but it is an approach with potential pitfalls and blind alleys. It is easy to lose sight of the fact that cases are selective narratives. In this respect, short and tightly focused cases can be better than long and highly detailed cases: They are less likely to mislead one into seeing the narrative as recreation of reality, as opposed to representation of reality, and a partial one at that.

Though cases are partial representation of reality, they can be revealing if used wisely. Most cases pose a dilemma or a problem. They irresistibly draw us toward prescription. An invitation to pronounce is appealing: how many can resist being the CEO of IBM or Microsoft for a day? However, this is false empowerment. It is not only based on incomplete information (made worse by the illusion of comprehensive description), it also lacks the pressure and nuance that are indispensable to decision making.

Cases are positive when they are used to illustrate and stimulate. They illustrate situations and dilemmas. They stimulate thinking by focusing minds on crucial issues, forcing the student to struggle with questions without the comfort of pretending that questions posed in the classroom can be settled in the classroom.

Our cases consciously contain both descriptive and prescriptive aspects of strategy, and as authors of this text, we have different views on which to use—description only, or description with prescription. On the one hand, the cases provide the data and background for making a major decision. Students can appraise the situation in its full context, suggest what future directions would be best for the organization in question, and discuss how their solutions can realistically be implemented. On the other hand, each case is also an opportunity to understand the dynamics of an organization—the historical context of the problems it faces, the influence of its technology, values, relationship to other organizations, its probable reactions to varying solutions, and so on. Unlike many cases which focus on only the analytical aspects of a decision, ours constantly force you to consider the messy realities of arriving at decisions in organizations and obtaining a desired response to any decision. In these respects, case study can involve a good deal of descriptive and prescriptive analysis. LINKING CASES AND READINGS

The cases in this book are not intended to emphasize any particular theories, any more than the theoretical materials are included because they explain particular cases. Each case presents a slice of some specific reality, each reading a conceptual interpretation of some phenomenon. The readings are placed in particular groupings because they approach some common aspects or issues in theory.

We have provided some general guidelines for relating particular cases to sets of readings. But do not push this too far: study each case for its own sake. Cases are intrinsically richer than readings. Each contains a wide variety of issues—many awfully messy—in no particular order. The readings, in contrast, are usually neat and tidy, professing one or a few basic conceptual ideas, and providing some specific vocabulary. When the two connect—sometimes through direct effort, more often indirectly as conceptual ideas are recalled in the situation of a particular case—some powerful learning can take place in the form of clarification and, we hope, revelation.

Try to see how particular theories can help you to understand some of the issues in the cases and provide useful frameworks for drawing conclusions. Perhaps the great military theorist, Von Clausewitz, said it best almost two centuries ago:

All that theory can do is give the artist or soldier points of reference, and standards of evaluation, with the ultimate purpose not of telling him how to act but of developing his judgment. (1976:15)

In relating theory to cases bear in mind that sound judgment depends on knowing the limitations of the former and the incompleteness of the latter. Theories compartmentalize reality. You should not take this compartmentalization as a given. Go beyond it when preparing each case. Use whatever concepts you find helpful both from chapters of the book and from your personal knowledge. Likewise, bear in mind that cases never tell the whole story (how could they!). This is rather evident in ones that deal with real people and real companies. Because they leave out so much, it is worthwhile to reach out to newspapers, Websites, Who's Who, or any other reference that comes to mind. Some of our cases, however, present imaginary situations, but should not for this reason be considered unreal. Their intent is to enhance awareness of key issues by avoiding the bias that comes with our accidental knowledge of actual companies and events. CASE DISCUSSION

Management cases provide a concrete information base for students to analyze and share as they discuss management issues. Without this focus, discussions of theory can become quite confusing. You may have in mind an image of an organization or a situation that is very different from that of other discussants. As a result, what appears to be a difference in theory will—after much argument—often turn out to be simply a difference in perception of the realities surrounding these examples.

In this text we try to provide three levels of learning: first, a chance to share the generalized insights of leading theoreticians (in the readings); second, an opportunity to test the applicability and limits of these theories in specific (case) situations; third, the capacity to develop one's own special amalgam of insights based upon empirical observations and inductive reasoning (from case analyses). All are useful approaches; some students and professors will find one mix more productive for their special level of experience or mindset. Another will prefer a quite different mix. Hence, we include a wide selection of cases and readings.

The cases are not intended as examples of either weak or exceptionally good management practices. Nor, as we noted, do they provide examples of the concepts of a particular reading. They are discussion vehicles for probing the benefits and limits of various approaches. And they are analytical vehicles for applying and testing concepts and tools developed in your education and experience. Cases can have marketing, operations, accounting, financial, human relations, planning and control, external environmental, ethical, political, and quantitative dimensions. Each dimension should be addressed in preparations and classroom discussions, although some aspects will inevitably emerge as more important in one situation than another.

In each case you should look for several sets of issues. First, you should understand what went on in that situation. Why did it happen this way? What are the strong or weak features of what happened? What could have been changed to advantage? How? Why? Second, there are always issues of what should be done next. What are the key issues to be resolved? What are the major alternatives available? What outcomes could the organization expect from each? Which alternative should it select? Why? Third, there will almost always be "hard" quantitative data and "soft" qualitative impressions about each situation. Both deserve attention.

But remember, no realistic strategy situation is just an organization behavior problem or just a financial or economic analytical one. Both sets of information should be considered, and an integrated solution developed. Our cases are consciously constructed for this. Given their complexity we have tried to keep the cases as short as possible. And we have tried to capture some of the flavour of the real organization. Moreover, we have sought to mix product and services cases, technological and "non-tech" cases, entrepreneurial, small company, and large enterprise situations. In this cross section, we have tried to capture some of the most important and exciting issues, concepts, and products of our times. We believe management is fun and important. The cases try to convey this.

There is no "correct" answer to any case. There may be several "good" answers and many poor ones. The purpose of a strategy course should be to help you understand the nature of these "better" answers, what to look for, how to analyze alternatives, and how to see through the complexities of reaching solutions and implanting them in real organizations. A strategy course can only improve your probability of success, not ensure it. The total number of variables in a real strategy situation is typically beyond the control of any one person or group. Hence another caveat; do not rely excessively on performance as a criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a strategy. A company may have succeeded or failed not because of its specific decisions, but because of luck, an outstanding personality, the bizarre action of an opponent, international actions over which it had no control, and so on. One of the products of a successful strategy course should be a little humility. CASE STUDY GUIDES

In our last edition we posed a few questions at the end of each case. In this edition we decided to drop the questions. A crucial part of reflection and analysis in the classroom, as in the real world, is coming up with the question that really matters. Asking the right question in strategy is analogous to an explorer's finding his or her bearing before starting the journey. There is no standard methodology for coming up with questions: intuition and experience play far too important a role in the process.

The cases provide a rich soil for investigating strategic realities. Their complexities always extend well below the surface. Each layer peeled back can reveal new insights and rewards. Like any good mystery story, a case provides many clues, never all, but, surprisingly, sometimes more than managers might have had time to absorb in the real situation.

Believing that no "canned approach" is viable for all strategic situations, we have selected cases that cut across a variety of issues and theoretical constructs. Almost any of these cases contains sufficient richness and complexity that it can be positioned at a number of different spots in a good strategy course. We leave the final case selection to the style and wisdom of the professor and his or her students. THIS BOOK'S STRUCTURE NOT FORMULATION, THEN IMPLEMENTATION

The first edition of this text offered a chapter format that was new to the strategy field. Unlike most others, it had no specific chapter or section devoted to "implementation" per se. The assumption in other texts is that strategy is formulated and then implemented, with organizational structures, control systems, and the like following obediently behind strategy. In this text, as in reality, formulation and implementation are intertwined as complex interactive processes in which politics, values, organizational culture, and management styles determine or constrain particular strategic decisions. And strategy, structure, and systems mix together in complicated ways to influence outcomes. While strategy formulation and implementation may be separated in some situations—perhaps in crises, in some totally new ventures, as well as in organizations facing predictable futures—these events are far from typical. We certainly do not believe in building a whole book (let alone a whole field) around this conceptual distinction. BUT CONCEPTS, THEN CONTEXTS

The readings are divided roughly into two different parts. The first deals with concepts, the second with contexts. We introduce concepts early in the text as equal partners in the complex web of ideas that make up what we call "the strategy process:" In the second half of the text we weave these concepts together in a number of distinct situations, which we call contexts.

Our theme diagram illustrates this. Concepts, shown on top, are divided into two groups—strategy and forces—to represent the first two sections of the book. Contexts draw all these concepts together, in a variety of situations—covered in the third section—which we consider the key ones in the field of strategy today (though hardly the only ones). The outline of the text, chapter by chapter, proceeds as follows:

Section 1: Strategy
The first section is called Strategy; it comprises six chapters, two introductory in nature and four on the processes by which strategy making takes place. Chapter 1 introduces strategies themselves and probes the meaning of this important word to broaden your view of it. Here the pattern is set of challenging you to question conventional views, especially when these act to narrow perspectives. The themes introduced in this chapter carry throughout the book and are worth care in understanding.

Chapter 2 introduces a very important set of actors in this book, the strategists—all those people who play key roles in the strategy process. In examining the work of the general manager and other strategists, we shall perhaps upset a number of widely accepted notions. We do this to help you understand the very real complexities and difficulties of making strategy and managing in contemporary organizations.

Chapters 3 to 5 take up a theme that is treated extensively in the text—to the point of being reflected in its title: the development of an understanding of the processes by which strategies are made. Chapter 3 looks at formulating strategy, specifically at some widely accepted prescriptive models for how organizations should go about developing their strategies. Chapter 4 extends these ideas to more formal ways of analyzing strategy and considering what, if any, "generic" forms a strategy can take. While readings in later chapters will challenge some of these precepts, what will not be questioned is the importance of having to understand them. They are fundamental to appreciating the strategy process today.

Chapter 5 switches from a prescriptive to a descriptive approach. Concerned with understanding strategy formation, it considers how strategies actually do form in organizations (not necessarily by being formulated) and why different processes may be effective in specific circumstances. This text takes an unconventional stand by viewing planning and other formal approaches as not the only—and often indeed not even the most desirable—ways to make strategy. You will find our emphasis on the descriptive process—as an equal partner with the more traditional concerns for technical and analytical issues—to be one of the unifying themes of this book. Chapter 6 then turns attention to the nature of strategic change, and how this can come about.

Section II: Forces
In Section I, the readings introduced strategy, the strategist, and various ways in which strategy might be formulated and does in fact form. In Section II, entitled Forces, we introduce six additional concepts that constitute part of the strategy process.

In Chapter 7, the influence of cognition is discussed. Strategy is fundamentally a concept in people's minds, and so how we think about it—our cognitive process—must be understood. Chapter 8 looks at organization, how we put together and design those institutions for which strategies are created. Chapter 9 takes up another key force in the process, namely technology. We turn in Chapter 10 to the nature of collaboration as it influences the strategy process, from collaboration among individuals to alliances among corporations. Chapter 11 looks at globalization, that very popular yet over-hyped notion about which most of us need much more careful understanding. Last in this section, but certainly not least, is consideration of the values that drive us all. Together, these six forces must be understood if modern day processes of strategy making are to be appreciated.

Section III: Contents
Section III is called Contexts. We consider how all of the elements introduced so far—strategies, the processes by which they are formulated and get formed, the strategists, cognition, organization, technology, collaboration, globalization and values—combine to suit particular contexts, five in all.

Chapter 13 deals with managing start-up, where often rather simple organizations come under the close control of strong leaders, or "entrepreneurs," frequently people with vision. Chapter 14 examines managing maturity, a context common to many large business and government organizations involved in the mass production and/or distribution of goods and services.

Chapters 14 and 15 consider managing experts and managing innovation, two contexts involving organizations of high expertise. In the first, experts work relatively independently in rather stable conditions, while in the innovation context, they combine in project teams under more dynamic conditions. What these two contexts have in common, however, is that they act in ways that upset many of the widely accepted notions about how organizations should be structured and make strategy.

Chapter 17 considers managing diversity, and deals with organizations that have diversified their product or service line and usually divisionalized their structures to deal with the greater varieties of environments they face. Finally, Chapter 18, called Managing Otherwise, closes the book by considering some rather unconventional views of the strategy process and of organizations that work despite being so different—and upsetting cherished beliefs. You don't have to be unusual to succeed, but you do have to be tolerant of the unusual to be a successful manager.

In considering each of these widely different contexts we seek to discuss the situation in which each is most likely to be found, the structures most suited to it, the kinds of strategies that tend to be pursued, the processes by which, these strategies tend to be formed and might be formulated, and the social issues associated with the context.

Instructors' Supplements
The fourth edition of The Strategy Process is accompanied by a comprehensive Instructor's Manual and a Companion Website. The Instructor's Manual includes detailed summaries of all readings and discussion questions for each chapter, as well as Teaching Notes for the cases in each section. The accompanying Website features the materials included in the Instructor's Manual in an electronic format.

Well, there you have it. We worked hard on this book, in both the original and revised editions, to get it right. We have tried to think things through from the basics, with a resulting text that in style, format, and content is unusual for the field of strategy. Our product may not be perfect, but we believe it is good. Now it's your turn to find out if you agree. Enjoy yourself along the way.

Henry Mintzberg
Joseph Lampel
James Brian Quinn
Sumantra Ghoshal

Case 1. Robin Hood. Case 2: Astral Records, Ltd., North America. Case 3: MacArthur and the Philippines Case 4: Rudi Gassner and the Executive Committee of BMG International. Case 5: Arista Records Case 6: Algodonera Del Plata Case 7: HBO Case 8: IMPSAT Case 9: Canon: Competing on Capabilities Case 10: MP3.COM Case 11: WFNX-101.7FM and Boston's Radio Wars Case 12: Beijing Mirror Corporation Case 13: Lufthansa 2000. Case 14: London Free Press Case—Strategic Change 15: NBC Case 16: LVMH: Taking the Western Art de Vivre to the World Case 17: Kami Corporation Case 18: Strategic Planning at the New York Botanical Garden. Case 19: Napoleon Bonaparte: Victim of an Inferior Strategy? Case 20: Honda Motor Company 1994 Case 21: The Acer Group: Building an Asian Multinational. Case 22: AmBev: The Making of a Brazilian Giant. Case 23: Wipro Corporation Case 24: TV Asahi Theatrical Productions Case 25: Selkirk Group in Asia Case 26: Sportsmake: A Crisis of Succession Case 27: S.A. Chupa Chups Case 28: Mountbatten and India Case 29: Saatchi & Saatchi Case 30: McKinsey & Company: Managing Knowledge and Learning Case 31: Sony Regeneration. Case 32: Reorganization at Axion Consulting (A) Case 33: Reorganization at Axion Consulting (B) Case 34: Empire Plastics Case 35: Kao Corporation Case 36: Unipart Group of Companies Case 37: Workbrain Case 38: Warner Brothers Case 39: Intel Case 40: The National Bicycle Industrial Company Case 41: Novacare Case 42: Lechabile: IT as a People Business Case 43: Phil Chan Case 44: Natura Case 45: A Restaurant with a Difference.

Preface

In our first edition, we set out to produce a different kind of textbook in the field of strategy, or general management:

We tried to provide the reader with a richness of theory, a richness of practice, and a strong basis for linkage between the two. We rejected the strictly case study approach, which leaves theory out altogether, or soft-pedals it, and thereby denies the accumulated benefits of many years of careful research and thought about management processes. We also rejected an alternate approach that forces on readers a highly rationalistic model of how the strategy process should function. We collaborated on this book because we believe that in this complex world of organizations a range of concepts is needed to cut through and illuminate particular aspects of that complexity.

There is no "one best way" to create strategy, nor is there "one best form" of organization. Quite different forms work well in particular contexts. We believe that exploring a fuller variety systematically will create a deeper and more useful appreciation of the strategy process. In this revised edition, we remain loyal to these beliefs and objectives, while making major changes in the readings and cases. We kept some of the classic readings, but there are many new ones.

A host of new cases provide rich vehicles for discussing the value and limits of new management approaches and the dimensions of new management issues. There is a conscious balance among small, medium, and large-scale companies. They are entrepreneurial, innovative, rapidly growing, or slowly maturing; and they run the gamut from consumer goods to high technology. We have made an effort to select cases from new areas of the economy, such as microelectronics, digital technology, software, personal computers, as well as areas that have been around for a while but are increasingly important, including media, entertainment, pharmaceuticals, and management consulting. Companies such as Sony, Acer, LVMH, Kami Corporation, S.A. Chupa Chups, and National Bicycle Industrial Company represent some of the most exciting experiments in products and services, and management itself, today. We have also set out to offer the most international set of cases available. Glance down the fist of cases included in this book and you realize how widely we have covered the globe.

This text, unlike most others, is therefore eclectic. Presenting published articles and portions of other books in their original form, rather than filtered through our minds and pens, is one way to reinforce this variety. Each author has his or her ideas and his or her own best way of expressing them (ourselves included!). Summarized by us, these readings would lose a good deal of their richness.

We do not apologize for contradictions among the ideas of leading thinkers. The world is full of contradictions. The real danger lies in using pat solutions to a nuanced reality, not in opening perspectives up to different interpretations. The effective strategist is one who can live with contradictions, learn to appreciate their causes and effects, and reconcile them sufficiently for effective action. The readings have, nonetheless, been ordered by chapter to suggest some ways in which reconciliation can be considered. Our own chapter introductions are also intended to assist in this task and to help place the readings in perspective.

ON THEORY

A word on theory is in order. We do not consider theory a dirty word, nor do we apologize for making it a major component of this book. To some people, to be theoretical is to be detached and impractical. But a bright social scientist once said, "There is nothing so practical as a good theory." And every successful doctor, engineer, and physicist would have to agree: They would be unable to practice their modern work without theories. Theories are useful because they shortcut the need to store masses of data. It is easier to remember a simple framework about some phenomenon than it is to consider every small detail you ever observed. In a sense theories are a bit like cataloging systems in libraries: The world would be impossibly confusing without them. They enable you to store and conveniently access your own experiences as well as those of others.

One can, however, suffer not just from an absence of theories but also from being dominated by them without realizing it. To paraphrase the words of John Maynard Keynes, most "practical men" are the slaves of some defunct theory. Whether we realize it or not, our behavior is guided by the systems of ideas that we have internalized over the years. Much can be learned by bringing these out in the open, examining them more carefully, and comparing them with alternative ways to view the world—including ones based on systematic study (that is, research). One of our prime intentions in this book is to expose the limitations of conventional theories and to offer alternate explanations that can be superior guides for understanding and taking action in specific contexts.

PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY VERSUS DESCRIPTIVE THEORY

Unlike many textbooks in this field, this one tries to explain the world as it is rather than as someone thinks it is supposed to be. Although there has sometimes been a tendency to disdain such descriptive theories, prescriptive (or normative) ones have often been the problem, rather than the solution, in the field of management. There is no one best way in management; no prescription works for all organizations. Even when a prescription seems effective in some context, it requires a sophisticated understanding of exactly what that context is and how it functions. In other words, one cannot decide reliably what should be done in a system as complicated as a contemporary organization without a genuine understanding of how that organization really works. In engineering, no student ever questions having to learn physics, in medicine, having to learn anatomy. Imagine an engineering student's hand shooting up in physics class: "Listen, prof, it's fine to tell us how the atom does work. But what we really want to know is how the atom should work." Why should a management student's similar demand in the realm of strategy or structure be considered any more appropriate? How can people manage complex systems they do not understand?

Nevertheless, we have not ignored prescriptive theory when it appears useful. A number of prescriptive techniques (industry analysis, experience curves, and so on) are discussed. But these are associated both with other readings and with cases that will help you understand the context and limitations of their usefulness. Both readings and cases offer opportunities to pursue the full complexity of strategic situations. You will find a wide range of issues and perspectives addressed. One of our main goals is to integrate a variety of views, rather than allow strategy to be fragmented into just "human issues" and "economics issues." The text and cases provide a basis for treating the full complexity of strategic management.

ON SOURCES

How were the readings selected and edited? Some textbooks boast about how new all their readings are. We make no such claim; indeed we would like to make a different boast; many of our readings have been around quite a while, long enough to mature, like fine wine. Our criterion for inclusion was not the newness of the article so much as the quality of its insight—that is, its ability to explain some aspect of the strategy process better than any other article. Time does not age the really good articles. Quite the opposite—it distinguishes their quality. So look here for classics from the 1950s still fully relevant alongside the latest thinking in this new millennium.

We are, of course, not biased toward old articles—just toward good ones. Hence, the materials in this book range from the classics to some published just before our final selection was made (as well as a few hitherto unpublished pieces). You will find articles from the most serious academic journals, the best practitioner magazines, books, and some very obscure sources. The best can sometimes be found in strange places.

We have tried to include many shorter readings rather than fewer longer ones, and we have tried to present as wide a variety of good ideas as possible while maintaining clarity. To do so we often had to cut within readings. We have, in fact, put a great deal of effort into the cutting in order to extract the key messages of each reading in as brief, concise, and clear a manner as possible. Unfortunately, our cutting sometimes forced us to eliminate interesting examples and side issues. (In the readings, as well as some of the case materials from published sources, dots . . . signify portions that have been deleted from the original, while square brackets signify our own insertions of minor clarifications into the original text). We apologize to you, the reader, as well as to the authors, for having done this, but hope that the overall result has rendered these changes worthwhile.

We have also included a number of our own works. Perhaps we are biased, having less objective standards by which to judge what we have written. But we have messages to convey, too, and our own writings do examine the basic themes that we feel are important in policy and strategy courses today.

ON CASES

A major danger of studying the strategy process—probably the most enticing subject in the management curriculum, and at the pinnacle of organizational processes—is that students and professors can become detached from the basics of the enterprise. The "Don't bore me with the operating details; I'm here to tackle the really big issues?" syndrome has been the death of many strategy courses (not to mention managerial practices!). Effective strategy processes always come down to specifics. For this reason, cases are the most convenient way to introduce practice into the classroom, to cap a wide variety of experiences, and to involve students actively in analysis and decision making.

Cases are the pedagogical approach of choice when it comes to studying strategy, but it is an approach with potential pitfalls and blind alleys. It is easy to lose sight of the fact that cases are selective narratives. In this respect, short and tightly focused cases can be better than long and highly detailed cases: They are less likely to mislead one into seeing the narrative as recreation of reality, as opposed to representation of reality, and a partial one at that.

Though cases are partial representation of reality, they can be revealing if used wisely. Most cases pose a dilemma or a problem. They irresistibly draw us toward prescription. An invitation to pronounce is appealing: how many can resist being the CEO of IBM or Microsoft for a day? However, this is false empowerment. It is not only based on incomplete information (made worse by the illusion of comprehensive description), it also lacks the pressure and nuance that are indispensable to decision making.

Cases are positive when they are used to illustrate and stimulate. They illustrate situations and dilemmas. They stimulate thinking by focusing minds on crucial issues, forcing the student to struggle with questions without the comfort of pretending that questions posed in the classroom can be settled in the classroom.

Our cases consciously contain both descriptive and prescriptive aspects of strategy, and as authors of this text, we have different views on which to use—description only, or description with prescription. On the one hand, the cases provide the data and background for making a major decision. Students can appraise the situation in its full context, suggest what future directions would be best for the organization in question, and discuss how their solutions can realistically be implemented. On the other hand, each case is also an opportunity to understand the dynamics of an organization—the historical context of the problems it faces, the influence of its technology, values, relationship to other organizations, its probable reactions to varying solutions, and so on. Unlike many cases which focus on only the analytical aspects of a decision, ours constantly force you to consider the messy realities of arriving at decisions in organizations and obtaining a desired response to any decision. In these respects, case study can involve a good deal of descriptive and prescriptive analysis.

LINKING CASES AND READINGS

The cases in this book are not intended to emphasize any particular theories, any more than the theoretical materials are included because they explain particular cases. Each case presents a slice of some specific reality, each reading a conceptual interpretation of some phenomenon. The readings are placed in particular groupings because they approach some common aspects or issues in theory.

We have provided some general guidelines for relating particular cases to sets of readings. But do not push this too far: study each case for its own sake. Cases are intrinsically richer than readings. Each contains a wide variety of issues—many awfully messy—in no particular order. The readings, in contrast, are usually neat and tidy, professing one or a few basic conceptual ideas, and providing some specific vocabulary. When the two connect—sometimes through direct effort, more often indirectly as conceptual ideas are recalled in the situation of a particular case—some powerful learning can take place in the form of clarification and, we hope, revelation.

Try to see how particular theories can help you to understand some of the issues in the cases and provide useful frameworks for drawing conclusions. Perhaps the great military theorist, Von Clausewitz, said it best almost two centuries ago:

All that theory can do is give the artist or soldier points of reference, and standards of evaluation, with the ultimate purpose not of telling him how to act but of developing his judgment. (1976:15)

In relating theory to cases bear in mind that sound judgment depends on knowing the limitations of the former and the incompleteness of the latter. Theories compartmentalize reality. You should not take this compartmentalization as a given. Go beyond it when preparing each case. Use whatever concepts you find helpful both from chapters of the book and from your personal knowledge. Likewise, bear in mind that cases never tell the whole story (how could they!). This is rather evident in ones that deal with real people and real companies. Because they leave out so much, it is worthwhile to reach out to newspapers, Websites, Who's Who, or any other reference that comes to mind. Some of our cases, however, present imaginary situations, but should not for this reason be considered unreal. Their intent is to enhance awareness of key issues by avoiding the bias that comes with our accidental knowledge of actual companies and events.

CASE DISCUSSION

Management cases provide a concrete information base for students to analyze and share as they discuss management issues. Without this focus, discussions of theory can become quite confusing. You may have in mind an image of an organization or a situation that is very different from that of other discussants. As a result, what appears to be a difference in theory will—after much argument—often turn out to be simply a difference in perception of the realities surrounding these examples.

In this text we try to provide three levels of learning: first, a chance to share the generalized insights of leading theoreticians (in the readings); second, an opportunity to test the applicability and limits of these theories in specific (case) situations; third, the capacity to develop one's own special amalgam of insights based upon empirical observations and inductive reasoning (from case analyses). All are useful approaches; some students and professors will find one mix more productive for their special level of experience or mindset. Another will prefer a quite different mix. Hence, we include a wide selection of cases and readings.

The cases are not intended as examples of either weak or exceptionally good management practices. Nor, as we noted, do they provide examples of the concepts of a particular reading. They are discussion vehicles for probing the benefits and limits of various approaches. And they are analytical vehicles for applying and testing concepts and tools developed in your education and experience. Cases can have marketing, operations, accounting, financial, human relations, planning and control, external environmental, ethical, political, and quantitative dimensions. Each dimension should be addressed in preparations and classroom discussions, although some aspects will inevitably emerge as more important in one situation than another.

In each case you should look for several sets of issues. First, you should understand what went on in that situation. Why did it happen this way? What are the strong or weak features of what happened? What could have been changed to advantage? How? Why? Second, there are always issues of what should be done next. What are the key issues to be resolved? What are the major alternatives available? What outcomes could the organization expect from each? Which alternative should it select? Why? Third, there will almost always be "hard" quantitative data and "soft" qualitative impressions about each situation. Both deserve attention.

But remember, no realistic strategy situation is just an organization behavior problem or just a financial or economic analytical one. Both sets of information should be considered, and an integrated solution developed. Our cases are consciously constructed for this. Given their complexity we have tried to keep the cases as short as possible. And we have tried to capture some of the flavour of the real organization. Moreover, we have sought to mix product and services cases, technological and "non-tech" cases, entrepreneurial, small company, and large enterprise situations. In this cross section, we have tried to capture some of the most important and exciting issues, concepts, and products of our times. We believe management is fun and important. The cases try to convey this.

There is no "correct" answer to any case. There may be several "good" answers and many poor ones. The purpose of a strategy course should be to help you understand the nature of these "better" answers, what to look for, how to analyze alternatives, and how to see through the complexities of reaching solutions and implanting them in real organizations. A strategy course can only improve your probability of success, not ensure it. The total number of variables in a real strategy situation is typically beyond the control of any one person or group. Hence another caveat; do not rely excessively on performance as a criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a strategy. A company may have succeeded or failed not because of its specific decisions, but because of luck, an outstanding personality, the bizarre action of an opponent, international actions over which it had no control, and so on. One of the products of a successful strategy course should be a little humility.

CASE STUDY GUIDES

In our last edition we posed a few questions at the end of each case. In this edition we decided to drop the questions. A crucial part of reflection and analysis in the classroom, as in the real world, is coming up with the question that really matters. Asking the right question in strategy is analogous to an explorer's finding his or her bearing before starting the journey. There is no standard methodology for coming up with questions: intuition and experience play far too important a role in the process.

The cases provide a rich soil for investigating strategic realities. Their complexities always extend well below the surface. Each layer peeled back can reveal new insights and rewards. Like any good mystery story, a case provides many clues, never all, but, surprisingly, sometimes more than managers might have had time to absorb in the real situation.

Believing that no "canned approach" is viable for all strategic situations, we have selected cases that cut across a variety of issues and theoretical constructs. Almost any of these cases contains sufficient richness and complexity that it can be positioned at a number of different spots in a good strategy course. We leave the final case selection to the style and wisdom of the professor and his or her students.

THIS BOOK'S STRUCTURE

NOT FORMULATION, THEN IMPLEMENTATION

The first edition of this text offered a chapter format that was new to the strategy field. Unlike most others, it had no specific chapter or section devoted to "implementation" per se. The assumption in other texts is that strategy is formulated and then implemented, with organizational structures, control systems, and the like following obediently behind strategy. In this text, as in reality, formulation and implementation are intertwined as complex interactive processes in which politics, values, organizational culture, and management styles determine or constrain particular strategic decisions. And strategy, structure, and systems mix together in complicated ways to influence outcomes. While strategy formulation and implementation may be separated in some situations—perhaps in crises, in some totally new ventures, as well as in organizations facing predictable futures—these events are far from typical. We certainly do not believe in building a whole book (let alone a whole field) around this conceptual distinction.

BUT CONCEPTS, THEN CONTEXTS