Evan Thompson
This work takes a huge step forward in bringing phenomenological philosophy to bear on contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It is a work of major importance that no one thinking about the philosophy and science of consciousness can afford to neglect.
Eduard Marbach
In this very timely book, Dan Zahavi offers a wealth of illuminating discussions centered on an integrated investigation of self, self-awareness, and experience that take the first-personal or subjective dimensions of consciousness seriously. Expertly rooted in philosophical phenomenology of both the Austro-German and French traditions, but also engaging in a critical dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind and developmental psychology and psychiatry, he masterfully develops his case by raising precise questions and painstakingly evaluating argumentative lines to possible answers.
Endorsement
Zahavi delivers a critical phenomenological account of the subjectivity of experience that shows how phenomenology is not just a description but an analysis that can contribute to explanations of consciousness, self, and intersubjectivity. Staying deftly on target, Zahavi challenges higher order representational theory and standard theory-of-mind approaches to social cognition. He pushes the phenomenological envelope and egages in an original way with traditional analytic philosophy of mind and more recent lines of thought that are drawn from the cognitive sciences. To the list of classic phenomenologists from whom Zahavi draws we need to add one more: Zahavi himself.
Shaun Gallagher, Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida
From the Publisher
In this very timely book, Dan Zahavi offers a wealth of illuminating discussions centered on an integrated investigation of self, self-awareness, and experience that take the first-personal or subjective dimensions of consciousness seriously. Expertly rooted in philosophical phenomenology of both the Austro-German and French traditions, but also engaging in a critical dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind and developmental psychology and psychiatry, he masterfully develops his case by raising precise questions and painstakingly evaluating argumentative lines to possible answers.
Eduard Marbach, Professor of Phenomenology and of Philosophy of Mind, University of Bern, Switzerland
This work takes a huge step forward in bringing phenomenological philosophy to bear on contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It is a work of major importance that no one thinking about the philosophy and science of consciousness can afford to neglect.
Evan Thompson, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
Zahvi's book is a valuable contribution to the current interdisciplinary discussion of consciousness. In simple and direct language, he gives us a full phenomenological investigation of subjectivity and selfhood.
David Carr, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Philosophy, Emory University
Zahavi delivers a critical phenomenological account of the subjectivity of experience that shows how phenomenology is not just a description but an analysis that can contribute to explanations of consciousness, self, and intersubjectivity. Staying deftly on target, Zahavi challenges higher order representational theory and standard theory-of-mind approaches to social cognition. He pushes the phenomenological envelope and egages in an original way with traditional analytic philosophy of mind and more recent lines of thought that are drawn from the cognitive sciences. To the list of classic phenomenologists from whom Zahavi draws we need to add one more: Zahavi himself.
Shaun Gallagher, Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida
David Carr
Zahvi's book is a valuable contribution to the current interdisciplinary discussion of consciousness. In simple and direct language, he gives us a full phenomenological investigation of subjectivity and selfhood.
Shaun Gallagher
Zahavi delivers a critical phenomenological account of the subjectivity of experience that shows how phenomenology is not just a description but an analysis that can contribute to explanations of consciousness, self, and intersubjectivity. Staying deftly on target, Zahavi challenges higher order representational theory and standard theory-of-mind approaches to social cognition. He pushes the phenomenological envelope and egages in an original way with traditional analytic philosophy of mind and more recent lines of thought that are drawn from the cognitive sciences. To the list of classic phenomenologists from whom Zahavi draws we need to add one more: Zahavi himself.